Ecuador: Daniel Noboa’s Surprise Victory – Analysis

By Pedro Labayen Herrera

President Noboa Wins the Runoff Election

On April 13, incumbent President Daniel Noboa, with 55 percent of the vote, defeated progressive candidate Luisa González (with 44 percent of the vote) in the presidential runoff election. The results surprised both camps, as neither had anticipated Noboa’s decisive 11-point victory over González. The first round of voting on February 9 had ended in a tie, with both candidates receiving 44 percent and nearly all pre-election and exit polls predicting a tight race — reinforcing expectations of another closely contested outcome.

The results are striking not only because of Noboa’s wide margin of victory but also because González barely improved on her first-round performance and even lost votes in key regions. Despite higher voter turnout, a historic endorsement from the influential Indigenous movement on her left, and her strategic nomination of Jan Topic — a conservative, security-oriented former presidential candidate — as a potential interior minister to attract right-leaning undecided voters, González gained only 172,000 net additional votes, and Noboa gained almost 1.2 million.

The outcome was so unexpected for González that, during her election night event at party headquarters, she claimed there had been “grotesque” fraud and refused to recognize the results. On April 22, González’s Revolución Ciudadana (RC) party requested a review of 1,800 tally sheets representing roughly half a million votes, which Ecuador’s National Electoral Council (CNE) denied. On April 27, the party filed an objection to another 1,000 tally sheets and asked that the results and the election be nullified. The CNE rejected this legal challenge the next day.

The party’s broader theory of fraud follows a hypothesis, formulated by a group of unnamed experts, suggesting that rigged ballots and ink could have enabled the physical transfer of large numbers of votes from González to Noboa during the voting process, particularly when ballots were folded. This argument largely hinges on a paragraph in the Organization of American States’ (OAS’s) Electoral Observation Mission (EOM) report, which noted that “the ink used to mark the ballots was transferred between the political options when they were folded,” generating “confusion in the interpretation of the vote and, in some cases, led to its annulment.” Following the publication of the hypothesis, the OAS issued a statement clarifying that such incidents, which affected both candidates, were isolated, were largely resolved, and did not constitute fraud.

The CNE — which dismissed the RC’s ink theory as “funny” — and international observers from the European Union (EU) and OAS stated that no fraud occurred during the vote. However, these observers did report irregularities by Noboa — most notably, his extensive use of public funds, which created an uneven playing field — in the lead-up to the election that influenced the outcome.

What Happened?

In the wake of the vote, observers and analysts have tried to make sense of how such an outcome — described by academic and CEPR Senior Research Fellow Francisco Rodríguez as an “anomaly” due to Noboa securing many more third-party votes than any other candidate in the region over the past 15 years — came to pass. CEPR staff were present in the country before, during, and after the elections, holding meetings with politicians, international observers, and members of civil society while also producing a live election blog. Together with reports from international electoral missions, these discussions shed light on several factors that contributed to the results, though none alone fully explain what occurred.

Noboa’s Leveraging of State Power and Resources

One of the most significant factors may have been President Noboa’s removal of his vice president and use of the state to gain an electoral advantage. Although the law requires incumbents who are seeking reelection to take a leave of absence during the campaign period and prohibits the use of public funds for campaigning, Noboa violated these rules and leveraged his position for electoral benefit.

Right before the first and second rounds, for instance, Noboa decreed $560 millionin disbursements to citizens as part of 14 new economic relief packages — including bonuses, cash transfers, loans, and other measures — many of which were directed toward areas known to be González strongholds. Additionally, Noboa hired Erik Prince, founder of the private military company Blackwater, as a security advisor. While on the state’s payroll, Prince publicly campaigned for Noboa in media outlets and even on the Ministry of Defense’s official X account.

In this regard, the OAS EOM report states, “The Mission noted with concern that the electoral process was marked by conditions of inequity during the campaign, as well as by indications that public resources and the state apparatus were improperly used for proselytizing purposes. … The fact that the President of the Republic had not requested a leave of absence in these elections had an impact on the fairness of the electoral campaign.” The EU’s report similarly notes, “Failure to request a ‘leave of absence’ from the Assembly, which is mandatory for incumbents, contributed to further blurring the boundaries between the two functions [of president and candidate].”

By refusing to step down, Noboa was also able to engage in conduct that raised serious concerns about electoral irregularities. Less than 24 hours before voting began, he declared a state of emergency in seven provinces — all of which González had won in the first round — suspending the freedom of assembly, imposing a curfew, and granting authorities the power to intercept private telecommunications. These measures contributed to an overall climate of fear.

Moreover, the OAS EOM highlighted that the executive’s “extraordinarily active role” in the electoral process “raised questions about the autonomy and leadership of the electoral authorities.” The executive branch, the EOM states, issued insistent requests and constantly pressured the CNE to issue resolutions banning phones in polling places and waiving fines for people who failed to vote — the latter being ultimately rejected by the CNE. This “activation of electoral and judicial instances for political purposes,” the OAS EOM added, “weakened the institutionality of the [Ecuadorian] State.”

The CNE was not the only body that was “activated” for “political purposes.” Ecuador’s Electoral Dispute Tribunal (TCE), a second-instance electoral authority that is also in charge of adjudicating certain political matters, also aligned with the executive and played a key role in removing Ecuador’s vice president.

Since his inauguration in November 2023, President Noboa has orchestrated the irregular removal and replacement of his vice president, Verónica Abad (see full analysis in Round-Ups No. 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21). Their bad relationship was a key factor in Noboa’s refusal to temporarily step down during the campaign period, as he was unwilling to allow Abad to assume the presidency in his absence.

His efforts to force her resignation included appointing her to diplomatic posts in Israel and Turkey, suspending payment of her salary, and jailing her son. He also sought her removal based on alleged infractions. In November, for example, the Ministry of Labor suspended Abad from her duties for five months through an administrative disciplinary action — a move overturned by a court, which ruled that only the National Assembly had the authority to remove a vice president. Undeterred, Noboa issued several decrees removing Abad and appointing an ally in her place, an action later declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.

Following months of silence from both the CNE and TCE, which were widely viewed as acts of complicity, the TCE ultimately removed Abad on March 29. The tribunal suspended her political rights, finding her guilty of committing “gendered political violence” against the foreign minister while dismissing Abad’s earlier complaint against the minister on the same grounds. All this fueled accusations from politicians, lawyers, and experts that the TCE had been co-opted by Noboa and was acting in his political favor. The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women and Girls expressed concern over the ruling, stating that the TCE had applied an overly broad and distorted interpretation of gendered political violence.

Both the EU and the OAS electoral missions also raised concerns about the decision in their reports, with the EU stating:

The TCE’s sentence, suspending the political rights of vice-president Veronica Abad for two years, sets a worrying precedent in the treatment of gender-based political violence. … The TCE ruling imposed disproportionate penalties and unduly restricted freedom of expression in the political debate. The sentence is widely considered as opening the door to the political instrumentalisation of an offence initially conceived to protect the participation of women in politics, not to limit it.

Missteps and Disinformation

Another key factor in González’s poor performance was a series of missteps by her campaign, her party, and its members in the final weeks and days of the campaign. Combined with a highly polarized environment and widespread disinformation campaigns, these errors triggered a chain of controversies that ultimately undermined her candidacy.

For example, on March 16, Paola Cabezas, a legislator from González’s RC party, said in an interview that Ecuador’s dollarized economy needed to be adapted to better suit the country’s needs. Although Cabezas never suggested ending dollarization — and González consistently reaffirmed her commitment to strengthening it — this did not prevent a wave of backlash. Social media, news outlets, and Noboa’s campaign seized on the remarks to spread false claims that González intended to abolish or severely modify dollarization. Opponents have repeatedly used the threat of de-dollarization as a line of attack against the RC over the past decade, despite no indication that the party intends to end the monetary arrangement — and despite dollarization having actually been strengthened during Rafael Correa’s presidency. This tactic plays on the broad national consensus in favor of keeping the US dollar as Ecuador’s official currency.

Further controversy arose on March 28 when the National Assembly debated a billon religion, which had been originally introduced in 2023 by an RC legislator. The proposal — which sought to promote fundamental rights and restrict the ability of religious organizations to engage in political campaigns — faced strong oppositionfrom Noboa’s party, other conservative factions, and the Ecuadorian Episcopal Conference, which made false claims about the bill’s contents, among other criticisms. The bill was ultimately shelved just days later at González’s request due to public uproar.

On April 9, four days before the election, social media and news outlets became flooded with stories saying González intended to create armed community militias to tackle crime, referred to as “gestores de paz” (peace facilitators). These stories alleged that the militias would act as parallel state structures for surveillance and social control, drawing comparisons with similar alleged programs in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. However, the reports were based on comments González had made in December 2024, when she had merely described a crime prevention initiative involving unarmed community organizers funded by the state.

All this came to a head on election day, when so-called “news portals” circulated a clip from a livestream featuring González, in which an advisor can be heard in the background saying, “The first decree is about Venezuela, don’t forget.” The remark was widely interpreted as a signal that González would recognize Nicolás Maduro as Venezuela’s president, a controversial move for many in the country. Although González had previously stated during a presidential debate that she would recognize Maduro’s government, she framed it as a pragmatic step solely to facilitate the deportation of Venezuelan migrants. The advisor’s comment, however, led some voters to believe that González would urgently recognize Maduro out of political affinity with his administration.

Slanted Media Environment 

A slanted and biased media environment, not only supportive of Noboa but also hostile toward González, also contributed to the RC candidate’s defeat. EU observers highlighted that “Daniel Noboa received the largest share of media attention, much of it positive, benefiting from the advantages of incumbency, including coverage of his official duties as president in parallel to his campaign activities.” State-owned outlets, the EU said, strongly supported Noboa, noting that “extensive government-sponsored advertising contributed to an uneven playing field in the media.” Overall, Noboa dominated coverage in print and digital media — mostly in a positive light — whereas coverage of González was “limited and often negative.” Even television channels, described by the EU as “relatively balanced,” framed González less favorably than Noboa.

Weak Endorsements and Alliances 

The endorsement González received from the Indigenous movement and her alliance with Topic proved less solid than it had initially seemed and appeared to do little to boost her presidential bid.

The Indigenous movement’s endorsement was no doubt historic; the RC had failed to gain the movement’s backing in past elections due to internal tensions within the movement and lingering tensions from the Correa era. But the endorsement came from the Indigenous political party Pachakutik and not directly from the CONAIE, Pachakutik’s parent organization and the country’s largest and most influential Indigenous organization, which diminished its impact. The CONAIE’s leader and Pachakutik’s first-round presidential candidate, Leonidas Iza, also kept his distance, skipping Pachakutik’s endorsement event and never explicitly stating that he would vote for González.

Moreover, González’s decision to name Topic as a potential interior minister created friction between the RC and the Indigenous movement, which saw the move as opening the door to right-wing influence in her potential administration. Topic’s public support for her was also limited and weak.

This election marked the first time that the RC’s campaign meaningfully incorporated people and groups beyond its own party and base, which made the final result even more puzzling to observers, analysts, and ordinary citizens.

What’s Next for Noboa and Ecuador? 

One of Noboa’s immediate challenges will be securing a majority in the National Assembly, which convenes its new session on May 14. Of the 151 available seats, Noboa’s National Democratic Action (ADN) party won 66 in these elections, leaving him 11 short of the 77 needed for a majority. Thanks to backing from the traditionalist PSC, which holds five seats, and smaller parties, it appears that Noboa can currently count on approximately 74 votes. This support is crucial not only for advancing his legislative agenda but also for securing the presidency of the National Assembly. ADN is expected to nominate Noboa’s mother — who was elected as a legislator on the party’s ticket — for the position. This possibility has raised concerns about the assembly’s independence, especially given its key role in overseeing the executive branch’s actions.

