Does Russia Want To Increase Tension In BRICS? – OpEd

Just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China announced to much fanfare a “no limits friendship” with Russia, suggesting a future of close collaboration in trade, energy and, perhaps most importantly, security.

Now, more than two years into the war, the meaning and interpretation of this “no-limits” commitment has evolved. There has been much debate in Chinese society in recent months about Beijing’s alignment with Moscow. While some have advocated for a more formal alliance with Russia, others have taken a more cautious stance. In sharp contrast to 2022, China’s growing wariness is increasingly being discussed in the open, even among those who were previously censored.

In early 2022, for instance, a joint letter by a group Chinese experts opposing Russia’s invasion was censored by the government. The scholars were also warned. Now, however, it appears the government is seeking to balance its relationships with both Russia and the West. Beijing may not want to be seen as a “decisive enabler” of the war.

For example, the once-prominent “no-limits” friendship language quietly vanished from a Sino-Russian joint statement. And Beijing’s response to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visits that month was notably subdued. Putin ingratiated himself with Xi, saying they were “as close as brothers”. Xi’s response was more perfunctory – he called Putin a “good friend and a good neighbor”. Scholars are also articulating their concerns about China’s political and economic investments in Russia, both publicly and privately.

Shen Dingli, a leading scholar of Chinese security strategy at Fudan University in Shanghai, said China doesn’t want to be seen as collaborating with Russia against Ukraine or any other country. He also quoted Fu Cong, China’s former ambassador to the European Union, who said last year the “no-limits” [friendship] is “nothing but rhetoric”. And in August, after Putin referred to China as an “ally” during a visit to far-eastern Russia, Chinese scholars promptly sought to clarify this statement to prevent any misunderstanding China wants a formal alliance with Russia.

These statements carry weight. In many respects, leading Chinese scholars at the government-affiliated universities act as propagandists to convey and justify the government’s stance on issues. As a result, subtle shifts in their commentary provide insights into the strategic mindset in Beijing.

WHY CHINA IS RETHINKING ITS ‘NO-LIMITS’ FRIENDSHIP?

There are three elements driving this re-evaluation of the Russia-China alignment. First, there is growing skepticism of Russia’s state capacities. The mutiny by the Wagner Group last year and Ukraine’s recent incursion into Russia’s Kursk region have prompted critical reassessments in Beijing of Russia’s political stability and military preparedness, as well as the growing anti-war sentiment in Russia. 

As Feng Yujun, director of Fudan University’s Russia and Central Asia Study Centre, argued, the Wagner rebellion was a reflection of Russia’s internal conflicts and domestic security challenges. He noted every time Russia has faced both internal and external crises in history, its regimes have become less stable. More recently, Feng has been even bolder, predicting a Russian defeat in Ukraine. He argued China should keep its distance from Moscow and resume a policy of “non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-partisanship”.

Second, China’s sluggish economy and its underwhelming trade with Russia have further exposed how dependent both countries are on the West. The relationship heavily favors Beijing. Russia accounts for only 4% of China’s trade, while China accounts for nearly 22% of Russia’s trade. Many Chinese experts are now warning against an over-dependence on Russia, instead calling for more cooperation with neighboring countries. This echoes a recent concern Russia has been using its natural resources as a bargaining chip to extract greater benefits from China.

RUSSIA’S VALUE AS A MILITARY ALLY

Finally, there are rising Chinese concerns its international outlook does not align with Russia’s. Zhao Long, deputy director of the Shanghai Institute of International Relations, says there is an important difference in how they view the world: Russia wants to destroy the current international system to build a new one. China wants to transform the current system by taking a more prominent place in it.

Shi Yinhong, a strategist at Renmin University in Beijing, has highlighted an unbridgeable gap preventing a stronger China-Russia alliance. He says there’s a deep mutual distrust on regional security. Russia has never promised support for China in the event of a conflict over Taiwan, just as China has avoided involvement in the war in Ukraine. As Russia’s war in Ukraine reaches a stalemate, its value as a military ally is increasingly being questioned in China.

Recently, Feng Yujun warned China risks being led by the nose by Russia, despite being the stronger economic partner. He says every time China has attempted an alliance with Russia in history, it has had negative consequences for China. Consequently, it is crucial for China to maintain its long-term partnership with Russia without undermining its constructive relationship with the West. Russia has arguably benefited from the current competition between the US and China, as it has sought to exploit the rivalry for its own benefit. But this has also led to uncertainty in the China-Russia relationship.

