A Deal With Russia At Ukraine’s Expense Will Not Bring Peace – Analysis

By Olena Snigyr

(FPRI) — Discussions of possible ceasefire negotiations in the war between Russia and Ukraine focus on the concessions that Ukraine could make to stop the hot phase of the war. At the same time, a realistic assessment of the prospects for a truce or peace should be based primarily on an analysis of Russian policy and the goals that Russia wants to achieve through the war with Ukraine. The conditions for negotiations and a truce, which Russia imposes on the West, suggest that a lasting peace is not currently achievable. Restoring the security of the Euro-Atlantic area requires a revision of the Western strategy towards Russia and taking measures that will deprive the Russian authorities of the resources to wage this war.

Misperception Has a Price

Despite the West’s declarations of commitment to the defense of liberal values and the rules-based order, Western policy toward Russia has maintained a pragmatic approach of diplomatic flexibility even as Russia’s transformation into an authoritarian revisionist aggressive state has been progressing.

When deciding on a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russians were counting on a restrained reaction from Western countries, similar to that demonstrated during the occupation and annexation of Crimea and even earlier during Russia’s military aggression against Georgia and during Russia’s war against the Chechen people. In all cases, it was a question of undermining and violating the liberal international order, but not a direct conventional threat to the North Atlantic area. It is likely that if the seizure of Ukraine had happened quickly, as the Russian authorities expected, and had not turned into a long and brutal war with huge media coverage, the West would have shown the same restraint and would have pressed the “reset” button on relations with Russia after a while for the sake of common security and economic cooperation.

The Zeitenwende or “historic turning point” declared by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz occurred because Russia, in the eyes of many in the West, suddenly turned from a predictable partner into an uncontrolled belligerent state whose actions do not fit into the agreed rules of the game and contradict the established Western perceptions of Russia. The actions of the Russian authorities were then perceived as a threat to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area, and Ukraine suddenly became a crucial element in restoring this security.

It is a mistake to believe that the war between Russia and Ukraine can end with compromise and concessions from Ukraine. Such agreements could lead to a temporary de-escalation and transfer of the conflict to a low-intensity level, a tried-and-true Russian method of fixing political reality and normalizing relations with the West. The so-called “truce” between Russia and Ukraine will not lead to a lasting peace, as Russia will not cease to be an aggressive revisionist state whose stability depends largely on war.

Current discussions of concessions that Ukraine could make to Russia often have one major common flaw: They overlook that Russia is not making demands on Ukraine, but on the West, and especially on the United States. Russia has made the war with Ukraine a tool to force the West to revise the European security system and the world order. Russia’s allies, China, Iran, and North Korea, are also beneficiaries of this war. Obviously, these countries are not supporting Russia in the war against Ukraine so that Russian President Vladimir Putin can triumphantly announce the annexation of some or all of Ukraine’s territories. It’s safe to say that the alliance of authoritarian countries has a more ambitious goal—to redivide the world into zones of influence and establish new rules of the game.

What Russia Wants

Russia does not want to negotiate with Ukraine but with the United States and Western Europe on new agreements on new rules in European security. In this context, US President-elect Donald Trump’s previous statements about his intention to reduce US involvement in European security matters are causing Russians to be cautiously optimistic. Russian conditions for the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, in addition to the actual transfer of Ukraine under Russian control, will also include conditions for:

• Decreased US presence in European politics
• Agreements on a new European security architecture in terms of creating a buffer zone between Russia and Western Europe from NATO countries in Central and Eastern Europe
• Western countries accepting certain obligations and self-restrictions to Russia
• Lifting of sanctions, compensation for damages, cancellation of the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrants for Putin and Children’s Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova, and the suspension of investigations into Russian war crimes and crimes against humanity

Conceptually, such Russian demands are not new: They can be found in all the draft treaties that Russia has proposed to revise security commitments in Europe and to which the West has not agreed. For example, Russian initiatives to reform European security from 2008 to 2009—the draft European Security Treaty and the proposal to reform the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE, the “Corfu Process”) by making OSCE decisions legally binding—were aimed at establishing Russia’s control over political and security decisions through the possibility of Russia or its allies vetoing any decision regarding security cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area and any assistance to a third country in the event of armed aggression against it (Article 8 of the EST).

