Lessons From The Syrian Civil War: A Bangladeshi Perspective – OpEd
In November–December 2024, several insurgent groups, with the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) at the forefront, overthrew the Syrian government in a series of lightning offensives.
The Syrian Arab Republic, ruled by the Syrian Regional Branch of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party since 1963, which had held its own against a large array of insurgent groups as well as direct and indirect interventions by a number of external actors for more than a decade, suddenly collapsed in less than two weeks. The event shocked the world, as few had anticipated the sudden and rapid collapse of the Syrian government, or the dramatic rise of the HTS Emir Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known by his nom de guerre Abu Muhammad al-Julani, who is now the de facto head of the mutilated, truncated, and divided Syria.
Opponents of the former Alawite-dominated Syrian government have celebrated the fall of former President Bashar al-Assad, and termed it as a ‘great victory’ for freedom and anti-authoritarianism in Syria and the wider Middle East. On the other hand, supporters of the former Syrian government have portrayed the HTS takeover of Syria in apocalyptic terms, viewing it as a victory for ‘terrorists’ and a precursor to the outbreak of a new civil war along sectarian lines in the devastated country. As it often happens, the truth lies somewhere in between. The events that happened in Syria during and after the fall of the former Syrian government hold important lessons for the states of the Global South that share similar characteristics with Syria. While Bangladesh shares no geographical or ethnic ties with Syria, both Muslim-majority states are located in the Global South, contain substantial minorities, attract significant attention from external actors, and have witnessed the fall of authoritarian governments in 2024.
First, the Syrian Civil War has essentially been a complex proxy war for great and regional powers. All belligerents, including the former Syrian government, the ‘pro-democratic’ rebels, the Islamist insurgents, and the Kurdish secessionists, actively sought external assistance to sustain themselves, allowing Syria to become a battleground for influence. The previous Syrian government was supported by Russia and Iran, while the myriad insurgent groups were supported by the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), France, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Israel. Consequently, the Syrian War was prolonged, resulting in the deaths of more than 600,000 Syrian citizens, the displacement of more than 13.3 million Syrians, and the near-complete destruction of the Syrian economy and infrastructure. At present, Syria is essentially a truncated state, with the US occupying the fertile and hydrocarbon-rich regions in the east and south, Turkey occupying substantial territories in the north, and Israel occupying strategically vital regions in the south.
This should serve as a cautionary tale for Bangladesh. Political actors in Syria have invited and facilitated external intervention to further their objectives, and external powers are using internal fault-lines in Syria to further their political, military-strategic, and economic goals. External powers can similarly exploit Bangladesh’s internal fault-lines to further their geopolitical objectives in the country. Already, external powers are actively using the issue of the alleged mistreatment of minorities in Bangladesh to pressurize the country and to complicate its international relations. So, Bangladeshi political actors of all stripes should be very careful about courting foreign powers to further their narrow party-political objectives.
Second, during the Syrian Civil War, thousands of foreign citizens have travelled to Syria to enlist in the numerous insurgent groups, ranging from the Turkish-controlled Syrian National Army (SNA) to the Islamist HTS and IS to the nationalist SDF. The HTS, which currently controls the Syrian government, includes thousands of foreign fighters, originating from countries such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan. The HTS-controlled Syrian government has decided to grant citizenship to foreign fighters and appointed several foreign fighters to important posts. Meanwhile, these foreign fighters have gained extensive military experience through fighting for several years. Now, the HTS-controlled Syria can turn into a magnet for further influx of foreign fighters, while the home countries of the aforementioned foreign fighters can be threatened by the return of battle-hardened bands of fighters. In particular, the latter possibility presents a serious potential threat to the ultra-secular governments of Central Asian states, Russian control over North Caucasus, and Chinese control over Xinjiang.
While militancy is a comparatively less salient threat to Bangladesh’s security under current circumstances, it cannot be dismissed altogether. Dozens of Bangladeshi citizens had travelled to Syria to join the IS and other insurgent groups in the 2010s, and the rise of the IS had contributed to the increase in the number of terrorist attacks in the country. The rise of the HTS can replicate the scenario by emboldening local militants. Hence, Bangladeshi law enforcement and security services should strictly monitor the activities of the country’s militant outfits, while the government should undertake efficient socio-political measures to prevent the rise of militancy.
Third, Syria had shared adversarial relationships with neighbouring Turkey and Israel for decades. In both military and economic terms, Syria was weaker than both its adversaries. To offset this, Damascus pursued both internal and external balancing by strengthening its military capabilities and forging close partnerships with the Soviet Union (later Russia) and Iran. However, Syria’s strategy ultimately failed owing to the absence of national unity in the country. Turkey waged a complex and protracted proxy war against the former Syrian government since 2011, and ultimately succeeded in overthrowing it and replacing it with its protégés, the HTS. Similarly, Israel assisted the insurgent groups to keep Syria divided, weakened Syrian military capabilities by conducting hundreds of bombings on Syria since 2013, and ultimately destroyed the bulk of Syrian military-strategic capabilities, including most of Syria’s armoured vehicles, air defense systems, chemical weapons, aircrafts, naval vessels, and military research institutes, immediately after the HTS takeover. Thus, prolonged rivalry with its stronger neighbours, coupled with its inability to foster internal cohesion, contributed to the defeat and dissolution of the former Syrian government.
Following the overthrow of the previous government in Bangladesh on 5 August 2024, the Indo–Bangladeshi relations have witnessed a marked deterioration. While Bangladesh reserves the sovereign right to freely pursue its internal and external policies, it should be careful in dealing with India. Under the current international system, the accumulation of military-economic power and the strengthening of internal cohesion are the best guarantors of state sovereignty and national independence. Accordingly, Bangladesh should pursue the strategies of both internal and external balancing to protect it from the encroachments of external powers.
Finally, the rapid outward transformation of Julani from an Islamist warlord to a modern statesman has drawn significant attention. In his interviews, Julani has repeatedly emphasized the need for institution-building for successful state formation. Initially, the HTS had placed particular emphasis on institution-building in its mini-statelet in Idlib, creating government institutions such as the bureaucracy and the judiciary, and constructing a military academy. In contrast, a number of factors, including crippling US sanctions, continued US occupation of Syria’s fertile and hydrocarbon-rich territories, rampant corruption and nepotism, the effective demobilization of the Syrian military, and the former Syrian government’s involvement in the trade in Captagon, turned Syria’s Ba’ath-controlled part into a semi-failed narco-state. The HTS’s successes in institution-building and the former Syrian government’s failure in preserving its institutions, contributed substantially to the latter’s unexpected defeat in the war.
Bangladesh had been an independent state for more than five decades, yet its record in institution-building remains mixed at best. Bangladeshi state institutions remain plagued by a host of problems, including inefficiency, backwardness, red tape, undue political interference, corruption, and lack of coordination. Hence, if the country faces a serious internal or external threat, the viability of the state would be in danger. Hence, institution-building should be a top priority for any government in Dhaka.
While Damascus may be 5,000 km away from Dhaka, this should not prevent the state from learning relevant lessons from the Syrian conflict. The Syrian War has demonstrated the importance of strong internal cohesion, adequate internal and external balancing, and effective institution-building for the stability and sustainability of a state. Therefore, Bangladesh should draw proper lessons from the current dynamics of the Syrian conflict and act accordingly.
