The Funan Techo Canal And Vietnam’s Maritime-Continental Dilemma – Analysis
By ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
By Nguyen The Phuong
Since the establishment of the modern Vietnamese nation-state in 1945, the country’s grand strategy has revolved around two pillars: “building” and “defending”. Before 1975, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) focused on two main tasks: “building” socialism in the North, while “fighting” against the southern regime and liberating the South from American imperialism.[1]
This process was largely continental in nature, with most of the “fighting” and “building” taking place on land. The continental West and North were the main sources of Vietnam’s security concerns and formed the pillars of its defence strategy, as evidenced by its wars with China and the Khmer Rouge. After 1991, with the resolution of the Cambodian issue, Vietnam shifted its focus towards the “building” pillar. At the same time, the country has increasingly turned to the maritime East for its economic prosperity.
On 5 August 2024, Cambodia broke ground for the Funan Techo Canal Project, generating new tensions between Vietnam and Cambodia and sparking debates over its security implications for Vietnam. As Vietnam shifts its attention towards the “maritime” East, this project brings back bitter memories of the “continental” West that presented a grave security threat to the country during the 1970s and 1980s. Vietnam now faces the challenge of defending its interests from an increasingly assertive China in the South China Sea in the east, and a complex and growing non-traditional threat from the west.[2] This raises a crucial question: how should Vietnam, with its limited resources, balance its interests in the continental West and the maritime East?
CONTINENTAL WEST VERSUS MARITIME EAST
Since the turn of the 21st century, the maritime East has been designated a crucial area for Vietnam’s economic progress. Gazing out towards the sea serves as a way for the Vietnamese nation to reconnect with its maritime heritage. Throughout history, the maritime space has played a significant role in shaping the country’s political economy, even before the independence of the first Vietnamese dynasties from Chinese rule in the 10th century AD.[3]
The prominence of Đại Việt (a feudal state encompassing parts of present-day Vietnam) in regional maritime trade networks, as well as the development of a distinct maritime identity in the southern Cochinchina kingdom during the 16th and 17th centuries, proves that the Vietnamese people have always had strong ties to the maritime domain[4] Moreover, by expanding its interests into the maritime sphere, Vietnam is also redefining its “living space”.[5] After experiencing border conflicts with China and the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s and 1980s, Vietnamese leaders recognised the need to extend the country’s sovereignty and jurisdiction beyond its coast. This was done with the aim of creating a security buffer in the South China Sea[6] while maximising the country’s economic gains from maritime resources.
The strategic importance of the sea was officially recognised in 1993, and this importance was further institutionalised in the following decades.[7] The goal was clear: to transform Vietnam into a “strong maritime country”.[8] This objective was reiterated in the 2007 Maritime Strategy and the revised Blue Economy Strategy in 2018. These documents reflect the Vietnamese leadership’s strong maritime strategic mindset. The 2007 Maritime Strategy, for example, acknowledged that the 21st century would be the “maritime century”, hence the motto “hướng ra biển là thịnh vượng” (turning to the sea brings prosperity).[9] The sea is considered the country’s “living space”, crucial to its development and security.[10] Therefore, developing and implementing a maritime strategy was imperative to steering the country’s sea-based development .
That said, Vietnam’s traditional strategies have been primarily shaped by a continental mindset dominated by a Confucian, anti-mercantile ruling elite during the country’s dynastic era.[11] Throughout the 20th century, Vietnam faced numerous land-based security threats and engaged in wars fought primarily on land. The Vietnamese civilisation has thrived and been sustained by its extensive river systems. The Red River Delta in the North has long been considered the cradle of Vietnamese civilisation, while the Mekong Delta in the South is the country’s primary source of food. In fact, nearly half of the country’s rice, 65 per cent of its aquaculture, and 70 per cent of its fruits are produced in the Mekong Delta.[12] This strong continental identity is further reflected in the dominance of the army over the navy in terms of personnel and resources within the military.
In sum, the co-existence of this continental mindset versus maritime thinking suggests that Vietnam cannot solely focus on one extreme or another. Vietnam’s future will be defined by both its maritime space and its investment in its continental landmass.
THE FUNAN TECHO CANAL: A NON-TRADITIONAL THREAT FROM THE CONTINENTAL FRONTIERS
The crux of the recent friction between Vietnam and Cambodia over the Funan Techo Canal Project lies in the lack of clarity over how Cambodia intends to utilise the water from the canal, including its intended purposes and volume.
In 2023, the Cambodia National Mekong Committee (CNMC) released a 14-page report on the project. Vietnamese experts, however, criticised the report for failing to include information on the anticipated procedures of operation or the assessment of environmental impacts caused by the canal.[13] The report only mentioned the canal’s function as a waterway or navigation route, leaving unclear the extent to which it will serve purposes like irrigation, drainage, and water collection for various activities. As such, the report contradicts recent statements by Senate President Hun Sen that the canal would “facilitate agricultural activities by providing water for crop cultivation”.[14] Deputy Prime Minister Sun Chanthol also discussed the irrigation benefits of the canal in an English-language video interview.[15] Moreover, although the CNMC report mentions the use of a navigation lock system to prevent water from leaving the Mekong mainstream, more information is needed on its design, maintenance, and operations.[16]
In September 2023, the Vietnamese Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment requested that experts assess the impacts of the project. The following month, the Vietnamese Meteorological and Hydrological Administration released a four-page report emphasising that “the construction of a waterway canal in Cambodia will significantly exacerbate the issue of water resource depletion in the Mekong Delta, as seen in recent years.”[17] However, this analysis only considers the impact on water supply if the canal is used for transportation purposes. In April 2024, participants at a conference in Can Tho City highlighted the canal’s potential negative impacts on the Mekong Delta. At a regular press conference the same month, the spokesperson of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed interest in the Funan Techo Canal Project and urged the Cambodian government to closely coordinate with Vietnam and the Mekong River Commission, as well as the international community, in sharing information about the project.[18] This highlights the lack of information available to the Vietnamese government regarding the project.