Draft security treaties, such as the Agreement on Security Arrangements between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Security Assurances Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, contain the ultimatums that Russia issued to the United States on the eve of its full-scale aggression against Ukraine in December 2021 and also contain requirements for the creation of a buffer zone comprised of NATO countries. The draft Russia-US Treaty required US consent to an exclusively Russian zone of influence within the former Soviet Union, and Article 4 of the draft NATO-Russia Agreement requires the return of the Alliance’s security capabilities to the 1997 borders, expanding Russia’s zone of special interest from post-Soviet countries, including the Baltic states, to Central and Eastern Europe. While Russia’s demands don’t explicitly call for NATO’s dissolution, granting them would effectively dismantle the alliance and the Euro-Atlantic security order.

In turn, the draft Treaty on Permanent Neutrality and Security Assurances for Ukraine of 2022 explicitly provides for the obligation of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom to not cooperate with Ukraine in the security sphere and the obligation to obtain Russia’s consent for any assistance to Ukraine in the event of external aggression against it (Article 5). It is worth recalling that in February 2022, Russia’s proposal to “establish long-term legally binding security guarantees in Europe” was supported by China.

If we trace the evolution of Russian proposals, we can see that they did not conceptually change; only the rhetoric became more intense. So, we can say that Russia believed political reality was changing in its favor and allowing it to put forward bolder conditions to the West—if, in the noughties, Russian leadership cautiously insisted on a post-Soviet zone of influence, now the borders of Russia’s special interest zone are being pushed back to those of the former Warsaw Pact.

Russia’s demands are being voiced on an increasing scale and are supported by the gradual creation of a new political reality—what was considered impossible five to ten years ago is now becoming a subject of negotiations, and thus new and bolder goals are becoming more achievable for the Russians.

Why Russia Succeeded

Russia’s success has several prerequisites—some of which include the misinterpretation and misunderstanding of Russia, Russian strategic culture, and Russian behavior by the West.

Russia’s strategic culture is composed of authoritarian norms, beliefs, and values, underpinned by historical resentment and revisionism, and views relations with other countries as a zero-sum game in which the limits of what is permissible are determined only by (the balance of) power.

It would be true to say that there has never been a democracy in Russia. The game of democracy (with its peculiarities) was necessary for Russian leaders to convince Western countries that rapprochement with Russia was not a threat. It is difficult to say whether perceptual blindness or a choice in favor of promising energy cooperation was more prevalent in Western countries’ assessments of Russia’s behavior and intentions, but it gave Moscow the opportunity to change the political reality in the European security space step by step, first by discrediting and reducing the authority of soft security institutions such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE and then by violating the principle of territorial integrity and unleashing a full-scale war.

Another prerequisite for the success of Russian foreign policy on the European security direction is that Western countries preferred to adapt to the new political and security environment created by Russia without changing their approaches to security. The inertia of the defense policy paradigms of some Western countries was stronger than the shock of Russia’s occupation and annexation of Crimea and even the outbreak of a full-scale war in Europe.

Even today, NATO member states have different perceptions of the threats posed by Russia, some of which do not consider its actions to be a direct threat to their territorial integrity and security. This differentiation in assessing threats and risks affects NATO’s defense capabilities and creates an atmosphere of uncertainty about the security guarantees of NATO member states. After all, even the famous Article 5 of the treaty is limited in assisting the attacked Party by outlining that NATO should take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

Despite statements by Western leaders about their strong intentions to protect the security of the Euro-Atlantic area, the difference in defense policy paradigms among NATO member states creates uncertainty about what response NATO Allies would consider appropriate to an act of aggression against one of them. It is also unclear whether protecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area includes protecting the territorial integrity of NATO member states. Russia also does not know this yet and wants to eliminate this uncertainty.

Of the four possible scenarios for stopping the war between Russia and Ukraine analyzed by John Lough in the Chatham House Briefing Report, three, the “Long War,” the “Frozen Conflict,” and the “Defeat for Ukraine,” are winning for Russia. The shock of Russia’s actions has already worn off, and people are getting used to the current political reality. Since some NATO member states do not see the very existence of the Russian political regime as a threat to them, they may look for ways to return to full partnership with Russia and may likely discuss Russia’s conditions for creating a new buffer zone in Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, there should be no mistaking the meaning of neutrality or a “buffer zone” of any kind between Russia and the old NATO member states. Any buffer security space will be seen by Russia as an opportunity to expand its zone of control.

Other NATO countries will look for additional opportunities to strengthen their own security by concluding additional treaties, such as the Trinity House Agreement between the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Differences in assessments of external threats among NATO allies, coupled with a possible decline in US involvement in European security, will create tensions within the Alliance and reduce the already unclear level of joint commitments. In such circumstances, Russia, together with its allies, may decide to launch a direct aggression against a NATO member to confirm the inoperability of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and create a new political reality in Europe on Russia’s terms.