González’s RC, meanwhile, won 67 seats to become the largest party but lost oneafter a member announced she was leaving the party following the second round, bringing its total to 66. The RC is expected to seek support from Pachakutik, though one of Noboa’s ministers has claimed that some of Pachakutik’s nine legislators may side with the government instead. Regardless, the RC’s size ensures it will remain a powerful opposition force.

We should also expect Noboa to double down on many of the policies he has started to pursue. On security, it is likely that the “internal armed conflict” he declared against gangs in January 2024 will remain in effect, along with the continued practice of declaring frequent states of emergency, despite their failure thus far to curb the country’s historic levels of violence, with 2025 now on track to surpass 2023’s all-time record homicide rate. These policies have also led to security forces being widely accused of human rights abuses, including torture, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, and arbitrary detentions. In fact, on April 28, four of the 16 soldiers involved in the December forced disappearance of four Afro-Ecuadorian children — who were later found dead — confessed to torturing the boys. According to their statements, the children were beaten, stomped on, thrown head-first to the ground from a truck, forced to take off their clothes, and had a gun fired next to them as a form of intimidation.

Given Noboa’s pressure on electoral and judicial institutions, as documented in EOM reports, questions remain about how much independence bodies like the Constitutional Court will retain during his second administration. Noboa has long defied the court, particularly in matters related to his security policy. Ecuador’s Constitutional Court has repeatedly ruled that Noboa cannot justify states of emergency based on claims of an “internal armed conflict,” stating that he has not sufficiently demonstrated the existence of such a conflict. To curb the use of states of emergency, the court even ordered Noboa on March 5 to establish an inter-institutional security commission composed of various ministries and oversight bodies and tasked with developing security proposals and reporting regularly on their progress. The commission was also required to meet every two months at the court’s premises. Until April 2, when he announced that he would comply, President Noboa had disregarded the ruling, arguing that the court lacks the authority to direct or shape security policy.

Noboa is also determined to deepen Ecuador’s security cooperation with the US, with his primary objective being the establishment of a US military base on Ecuadorian soil — a move currently barred by the constitution. He has already taken steps in this direction, including granting the US permission to station and operate out of the environmentally fragile Galapagos Islands. CNN has reported that construction of a base has already begun in the coastal city of Manta, where the US maintained a base until 2009. Days after the election, Noboa stated the country was ready to receive “real aid” from the US. However, the prospect of US assistance being linked to human rights abuses committed by Ecuadorian security forces has already raised concerns among members of Congress, with 14 members signing a letter on this and other issues on April 10.

More broadly, Noboa has made it a priority to substantially revise or even replace Ecuador’s notably progressive constitution, which was drawn up in 2008. He says the current one obstructs his security agenda and hampers economic growth. Although Noboa already attempted constitutional change by putting an 11-question referendum to voters in April 2024, he now appears to favor even more significant reforms.

While he has remained vague, it is expected that Noboa will seek to overturn the country’s ban on investor-state dispute mechanisms — which allow companies to sue governments in international tribunals — as well as the prohibition on foreign military bases on Ecuadorian soil. He may also push to weaken labor protections and Indigenous rights, expand executive powers over security policy, promote privatization, and reform or dismantle certain bodies responsible for oversight and the selection of oversight officials.

Noboa hopes to achieve this through a constituent assembly, a process that involves the popular election of assembly members tasked with drafting a new charter. In total, a constituent assembly requires three separate votes: the election of assembly members and two referendums. The process is both lengthy and costly. For this reason, critics and supporters of constitutional reform alike argue that a constituent assembly is not the best path forward. Instead, they contendthat many of Noboa’s proposed changes could be accomplished with sufficient support in the National Assembly and just one referendum.

• About the author: Pedro Labayen Herrera’sresearch at CEPR centers on the Latin American region (with a particular focus on Ecuador), foreign policy, and the impact of economic sanctions.
• Source: This article was published by CEPR