Both Vietnamese scholars and Western experts have expressed concerns over the environmental consequences of the project on the Lower Mekong River Basin.[19] However, Vietnamese experts have varying opinions on the scale and extent of the impact. The most extreme estimation suggests that the canal could decrease the water flow to the Mekong Delta by over 50 per cent or even 70 per cent during the dry season.[20] However, other experts disagree, stating that the potential scenario would not be as severe, with a loss of 5-13 per cent of water flowing to the Delta.[21] The project will also have a significant impact on the hydrological regime of the transboundary floodplain.[22] For example, seasonal flooding provides irrigation to the Vinh Te Canal in Vietnam’s Kien Giang Province. However, building high levees to protect the Funan Techo Canal from flood damage will cause a large area of the Mekong Delta and significant portions of Cambodia’s floodplain to suffer from reduced natural flooding and increased dryness, ultimately resulting in a loss of industrial-scale agricultural production.[23]
It is evident that Vietnamese government officials and experts have been closely monitoring the issue since the CNMC submitted its initial document to the Mekong River Commission in 2023 regarding the construction of the Funan Techo Canal. Despite differences in assessing the potential impact of the project, most Vietnamese experts agree that Cambodia should be more transparent and provide more information and data on the operating procedures of the canal, its functions and purposes, as well as solutions to ensure safety in the event of any incidents.
VIETNAM’S OLD DILEMMA IN A NEW CONTEXT
Given Hanoi’s priorities of economic development and a peaceful approach to foreign and defence policy, it is highly unlikely that the Vietnamese government will respond aggressively to Cambodia’s plans to build the Funan Techo Canal. However, this recent friction has shed light on an important truth that has long been overlooked by the Vietnamese public: the increasing significance of the continental West in Vietnam’s security landscape, albeit of a different nature compared to the past. As Vietnam heavily relies on the sea for its grand strategy and faces potential conflicts in the South China Sea, the country must now navigate the challenge of balancing resources and strategic priorities between the maritime East and the continental West.
Challenges from both domains are viewed as existential threats to Vietnam’s national interests, or, from a geostrategic standpoint, to its “strategic space”. It is worth noting that “strategic space” holds significant weight in Vietnam’s strategic lexicon. It refers to a country’s physical environment, including its land, sea, space, and surrounding areas, as well as neighbouring countries and their foreign policies. Vietnam’s current strategic space includes its continental North and West (with Cambodia, Laos, and China as immediate neighbours) and the maritime East, with the South China Sea serving as the new frontier in the 21st century. Balancing the threats in both of these strategic spaces is a daunting task, requiring skilled statecraft and resource allocation.
Vietnam’s continental landmass and its immediate neighbours (Laos, Cambodia, and China) will always be crucial for its defence and security. Without stable and friendly neighbours, Vietnam would struggle to mobilise resources for economic and social development. Historically, the continental frontiers served as both sources of security and insecurity in a traditional sense, primarily focused on expanding and protecting territories. However, in the interconnected world of the 21st century, shaped by a specific international order, the nature of threats from the continental frontier has become more complex and less focused on territorial issues. These non-traditional challenges require Vietnam to be more adaptable, innovative, and skilled in managing its relationships, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Vietnam may need to focus on not only external factors but also internal development to secure its economic future and partnerships with neighbouring countries. A strong economic foundation is essential for ensuring long-term stability along Vietnam’s western border.
The primary challenge for Vietnam’s grand strategy is finding a balance between the continental West and the maritime East. This involves effectively allocating resources to both domains, particularly in defence and security. It is not a matter of choosing one over the other, but rather identifying the strategic priority in a complex and ever-changing environment; this is no easy task and can be costly, especially for a middle-income country. China’s notorious illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive activities in the South China Sea pose a threat to Vietnam, forcing the country to invest heavily in developing and modernising its maritime forces. The recent controversy surrounding the Funan-Techo Canal Project highlights that future challenges from the continental West could potentially divert resources away from the South China Sea.
CONCLUSION
The growing influence of China on Vietnam’s western “continental” frontiers is a legitimate concern for the country. As tensions in the South China Sea continue to escalate, the construction of the Funan Techo Canal raises a larger question at a grand-strategic level: how can Vietnam effectively balance its resources and vision between the “continental” West and the “maritime” East? While the South China Sea remains the primary battleground for sovereignty, the western frontiers are now faced with a variety of non-traditional security challenges, including issues in the Mekong region, human trafficking, and transnational crimes, which require a different approach.
Some analysts believe that Vietnam should take proactive measures with expert-led strategies and practical solutions to mitigate any potential impact that may arise from the canal.[24] At the same time, the government must balance the competing needs of the continental West and the maritime East. It is crucial for Vietnam to continue leveraging on international support and collaboration in managing security and development concerns on both fronts. While the maritime domain offers opportunities for economic growth and prosperity, without the support of the continental domain, the foundation of Vietnam’s economic and security interests would not be sustainable.
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
- About the author: Nguyen The Phuong is a PhD Candidate in Maritime Security and Naval Affairs at the University of New South Wales in Canberra, Australia. He is also a Lecturer at the Faculty of International Relations, Ho Chi Minh City University of Economics and Finance (UEF).
- Source: This article was published ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute
