Myanmar: The Arakan Army Battles For Legitimacy – Analysis

By Htet Hlaing Win

On 20 December 2024, the Arakan Army (AA) announced that it had captured the headquarters of the Myanmar junta’s Western Command — one of 14 similar commands scattered throughout the country. The Western Command was the second to fall into rebel hands, the first being the Northeastern Command, which was taken by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army in August 2024. The AA holds 13 of the 17 townships in Rakhine State and declared in October 2024 that it would transform the whole state into a junta-free zone.

The AA is attempting to govern the territories it has captured by establishing infrastructure and providing public services, like levying taxes, initiating a vaccine program and introducing a judicial program. But despite significant military advances in 2024, the AA faces considerable obstacles in achieving liberation from Burmese domination, as formulated in their doctrine, ‘The Way of Rakhita’. It emphasises the right of Rakhine people to create their own destiny, free from external influence. Having captured a large swath of territory and enjoying popular support from Arakanese people, the AA has begun portraying itself as the legitimate government of Arakan by creating so-called ‘departments’ to implement policies and provide public services.

But the AA is experiencing an international legitimacy crisis. Its status as a rebel group has hindered its attempt to engage with other countries on an equal basis. Though Bangladeshi authorities initially declined any contact with the AA, the country’s home advisor admitted that the government maintains links with both the AA and the junta to protect Bangladeshi interests. The Myanmar–Bangladesh border being under AA control has prompted Bangladesh to establish an unofficial channel with the AA. Yet the AA still has a long way to go before being recognised as the legitimate government of Arakan.

Trade between Rakhine State and Bangladesh has halted. The last cargo vessel to leave Maungdaw in Rakhine State arrived in Bangladesh on 3 December 2024. Though the AA has attempted to revive stalled trade, Dhaka has not responded favourably. In December 2024, a consignment of rice sacks, accompanied by a tax receipt signed by an AA official was seized at a Bangladeshi port.

There is some hope that the AA will gain recognition. In March 2024, representatives from the AA met with an Indian MP to discuss the construction of a road under the Indian-funded Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project. This indicates it may only be a matter of time before both domestic and foreign stakeholders engage with the new reality in Arakan.

Whether Bangladesh will establish a relationship with the AA partially depends on whether the AA is willing to accept Rohingya refugees. Bangladesh’s foreign advisor has stressed that ‘peace and stability in the region would remain unattainable without resolving the Rohingya crisis, which necessitates their safe and secure repatriation to Myanmar’. Bangladesh has declared that it will no longer accept additional Rohingya refugees. With the AA having near–complete control of Rakhine State, the responsibility falls on the AA to take the lead in repatriation efforts. The way in which the AA handles the issue could affect its image internationally.

Rohingya activists stationed in third countries consistently criticise the AA’s high-handed treatment of Rohingya civilians. 28 Rohingya organisations have called on the AA to uphold the rights of ethnic minorities. A report published in November 2024 states that the AA killed dozens of Rohingya with aerial bombs in August and forcibly evacuated them from Maungdaw town without providing assistance. These events underscore the tension between the AA and the Rohingya population.

The AA harbors prejudices against the Rohingyas, describing Rohingya armed groups such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army as ‘Muslim extremists’. This attitude stems from the fact that these groups collaborated with the junta and were involved in violence. The junta’s forceful conscription of Rohingyas into the military only exacerbated existing racial conflict. The way in which the AA resolves the Rohingya issue will decide whether it is hailed as a benevolent force or condemned as another genocidal armed actor.

International human rights watch group Fortify Rights recently published a statementcondemning AA for human right violations. The statement cited footage of AA soldiers torturing and executing two individuals who seem to be captured Rohingya soldiers from the junta’s army and urged the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate. Although AA had admitted to the killings, it had rejected the ICC’s involvement as unnecessary, arguing that it has necessary mechanisms in place to deal with such cases. The case is one among many in which the international perception of AA can change due to the way it handles Rohingya issues. 

Beyond the Rohingya question, the Arakan region as a whole faces a severe humanitarian crisis. The AA’s siege and the junta’s irresponsibility have caused starvation in some towns and the conflict has led to insufficient medical aid. Those fleeing Arakan to other regions are facing various difficulties, such as rising rents, discrimination and restriction on movement. Refugees sheltering in the Ramree township are in need of urgent help and 2 million Rakhine residents are on the brink of starvation. Cyclone Mocha — which made landfall on Rakhine coast — destroyed basic infrastructure and 85 per cent of existing camps for internally displaced persons (IDP). In Sittwe, only 10,634 of the 76,090 IDPs received assistance. Some people do not have homes to return to, as towns and villages were razed by the junta’s airstrikes. The AA needs to rebuild the Arakan region from scratch before it can function fully again — with much left to do for the AA to become a legitimate government.

• About the author: Htet Hlaing Win is a former student at University of Yangon, Myanmar. He now works as a contributor to Myanmar session for Asia in Review published by the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance
• Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum.