Vietnam Must Manage Its Trump-Era Expectations – Analysis

By Lena Le

On 5 November 2024, the US presidential election drew global attention. In Vietnam, a survey conducted by Tuoi Tre indicated that 76 per cent of respondents supported president-elect Donald Trump, while 24 per cent preferred Vice President Kamala Harris. A VnExpress poll similarly reported 80 per cent backing for Trump. This remarkable level of support is echoed on Facebook and TikTok, where many Vietnamese users appear to favour the president-elect.

This preference among Vietnamese social media users may stem from viewing Trump — known for his assertive rhetoric — as a leader capable of reasserting US global leadership. They may also believe he will promote regional stability and assist Vietnam in the South China Sea. But regardless of the motivations behind this support, it would be prudent to temper expectations concerning this assumption.

Vietnam will need to swiftly navigate shifts in bilateral trade policies, the long-term consequences of delayed climate action and pressures arising from US–China competition. The US–Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership forged in 2023 importantly does not directly translate into US policies that safeguard Vietnam in disputes.

Trump’s previous term and his campaign promises suggest that his administration will pursue fair trade policies, which he positions as essential to creating more US jobs. During Trump’s prior administration, Vietnam agreed to a US$21 billion purchase of Boeing aircraft to help mitigate its trade deficit with the United States. The United States’ trade deficit in goods with Vietnam reached US$104 billion in 2023, placing Vietnam among the top three countries with the highest trade imbalance with the United States. A renewed Trump administration will likely prioritise reducing this deficit as a matter of urgency.

Trump’s preference for bilateral trade agreements — viewed as more effective in addressing trade imbalances — may prompt a US withdrawal from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, established by US President Joe Biden. This speculation is rooted in Trump’s previous actions, including withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership on his first day in office in 2017, which was a blow to Hanoi.

A second Trump administration also plans to impose tariffs of 10–20 per cent on imported goods. Such tariffs would significantly affect Vietnamese exporters, as the United States has been Vietnam’s largest export market in recent years. Industries such as seafood, textiles, tires, furniture and steel would face considerable difficulties, as increased import costs would likely reduce US demand.

Trump would have several legal bases to justify these tariffs, including Section 232, Section 301, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and Section 122 Balance of Payments Authority. These enable the US president to adjust imports if deemed a national security threat, to address unfair trade practices and to impose temporary import surcharges or quotas to manage balance of payments issues.

One should not assume that an increase in tariffs of 40–60 per cent on Chinese goods would automatically benefit Vietnam. The US–China trade war initially drove some companies towards Vietnam as an alternative manufacturing hub. But in a 2019 interview, Trump accused Vietnam of exploiting the trade dispute to expand its exports to the United States. He called the country ‘the single worst abuser of everybody’ and suggested it might become the next trade target.

Trump’s trend of withdrawing from multilateral agreements could also lead to a US exit from the Paris Agreement on climate change. While this may not immediately affect Vietnam, it could undercut collective efforts to reduce carbon emissions and transition to renewable energy sources. This is particularly concerning for Vietnam, which ranks among the five countries most vulnerable to climate change.

In 2023, Vietnam and the United States elevated their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Vietnam’s highest diplomatic designation. But given Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy — even with close allies — he has often voiced dissatisfaction with what he perceives as an undue burden on the United States. Trump has previously threatened to withdraw US forces from allied nations and pressured allies to substantially increase their financial contributions to US troop presence in 2020. This precedent raises questions about the extent of support the United States might provide to Vietnam under its partnership, particularly in the face of external challenges.

Amid the increasingly intense US–China rivalry and Trump’s diplomatic brinkmanship, the president-elect may also demand that Vietnam make greater contributions to US policies in the region. It is possible that Trump may even pressure Vietnam to take sides between the United States and China. These decisions could pertain to security, defence and technological solutions. This poses a challenge that Vietnam has consistently sought to avoid.

The Vietnam–US relationship is strategically significant for both sides due to geostrategic and economic considerations. But it will likely face challenges under a renewed ‘America First’ approach that emphasises bilateralism, prioritises US interests and holds allies and partners accountable to US demands.

• About the author: Lena Le is Head of the Division of International Relations at the Faculty of International Affairs, Vietnam National University, Hanoi.
• Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum