China’s Silence Over Russia–North Korea Ties An Opportunity For The US – Analysis

By Alexander Richter

Relations between North Korea and Russia have developed rapidly over the course of 2024. For the first time in two decades, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea, culminating in a mutual defence pact. As a result of ever-closer relations, North Korea sent 10,000 soldiers to fight alongside Russia against Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region.  

This alliance has alarmed officials in Washington and Beijing. Sensing China’s unease with the developing security partnership between Russia and North Korea, the US State Department and European officials have urged China to leverage its influence to halt Pyongyang’s deployment of troops. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has so far remained silent and it is unlikely that US diplomatic pressure on China will persuade North Korea to change course. Instead, US diplomatic efforts should be oriented towards building international consensus with other states to delegitimise North Korean activities.  

To China, North Korea is both a strategic asset and liability. Historically, China and North Korea have maintained a close partnership, signing a mutual defence treaty in 1961 that remains in place today. China accounts for 90 per cent of all trade with North Korea and is an economic lifeline for the Kim regime. But China also views North Korea’s nuclear program as a destabilising force and has supported various efforts to denuclearise the Korean peninsula.  

Russia and North Korea’s security partnership exacerbates China’s insecurities. As Beijing is forced to share influence over Pyongyang with Moscow, North Korea has more room to improve its nuclear capabilities with Russia as an alternative benefactor of security and trade. North Korea’s deployment of troops will also draw unwanted attention from the United States and Europe — an outcome China seeks to avoid. 

Despite these frustrations, Beijing highly values its relationships with Russia and North Korea. China has been instrumental in propping up Russia’s defence industrial base and softening the impact of economic sanctions by exporting US$300 million worth of dual-use materials necessary for Russia’s weapons production.

Although China has held back on directly supplying lethal aid to Russia to avoid triggering Western secondary sanctions, China does not want to see Russia defeated as it remains a strategic deterrent and partner against US coercion. It will certainly work in Beijing’s favour if North Korean soldiers strengthen Russia’s capability without costing China and risking external economic repercussions.

Historically, China’s economic and diplomatic pressure has primarily been geared towardsNorth Korea’s nuclear program. But China refused to condemn North Korea for shelling Yeonpyeong Island, which killed four South Koreans, or for launching a torpedo at a South Korean warship that killed 46. This suggests that China is unlikely to condemn North Korea for the far less destabilising action of sending ground forces into Russia’s Kursk region. 

China’s lack of action so far indicates that North Korea’s troop deployments and engagement with Ukrainian forces do not place China’s ‘strategic security and core interests’ under threat. China almost certainly does not share the US view that North Korea’s support is ‘a dangerous expansion of the conflict, with serious consequences for European and Indo-Pacific security’.

Instead of unilaterally exerting diplomatic pressure, the United States should take this opportunity to shape norms by promoting territorial sovereignty and delegitimising North Korea’s military assistance to Russia.

US–China relations are increasingly dominated by a power politics mindset in which China views the United States as bent on maintaining hegemony, resulting in disillusionment with good-faith diplomacy. Building a broad coalition of states to condemn North Korea’s troop deployments can signal to Beijing that the objective of withdrawing North Korean troops reflects the genuine concerns of the international community, rather than a strategy by Washington to advance US interests in Europe or the Indo-Pacific.   

Part of China’s strategy to shape the global order is to portray itself as a leader and backer of the Global South. As much of the international community opposes Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States has an opportunity to build support among the Global South and co-opt China’s attempts at leadership.

But many Global South countries rely on Russia economically and are unlikely to be receptive to US advances in condemning North Korea’s troop deployments in Russia. Some states, such as Niger’s new military junta, receives direct military support from Moscow. Others are economically dependent on Russia and prefer to balance relations, like India, who has expressed discontent yet has not explicitly condemned Russia’s invasion. 

The United States should identify countries in the Global South that are not susceptible to Russian coercion. It could engage with Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia to coordinate multilateral statements condemning North Korea’s deployment of forces.

Southeast Asian states have criticised the United States for making them ‘pick sides’ in the US–China rivalry. But while picking sides in the US–China context could mean losing out on Chinese investment, Russia does not possess this influence in Southeast Asia.

Diplomacy alone will not ensure Ukraine can end the war on favourable conditions or prevent North Korea from sending troops to Russia. Still, a concerted diplomatic effort to build international consensus condemning North Korea is essential in creating favourable political conditions to support Ukraine and dissuade other states from backing Russia. 

• About the author: Alex Richter is Carnegie China Young Ambassador and Intern at the American Enterprise Institute.
• Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum