The Annexation Of Taiwan In Xi Jinping’s Timeline – OpEd

The conflict between China and Taiwan regarding independence or annexation has persisted since the end of World War II. However, since the mid-2000s, this issue has escalated significantly, largely due to the intensifying global competition in economic, political, and geopolitical spheres between the United States and China, which has become a defining element of the new world order. Additionally, Taiwan’s transformation into a major hub for semiconductor production—crucial to modern industrial, technological, financial, and logistical advancements—has heightened tensions among Beijing, Taipei, and Washington.

Taiwan’s strategic geographical location further underscores its importance. China is encircled by archipelagos hosting U.S. military bases and allied nations. For the United States, Taiwan serves as a critical pressure point on China’s access routes, whereas for China, it represents the “first island chain.” By integrating Taiwan and artificial islands under construction, China aims to complete its Anti-access/Area denial (A2/AD) strategy in the Western Pacific, thereby disrupting the U.S. containment efforts.

In 1972, Mao Zedong told Richard Nixon that Beijing could wait a century to reclaim Taiwan. However, Xi Jinping appears far less patient. According to U.S. intelligence, Xi has instructed the People’s Liberation Army to be ready for an operation to annex Taiwan by 2027. Various factors, however, could accelerate this timeline, potentially prompting a forcible annexation sooner.

Taiwan seeks independence and requires the support of a major power to counter China, making the United States its best ally. Taiwan leverages its semiconductor production capabilities to gain this support. It manufactures over 60% of the world’s advanced digital, analog, and mixed-signal chips, serving as a primary supplier to U.S. tech companies and defense contractors. Moreover, Taiwan fully cooperates with U.S. sanctions against China, especially regarding the use of integrated circuits made by Taiwanese companies like TSMC, thereby intensifying China’s determination to pursue Taiwan’s annexation more seriously.

China urgently needs specialized microelectronics, currently produced in Taiwan, to develop its military technologies and AI-related industries. To achieve this, China faces two options: either integrate its domestic production with the latest global technology—a challenging task due to Western sanctions preventing companies like ASML from selling chip-making machines to China—or annex Taiwan to utilize its top-tier manufacturing capabilities.

The potential transformation of Taiwan into a strategic military base for U.S. and NATO forces could prompt China to act preemptively. Under the pretext of aiding Taipei against an imminent Chinese attack, the U.S. aims to bolster its military presence on the island, solidifying its foothold near China’s borders. Presently, China is surrounded by U.S. and allied forces: to the northeast by Japan, South Korea, and Okinawa; to the south by Australia and New Zealand; and to the east by the Marshall Islands, Mariana Islands, and Guam, home to active U.S. military personnel. Given this encirclement and the placement of nuclear submarines and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUA), ballistic missiles (IRBM, ICBM, SLBM), B2 bombers in the Andersen Guam base, as well as the deployment of the navy’s 7th in the region, China views Taiwan as crucial to connecting with other recently constructed artificial islands to effectively implement its A2/AD strategy.

Considering the geographical positioning of U.S. forces in the Western Pacific, the capabilities of A2/AD systems will be crucial upon the first shot being fired. Advanced weaponry like hypersonic missiles, unless integrated with reliable A2/AD monitoring systems, will be ineffective in detecting, locating, and tracking enemy ships and aircraft. In such a scenario, Taiwan would serve as both the first and last line of defense for both sides. Should Beijing perceive Taiwan as becoming such a strategic position for the Western alliance, it would promptly initiate an early operation against Taiwan.

Another factor potentially accelerating China’s 2027 timeline is the U.S. presidential election. If Kamala Harris wins the election, NATO’s Indo-Pacific policy and the vision of NATO 2030 will likely continue, intensifying the military presence of the Atlantic alliance in East Asia and the Pacific. Taiwan’s geographical significance in this context will be more pronounced than ever. Conversely, if Donald Trump wins, the situation could differ. Trump’s non-interventionist rhetoric, aimed at reducing financial and human costs for American soldiers, could create an environment more conducive to China’s ambitions. Beijing would exploit the isolationist policies of a new administration to further its goal of reclaiming Taiwan.

Currently, China is disinclined to engage in a conflict over Taiwan, which could lead to a direct confrontation with the U.S. and its regional allies, as the economic and financial repercussions would be severe. Instead, China continues to make implicit threats and conduct military drills around Taiwan, such as the “Joint Sword A-2024” exercise, to maintain a constant threat over Taiwan and potential Western actions. However, if conditions change and certain factors emerge, China might act against Taiwan sooner than the end of this decade or 2027. If Western sanctions on Chinese technology intensify and the U.S. significantly widens its technological and military lead, Beijing will take decisive action to annex Taiwan, a key to 21st-century advancements. Should Washington expand the Indo-Pacific NATO idea and integrate Taiwan as a critical military outpost, it would be akin to chaining the wings of the Chinese dragon. In such a scenario, the People’s Liberation Army would launch a swift, decisive, and surprise operation to seize Taiwan.

If Trump enters the White House, his anti-NATO, non-interventionist, and anti-coalition policies would offer a glimmer of hope for Beijing. This would embolden Chinese leaders to pursue the annexation of Taiwan. If Beijing realizes that the U.S. is unwilling to bear the substantial costs of protecting Taipei’s political aspirations, it will seize the opportunity to annex the island.