Inventing NATO 3.0: Why Rutte Should Bridge EU And US For A Stronger Alliance – Analysis

By Camille Grand

On 1 October 2024, Mark Rutte became the new NATO secretary. The former Dutch prime minister succeeds the former Norwegian prime minister, Jens Stoltenberg, who over his ten-year tenure oversawimpactful transformation – but faced the issue of growing tensions between NATO members.

Rutte’s appointment takes place at a critical time for global diplomacy and security. But he is an experienced and qualified political leader, serving as Dutch prime minister from 2010 to 2024, including in leading a complex coalition government; is an influential figure at the European Council; and recently presided over the Netherlands joining the NATO ‘two per cent club’. Most allies easily endorsed Rutte, despite some hoping for the first female secretary general and more national diversity – issues he can at least partially address when choosing his deputy. But strong support for Rutte from the United States and the larger European nations enabled rapid consensus on the leadership to emerge.

Now comes the hard part. Given the uncertainty regarding America’s upcoming presidential election and how the conflict in Ukraine will develop, Rutte is faced with four immediate challenges:

1. Preserving alliance cohesion and support for Ukraine

The war in Ukraine will enter its fourth year in 2025 and NATO’s unified response is at risk. Dissenting voices already exist in Hungary and Slovakia; in the event of another Donald Trump presidency, the populist parties still questioning the provision of assistance to Kyiv could feel emboldened to step up their opposition. War fatigue and appetite for a compromise settlement also seem present in several Western nations.

In this context, NATO allies may not be able to guarantee long-term assistance to Ukraine. It will be an uphill battle for many pro-Ukrainian politicians in both parliament and public. Behind the NATO Vilnius Summit 2023 and NATO Washington Summit 2024 statements, Ukraine’s accession to the alliance remains a divisive issue which – like every NATO move – requires consensus.

Rutte should spare no efforts to preserve the political unity of the alliance in tackling the complex issue of NATO membership for Ukraine, which has been promised since 2008 and reaffirmed as an objective during both summits. But the accession of Ukraine continues to raise objections. For example, it is unclear if a country at war or which does not control its entire territory can even join NATO; and whether the ascension of Ukraine would be an asset or a liability for the wider alliance.

Rutte will therefore have to set a clean path fulfilling the promised accession once a ceasefire is secured. There are solid military, strategic, and political arguments for bringing Ukraine into NATO early; but it will take nerve to push this agenda forward at pace, given the reluctance of some allies, including the US, to agree to this.

2. Sustaining defence spending and military modernisation

NATO’s track record of increased defence spending is good, but brings rising tensions. Among the allies, nine are not at the agreed two per cent of their GDP; some, such as Belgium and Canada, have only vague plans to reach the ‘magic number’ in the next decade. Many more are under severe fiscal pressure and would happily lower their two per cent commitment, should the security environment improve even marginally.

At the same time, all military and defence experts insist on the importance of a sustained defence effort which should last over a decade or more. This could see defence spending significantly rise above two per cent. Rutte will be held accountable – in Europe as well as Washington, as the spending gap between European countries also widens – for keeping the pressure on all allies and ensuring that defence spending and burden-sharing move in the right direction.

Such pressure is necessary to meet the ambitious military and capability targets, including in defence and manpower, needed to fix existing gaps. These are defined under the demanding NATO defence planning process and assigned to the 32 allies. This is also no longer an optional task; the US is unlikely to cover Europe’s military shortfalls indefinitely.

3. Fixing the NATO-EU relationship

On a political front, the change of NATO and European Union leadership offers an opportunity to revisit their relationship and jointly clarify the EU’s new role in defence. Rutte is a genuine transatlanticistand more familiar with EU processes than his predecessor: but he only has a short window to advance NATO’s defence priorities as the EU develops its plans.

For over two decades, progress between NATO and the EU has been limited, although previously informal relationships have now developed to a good working level between the secretary general and the commission president. But a lack of mutual understanding, ongoing bureaucratic competition between the organisations, and the absence of clear procedures to share information persists. These should be addressed at each organisation’s highest political level, instead of the more bureaucratic traditional approach which also tends to assume that progress will be hampered by Turkish, Cypriot, or Greek opposition.

The US should also review former secretary of state Madeleine Albright’s 1998 “Three Ds” (no duplication, no discrimination, no decoupling) statement: this outdated defensive discourse fails to address the current state of play which pleads for cooperation and mutual recognition of added value.

Whether NATO likes it or not, the EU has become a defence player; rather than competing with or criticising each other, the EU and NATO should use the other’s strengths to establish how the EU can support a robust European pillar in the alliance.

4. Navigating a Trump presidency and changing US priorities

The outcome of the US election remains uncertain. Most, if not all, polls suggest a close call in America’s swing states. NATO needs to prepare for another complex journey, should Trump be elected once again: the Republican candidate has expressed his unwillingness to support “delinquent” allies and suggested he would encourage Russia to attack countries that do not “pay their bills”. He even stated that he would “encourage them [Russia] to do whatever the hell they want.”

At the very minimum, this suggests a return to Trump’s tough stance on burden-sharing and signals his poor understanding of alliances. Under the most extreme scenario, it could threaten the robustness of the 75-year-old NATO. Many on both sides of the Atlantic still hope that Trump 2.0 would be essentially a redux of Trump 1.0: a difficult, more transactional, but ultimately manageable presidency, which NATO can muddle through.

But this semi-optimistic prediction ignores some profound differences with 2016.

• First and foremost, the war in Europe makes an unpredictable US president more problematic for the alliance – a Trump victory would embolden those arguing for major policy shifts on Ukraine, including Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban.
• Although the composition of Trump’s cabinet is unknown, a major difference with his first term is that he is likely to be surrounded by individuals more aligned with his views. They are therefore likelier to transform his instincts into policy, rather than counteract them.
• Trump-leaning think tanks and high-profile cabinet candidates all share a tough approach in the burden-sharing debate and expect the Europeans to do more. While some in the Republican tribessuggest a relatively traditional “peace through strength” approach, others defend more extreme attitudes such a “dormant NATO”.
• Last but not least, the debate on Ukraine could swiftly sour if Trump attempts to force a deal on Ukraine like that suggested by JD Vance. This is an approach that most Europeans fear.

It remains to be seen how well Rutte can prepare for another Trump administration. The NATO secretary general should do his utmost to preserve a solid transatlantic link, and Rutte benefits by having some direct experience of previously dealing with Trump. The burden-sharing debate should enable the new NATO chief to engage the new US administration with convincing arguments about its recent progress – although Trump could still add new demands and raise the bar to three per cent. Rutte should also keep the European allies united in their messaging. If Trump become president, Rutte needs to prevent or mitigate the widespread temptation for NATO allies to bi-lateralise the US security relationship at the expense of a functioning alliance. Although Rutte has strong cards to play, this could easily become a pressing challenge.

Inventing NATO 3.0

Whether under a Donald Trump or Kamala Harris administration, at best the US commitment to European security will remain stable and severely constrained. The European theatre is competing for US military resources in a difficult fiscal environment; China has become the ‘pacing challenge’ for the US military and Washington is facing polarised domestic debates regardless of the election outcome.

The changing of the guard presents an opportunity for a serious transatlantic conversation on what a ‘more European’ NATO 3.0 could look like. This requires a deeper debate on the level of ambition of the European pillar of the alliance; the evolving role and scope of the US security commitment; the new role of the EU; the evaluation of NATO’s long-term role in addressing Russia and China; and the future of transatlantic relations.

Rutte will have to balance tackling urgent tasks with a bolder mid-term approach. His leadership has the potential to adapt NATO for a changing global political environment and simultaneously support the ambitious immediate military transformation of the alliance.

• About the author: Camille Grand is a Distinguished Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He leads the organisation’s work on defence and disruptive technologies in European security.
• Source: This article was published by ECFR. The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.