As another analyst argues, relying too heavily on Russia will leave China isolated and vulnerable. And this is not a position China wants to be in.

INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER’S VISIT FOR SHANGAI COOPERATION SUMMIT IN PAKISTAN

Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar travelled to Islamabad for a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, while Canada accuses six Indian diplomats of involvement in threats and attacks against Sikh separatists, and Bangladesh’s foreign secretary visits Washington. 

Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar traveled to Islamabad for a high-level Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit—marking the first time an Indian foreign minister has traveled to Pakistan since 2015 and the first time any Indian minister has visited the country since Defense Minister Rajnath Singh since 2016. During his roughly 24-hour visit Jaishankar participated in meeting and other activities with Pakistani officials present, but there were no bilateral engagements. 

JAYASHANKAR VISIT SIGNALS INDIAN COMMITMENT TO SCO

That is no surprise: Jaishankar’s trip was intended to signal India’s commitment to the SCO, not to strengthen ties with Islamabad. Prior to his trip, Jaishankar said he wouldn’t do any one-on-one meetings with Pakistani officials. The visit comes a month and a half after he declared that the “era of uninterrupted dialogue with Pakistan” was over.

New Delhi’s position is firm: Until Islamabad deals with terrorist groups on its soil that threaten India, there can be no talks. India has doubled down on this stance since January 2016, when militants attacked an Indian Air Force base days after Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a surprise visit to Pakistan—the last time an Indian minister traveled to Pakistan solely for bilateral reasons. 

That Jaishankar visited Pakistan despite these tensions reflects the importance that India attaches to the SCO. New Delhi values its membership in several monoliteral groupings—including the SCO, BRICS, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, among others. They enable India to amplify its support for multipolarity and reflect its strategic autonomy.

The SCO is especially important for India because its membership and focus emphasize Central Asia—a region where New Delhi is keen to ramp up ties but faces an inherent constraint with its outreach. India lacks direct land access to Central Asia because Pakistan—itself looking to expand ties there—denies it transit trade rights. This elevates the importance of any opportunity for Indian high-level engagement with the region. 

In recent years, Modi has convened dialogues with Central Asian leaders to signal India’s commitment to partnership—and New Delhi sent Jaishankar to Islamabad to amplify that message. However, Jaishankar’s visit does show a degree of stabilization in India-Pakistan bilateral ties. The relationship plunged to a new low in 2019 following another terrorist attack in India carried out by Pakistan-sponsored militants, a brief military crisis, and New Delhi’s decision to strip Indian-administered Kashmir of its autonomy. But in 2021, India and Pakistan signed a new truce along their disputed border, easing tensions. 

CONCLUSION

Today, China’s productivity is nearly double that of India. While 45% of Indian workers are still in the highly unproductive agriculture sector, China has graduated even from simple, labor-intensive manufacturing to emerge, for example, as a dominant force in global car markets, especially in electric vehicles.

China is also better prepared for future opportunities. Seven Chinese universities are ranked among the world’s top 100, with Tsinghua and Peking among the top 20. Tsinghua is considered the world’s leading university for computer science, while Peking is ranked ninth. Likewise, nine Chinese universities are among the top 50 globally in mathematics. By contrast, no Indian university, including the celebrated Indian Institutes of Technology, is ranked among the world’s top 100.

Chinese scientists have made significant strides in boosting the quantity and quality of their research, particularly in fields such as chemistry, engineering, and materials science, and could soon take the lead in artificial intelligence. As the figure shows, Chinese researchers, both in academia and industry, are rapidly generating high-quality patents. Since the mid-1980s, Indian and international observers have predicted that the authoritarian Chinese hare would eventually falter, and the democratic Indian tortoise would win the race.

Recent events – China’s harsh zero-COVID restrictions, rising youth unemployment, and the adverse repercussions of the Chinese authorities’ ham-handed efforts to rein in the country’s overgrown real-estate sector and large tech companies – seem to support this view. But while China, with its deep well of human capital and greater gender equality, stands poised at the frontiers of both the old and the new economies, Indian leaders and their international counterparts tout an ahistorical ability to leapfrog over a fragile human foundation with shiny digital and physical infrastructure. China has a plausible path through its current muddle. India, by contrast, risks falling into blind alleys of unfounded optimism.