Conditions for Lasting Truce

Apparently, Putin believes that Russia is close to a strategic breakthrough in the war with Ukraine and in its confrontation with the West and, therefore, is not interested in ending the war. The model of limited deterrence of Russia chosen by the West proved ineffective and gave Russian authorities time to adapt to the new conditions. Predictions of Russia’s economic and technological collapse due to limited sanction pressure proved irrelevant. The Russian economy has adapted, and it is now dependent on the war while simultaneously being the basis for waging war. The war has also become a necessary condition for the domestic political stability of the Russian regime.

Russia is waging a war of attrition in which cheap resources and cheap, mass-produced technology are crucial. China’s support is also an important element of Russia’s resilience. While formally remaining in the shadows, China is supporting Russia politically, economically, and technologically in the war against Ukraine (in fact, against the West) and is studying the conventional experience of this war and the possibilities of adapting to sanctions. The successes Russia is achieving are beneficial to China. To a certain extent, Beijing views Russia as a proxy in its rivalry with the United States because, in the Sino-Russian tandem, Russia does all the “dirty work” and takes all the risks in confronting the West.

The only way to stop Russia’s war against Ukraine and achieve lasting peace is to make this war unprofitable and dangerous for the Russian political regime or to weaken Russia so much that it will be unable to wage war. The Kremlin will see all other compromise options as intermediate achievements in the war with the West and will be converted into an escalation of the confrontation.

Today, it is hardly possible to talk about a lasting peace in the war Russia is waging. The prospect of peace is only possible if Russia itself undergoes internal transformations. At the same time, in the short term, states can discuss a lasting truce, provided that the West abandons its comfortable anti-escalation strategy and adopts a strategy of forceful deterrence and depowering Russia.

Most discussions about how to stop this war center on the compromise that Ukraine could make. Instead, the discussion should primarily be about how to stop Russia. Western policy toward Russia today is aimed at minimizing the risk of escalation. It is limited by the strategic dilemma of “not letting Russia win, but not letting Russia fall” and constrained by the narratives that Russians themselves spread. For example, the prospect of weakening and destabilizing Russia has traditionally been rejected by the West because of the risks associated with nuclear weapons. Thus, from the point of view of nuclear security, the stability of the Russian authoritarian regime is considered beneficial and necessary despite the destructive actions of this regime. Russian authorities also skillfully use nuclear-related concerns to contain the West, such as in its military support for Ukraine, and promote the narrative that the West is to blame for the increased risks of a nuclear confrontation.

Another narrative that narrows the West’s policy options toward Russia is spread by the so-called Russian opposition in exile and claims that Russia can be transformed into a liberal democratic state while maintaining its territorial integrity. At the same time, critics of this idea say that because Russia is not a homogeneous nation-state, successful liberalization will inevitably lead to the decolonization of Russia—to its disintegration, which, as the experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union shows, can have many stakeholders, be controlled, and carry minimal risks. An argument in favor of the impossibility of liberalizing Russia without a radical transformation is that Russian society has no successful liberal democratic experience, and all attempts at partial liberalization in Russia have led to a loss of political control, protest movements, and, as a result, a return to authoritarianism. Authoritarian Russia pursues an aggressive foreign policy and launches wars as soon as it has sufficient resources to do so. A weak Russia does not wage war.

At present, Russia is more effectively using the war with Ukraine to destroy the Euro-Atlantic security architecture than the West is using Ukraine to contain Russia. The Kremlin has enough resources to wage war, both human and financial. A sociological study by the Center for Analysis and Strategies in Europe shows that the Russian government has enough human resources to fight a war for the next few years without declaring mobilization. The analysis of the state and processes in the Russian economy also demonstrates the ability to meet war needs for the next few years. In a war of attrition, Ukraine is depleting faster than Russia, but there is still time and opportunity to change the strategy and stop Russia. To achieve, if not a lasting peace, then at least a lasting truce, it is necessary not only to arm Ukraine sufficiently and remove all political reservations on the use of the provided weapons on Russian territory but also to move to a policy of complete economic isolation of Russia by the West, and most importantly, to stop the flow of oil and gas revenues, which is the main resource for waging war and sustaining Russian authoritarianism.

• About the author: Olena Snigyr is a 2024 Templeton Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program. She is also a Jean Monnet Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute.
• Source: This article was published by FPRI