After The War Is Over – OpEd

One day the fighting in Gaza will end – how or when remains a matter of speculation, hope or despair.  ​With the latest Witkoff ceasefire formula in the balance and Israel’s “Operation Gideon’s Chariots” ​in full swing, a final end to the conflict could be months or even years away.​

Nevertheless Gaza cannot remain a devastated battleground forever, even if – as prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced to the media on May 5 – the IDF holds on to conquered areas of the Strip until Hamas is well and truly cleared from them;  or – a possibility reported in the media three days later – the US leads a temporary post-war administration for a while.  A “day after” will undoubtedly arrive, and on that day a fully-prepared plan for reconstruction will be needed, primed and ready to be put into effect.

An early vision of a possible future for Gaza was announced to an astonished world by Trump on February 4, 2025.  He declared that he intended the US to take over ownership of the Gaza Strip and convert it into the “Riviera of the Middle East”.

His proposal sent shock waves through the region, but when he then suggested that the entire Gazan civilian population should be resettled in neighboring countries during the development process, he faced a torrent of dissent from the world at large, and the Arab world in particular.  

To counter Trump’s proposals, Egypt took the lead in formalizing ideas already in circulation for reconstructing, developing and administering post-war Gaza.  An Arab summit was hastily convened, and on March 4 the Egypt-led post-Gaza-war plan was officially unveiled.  The comprehensive reconstruction plan was approved and adopted unanimously.  

Since then it has gained significant traction among international stakeholders including the UN, the EU, and the African Union.  UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres “strongly endorsed” the Egyptian plan, saying the UN stood ready to cooperate fully in implementing it.  

The Egyptian initiative addresses both immediate humanitarian needs and the long-term governance and reconstruction of Gaza.  It envisages a three-phase process: first, immediate humanitarian action;  then a multi-year reconstruction effort; and finally establishing a new governance structure for Gaza. 

The first phase is planned to be completed in about six months; the rebuilding and governance reforms are estimated to last about a further four to five years.

The plan explicitly excludes Hamas from any involvement in the future governance of Gaza.  It also bars the Palestinian Authority (PA) from direct administrative control, but it does envisage an umbrella-type council composed of Palestinian technocrats, operating under the auspices of the PA but supported by an international Governance Assistance Mission.  In addition, to maintain security during the transition, it proposes the establishment of an International Stabilization Force to be led by Arab states.

It is obvious that the cost of rebuilding Gaza’s towns and cities and their infrastructure will be astronomic.  Egypt’s three-phase plan puts it at $53 billion, to be expended over 5 years.  For the first six months of humanitarian relief, the reconstruction program is costed at $3 billion.  Phase two, which would involve rebuilding infrastructure such as roads and utilities, and constructing 200,000 permanent housing units, would cost some £20 billion.  The final phase, lasting two-and-a-half years and costing $30 billion, aims to complete infrastructure, build another 200,000 housing units, and develop industrial zones, ports, and an airport.

To finance this $53 billion plan, Egypt proposes establishing an internationally supervised trust fund to receive, channel and manage financial support from a wide range of international donors.  The initiative envisages a broad coalition of donors including the UN, global financial institutions, the wealthier Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the European Union, and other international bodies.

Although it is widely supported, the US and Israel have reservations, such as the lack of explicit measures for the disarmament of Hamas, the involvement of the PA, and the potential engagement of UNRWA. 

Hopes of the reconstruction plan being ready for action as soon as the fighting ends were dashed at the Arab summit held in Baghdad on May 17.  In his speech Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi said that Egypt plans to host an international conference for the reconstruction of Gaza, “once the aggression stops”. ​He seems to need the expressions of approval for his plan to be backed by commitment.  Nevertheless Iraq’s prime minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, said that Iraq will work on setting up an Arab fund for the reconstruction of the region in which Baghdad will pay $20 million for Gaza and a similar amount for Lebanon.​  

In their closing media release, the Arab leaders reiterated their opposition to Trump’ s idea of displacing Gazan civilians.  Any such move, they said, would be “a crime against humanity.” 

In line with the Egyptian plan, Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, called on Hamas to abandon power in Gaza and, along with other militant groups, hand over its weapons to the PA. 

In fact a large question mark looms over Hamas’s true attitude toward the Egyptian proposals.

On March 5, the day after the Arab League had unanimously endorsed the plan, Hamas issued a statement praising Egypt’s role in devising it, and urging “all necessary steps to guarantee its success”.  It framed this statement as support for Palestinian-led reconstruction, and made no mention of its own exclusion from the future governance of Gaza.  

The truth is that Hamas probably aims to retain a controlling presence through local networks, civil servants, and security forces. Moreover the plan’s lack of explicit disarmament clauses could allow it to retain some form of military capability.  This issue will need to be resolved if Saudi Arabia and UAE funding is to be secured to implement the plan.  Both states demand not only Hamas’s exclusion from any part of the governance of post-war Gaza, but also its total disarmament.

In essence, Hamas’s acceptance of the Egyptian plan is a survival tactic aimed at securing a foothold in post-war Gaza, while retaining as its long-term strategy the total elimination of Israel through armed conflict.  

Whether Egypt’s plan, or any modification of it, ever sees the light of day depends on a range of unforeseeable and imponderable factors.  Nevertheless, instead of hanging fire and waiting for the fighting to end before holding a conference to finalize the details, as Egypt seems to be suggesting, the plan’s supporters should expend every effort to ensure that any problems have been ironed out, and that it is ready to swing into action the moment the conflict has formally ended.