Pahalgam Attack: The Nuclear Domino – OpEd

The recent attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir, has ignited a spark in an already volatile region, pushing South Asia dangerously closer to the edge of nuclear escalation. As the world watches with bated breath, the critical question emerges: Can tensions between India and Pakistan be contained before they spiral out of control?

The assault, which killed multiple civilians, has become the latest flashpoint in the long-standing conflict between two nuclear-armed neighbors. In the aftermath, the reflexive reactions—blame, anger, and military posturing—have escalated tensions, raising the specter of another war, this time potentially involving nuclear weapons.

For Pakistan, this situation is fraught with peril. The country’s response is a delicate balancing act: on the one hand, it faces immense domestic pressure to retaliate against what is framed as yet another attack perpetrated by militants from across the border. On the other hand, the consequences of escalation, especially a nuclear exchange, would be catastrophic not only for the region but for the world at large. In such a high-stakes environment, Pakistan’s policies must be carefully calibrated to avoid crossing the nuclear threshold.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has long been characterized by its policy of “full spectrum deterrence”—a strategy that includes both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons. In recent years, Pakistan has made it clear that it is prepared to use nuclear weapons to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, particularly in the face of Indian aggression. This doctrine is rooted in the belief that India’s conventional military superiority could force Pakistan into a corner, where nuclear deterrence is the only viable response. The challenge for Pakistan’s leadership, however, is how to manage a situation in which military options, both conventional and nuclear, could easily spiral out of control.

India, for its part, has adopted a strategy of “Cold Start,” which envisions a rapid, limited conventional strike against Pakistan in the event of a cross-border attack. Such a doctrine assumes that Pakistan would be unable or unwilling to escalate to nuclear weapons in response to a limited conventional assault. Yet this assumption may be dangerously flawed. Pakistan’s threshold for nuclear use is incredibly low, particularly when it perceives its survival to be at risk. Any significant military action, whether conventional or tactical, could trigger a rapid escalation toward nuclear conflict.

The recent Pahalgam attack has highlighted this existential dilemma. Pakistan’s options are limited. A purely diplomatic response is unlikely to suffice, given the domestic political pressure and the ingrained distrust between the two nations. On the other hand, an overt military retaliation could trigger a chain reaction leading to a wider war and, potentially, the use of nuclear weapons. Even a limited, tactical strike could quickly spiral into a nuclear exchange—especially if miscommunications or miscalculations occur during a period of heightened tension.

One policy option that Pakistan could consider is pursuing greater regional and international diplomacy. Despite the entrenched hostilities, Pakistan could seek to de-escalate the situation through dialogue, possibly with the assistance of international mediators such as the United Nations or a neutral third-party like China or the United States. While past diplomatic efforts have often been stymied, the international community’s involvement could provide a necessary buffer to reduce the chances of a military clash.

However, diplomacy requires trust—something that has been in short supply between India and Pakistan for decades. Recent years have seen the collapse of peace talks, with both sides deeply entrenched in their narratives. In such an environment, the prospect of a diplomatic breakthrough seems unlikely, unless both sides are willing to make significant concessions. This raises the question: can Pakistan risk placing its future in the hands of external actors?

Another potential path is to strengthen Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence in a way that could signal a clear warning to India. This could include bolstering Pakistan’s tactical nuclear arsenal or enhancing its nuclear command-and-control systems to ensure that any escalation is met with a credible and immediate response. The hope would be that such a display of resolve would deter India from escalating further. However, this too is a double-edged sword. The more Pakistan emphasizes its nuclear deterrent, the more it risks provoking an arms race with India and exacerbating regional tensions.

Ultimately, the best policy for Pakistan may be one of restraint—continuing to engage in strategic signaling, but avoiding precipitous military actions. The country must recognize that nuclear escalation would serve no one’s interests. The international community must play a role in pressuring both nations to engage in confidence-building measures and to reassert the importance of diplomacy over military confrontation. South Asia cannot afford another conflict, let alone one that threatens the survival of both nations.

The Pahalgam attack has reminded the world that the nuclear threshold in South Asia remains perilously low. As both India and Pakistan find themselves at a crossroads, their next moves could define the future of the region—and the world. The time for calculated restraint is now, before the ticking clock of nuclear escalation runs out of time.