Ukraine’s Defeat, A Joint Victory For Russia And China – OpEd
Recent changes in the foreign policy approach of the United States under Donald Trump’s leadership concerning the Ukraine issue have had widespread global repercussions, raising fundamental doubts about the country’s commitment to its allies, including Ukraine and Taiwan.
The open rift between President Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has surprised the world. These developments have been accompanied by a temporary suspension of military aid and intelligence cooperation with Ukraine, seemingly designed to pressure Kyiv into accepting a ceasefire favorable to Russia. Such an approach not only diverges from the traditional patterns of U.S. foreign policy but also signals a redefinition of the country’s strategic priorities, with potential profound consequences for the international order, particularly in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region.
During his campaign, Trump committed to ending Russia’s war against Ukraine shortly after returning to power, without distinguishing between the aggressor and the victim. His recent statements, including the false claim that Ukraine should never have started the war or that Ukraine might one day become part of Russia, along with questioning the legitimacy of Zelensky’s government and initiating direct talks with Moscow, indicate a significant shift in U.S. policy. This stance not only contradicts the long-standing policy of isolating Russia due to its aggression, but it also seems to align more closely with Kremlin narratives. This shift has fueled doubts about the sustainability of U.S. commitments to its allies worldwide, particularly Taiwan.
This policy shift is rooted in a growing view among the radical wing of the Republican Party, which identifies China—not Russia—as the primary threat to U.S. national security in the 21st century. Prominent figures like Elbridge Colby, the nominated deputy of Pentagon defense policy, and Pete Hegseth, Trump’s appointed Secretary of Defense, argue that, in order to effectively counter China’s global ambitions, the U.S. must redirect its resources from Europe and the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific region. Colby, during his Senate confirmation hearing, emphasized the necessity of preventing China from establishing regional hegemony, describing Taiwan’s fall to Beijing as a strategic disaster for U.S. interests. He also warned that America’s ability to support simultaneous conflicts in three regions—Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific—is limited, hence recommending reduced support for Ukraine as a necessary step to focus on the China threat.
This viewpoint was also reflected in Hegseth’s statements. After meeting NATO allies in Brussels, he announced that withdrawal from Ukraine was part of a strategy to refocus on the Indo-Pacific region, and that responsibility for defending Europe should largely rest with European countries. Hegseth emphasized that deterrence in the Pacific could only be achieved through U.S. leadership. This position aligns with the bipartisan consensus in the U.S., which now sees East Asia as the main theater for global strategic competition, with China’s ambitions and its growing military power posing a serious threat to the U.S. and its democratic allies. However, these shifting priorities are not without challenges, as the Europe and Indo-Pacific fronts are intricately linked due to the strategic cooperation between Russia and China.
Relations between Russia and China have reached unprecedented levels since the announcement of their “unlimited partnership” in February 2022, just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This cooperation, reaffirmed by Chinese President Xi Jinping on the third anniversary of the war, is deeply entrenched at all levels, especially geopolitically. China has directly aided Russia’s war machine by providing financial resources, geopolitical intelligence, and opening its markets to Russian companies and natural resources under sanctions. In return, Russia has increased its military cooperation with China—such as joint military drills in the Sea of Japan and a joint bomber flight by both countries near Alaska in 2024, which was intercepted by the U.S. for the first time. The two countries have also strengthened each other’s positions globally through coordinated media and information operations.
This strategic synergy complicates the analysis of the impact of America’s new foreign policy. China supports Russia’s victory in Ukraine, as such an outcome not only weakens the image and credibility of the West as a united front but also portrays NATO as a fragile institution lacking executive power. This creates doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees among its allies. This is exactly the goal China has pursued for decades as part of its revisionist vision of the global order. More importantly, Russia’s success in Ukraine could provide a model for China’s strategic objective of annexing Taiwan. For this reason, the Taiwanese government, which has welcomed U.S. support for Ukraine over the past three years, is deeply concerned about Washington’s shift in approach.
Taiwan now finds itself in a sensitive and complex position. During Trump’s first term, his approach to strengthening relations with Taiwan—including arms sales to the island and supporting its stance against China—earned him significant popularity among Taiwanese politicians and people, as well as supporters of tough policies against Beijing in the U.S. However, his recent statements, including criticism of Taipei for its low defense spending and its dominance in the chip industry, along with threats to impose tariffs on semiconductors, have cast doubt on his resolve to continue supporting Taiwan.
French President Emmanuel Macron, before his meeting with Trump, warned that weakness against Putin would undermine U.S. credibility in confronting China, which could have implications for future U.S.-European cooperation in East Asia. He is right. If the war in Ukraine ends in a way that favors Russia due to policies implemented by Trump, China and Russia will have greater freedom of action in the Indo-Pacific region. Instead of facing a cautious China and a distracted Russia, the U.S. would be confronted with a bolder China and a victorious Russia, while its allies would view Washington’s commitments and capabilities with increasing skepticism.
Treating Ukraine as merely a European issue, a stance strongly advocated by policymakers in Trump’s second term, is an erroneous and ineffective attempt to address the growing power of China globally. A failure in Europe would not only mean a strategic setback in the Indo-Pacific region but also a reordering of the international order in favor of the China-Russia axis—an outcome that both Taiwan and America’s Western allies fear. Unfortunately, there is no sign of Trump and his supporters halting these harmful policies, leaving the West defenseless against the destructive consequences of this strategy. Unless Europe and other hesitant U.S. allies develop and pursue a strategy independent of America, they may find themselves too late to act.
