Japan: America’s Indispensable Ally In The 21st Century – Analysis

By Mohammed Soliman

(FPRI) —  In the 20th century, the United States and Great Britain formed a special relationship that defined the century, ensuring American primacy and British survival as the world transitioned from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana.

Across the Atlantic, once a British colony, America stood as a steadfast ally in the two great world wars. In addition to their shared culture and history, Washington recognized London’s pivotal role as an anchor state for American power in Europe. Against the specter of German aggression and continental hegemony under Kaiser Wilhelm and Adolf Hitler, the US-UK alliance served as a bulwark against Imperial German and Nazi domination of continental Europe.

Since the dawn of this millennium, there has been a clear shift in the global economic balance of power from Europe to Asia, and a new military balance of power will follow, as history informs us. Consequently, the fate of American power now hinges on the Indo-Pacific, where the specter of Chinese regional hegemony looms large.

Washington is currently engaged in a vigorous debate over American grand strategy for the 21st century, with advocates of an Asia-first approach competing against those who prioritize Europe. As the Ukraine War drags on, this debate is likely to cross partisan lines. At its core is the question of whether a new successor, such as Japan, is taking over London’s role from the last century. There is little doubt that Japan now serves as the anchor of US power in the Indo-Pacific. The US-Japan alliance is poised to define America’s Asian and global role, as well as Japan’s survival—just as the US-UK alliance did in the 20th century.

In response to the 2012 report by Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, and Michael Green, which questioned whether Japan would become a Tier-two nation, the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe emphatically declared, “Japan is not, and will never be, a Tier-two country. That is the core message I am here to make. And I reiterate this by saying, I am back, and so shall Japan be.”

Abe was a transformative figure for Japan and its central role in American power.  Abe and Japanese defense planners were among the first to grasp the strategic and military implications of China’s rise and its effects on the balance of power in Asia, while Washington was embroiled in the endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Backed by the Japanese strategic community, Abe embarked on a mission to redefine the Asia-Pacific as the Indo-Pacific and successfully lobbied Washington to adopt this expanded regional concept.

This expansive “Indo-Pacific” geography led Abe to believe that India might play a significant role in the regional balance of power, as he hoped to achieve with his 2007 Delhi speech titled “Confluence of the Two Seas.” In other words, Japan’s strategic revival under Shinzo Abe significantly shaped the way the United States engages with East Asia and Asia as a whole.

Japan’s departure from its post-World War II pacifism, marked by a significant military buildup, stands in stark contrast to Germany’s predicament. While Germany confronts a direct Russian threat on its doorstep, Japan has chosen to abandon its self-imposed limitations in pursuit of a balance of power vis-a-vis China in the Indo-Pacific. Building on the bold moves made by the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s government in late 2022 approved a major expansion of Japan’s military capabilities, including a substantial increase in defense spending over five years with the aim of reaching 2% of GDP. Tokyo is now spending 1.6% of its GDP on defense, significantly increasing its military capabilities. This increased funding is helping the country acquire advanced missile capabilities and pursue ambitious projects such as the stealth aircraft project with Italy and the United Kingdom.

By focusing on rebuilding its defense capabilities that it has long neglected, Japan is demonstrating its determination to do more for its own defense and has ultimately led to the transformation of the US-Japan alliance beyond a mere bilateral relationship. Washington is increasingly treating Tokyo as a “co-pilot” in various multilateral formats in the Indo-Pacific, including the Quad with Australia and India, the Squad with Australia and the Philippines, and the Camp David trilateral with South Korea, and the Chip 4 group, which also includes South Korea and Taiwan.

There are active discussions about bringing Japan into the AUKUS Pillar 2 and leveraging Tokyo’s capital and engineering expertise to revitalize inactive or closed American shipyards. Japanese shipyards could be used to regularly overhaul and maintain US Navy warships, ensuring their readiness for potential conflicts in Asian waters, particularly around Taiwan. Co-piloting with Tokyo occurs hand in hand with the US revamping its command in Japan, granting it a “direct leadership role” over American forces in operational planning during peacetime and potential crises. These are glimpses of how Japan became a central pillar of US strategy not only in the Indo-Pacific but also in Asia and globally and how the US-Japan alliance is now entering a phase of joint alliance integration.

As the US-Japan alliance deepens, it mirrors the transatlantic alliance with Britain that won the two world wars in the last century—this time, poised to counterbalance China’s rise. The Indo-Pacific, now the heart of 21st-century geopolitics, is witnessing Japan’s role as America’s indispensable ally, shaping not only the region’s future but also the contours of a new global order for the remainder of this century. As history has shown, such alliances often redefine the very essence of power itself.

• About the author: Mohammed Soliman is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the director of the Strategic Technologies and Cyber Security Program at the Middle East Institute and a visiting fellow with the National Security Program at Third Way. He can be found on X at @Thisissoliman.
• Source: This article was published by FPRI