Thailand’s Ongoing Struggle For Democratic Stability – Analysis

By Greg Raymond

While 2023 was an unusual year for Thai politics featuring serious challenges to the deep-rooted rules of the country’s political system, 2024 saw a return to business as usual, albeit not without its own sound and fury.

Through its policy of reforming Thailand’s lese–majeste law, the Move Forward Party (MFP) — prima facie winners of the 2023 election — raised the prospect of Thailand starting on a path towards genuine democracy via measures to increase transparency and accountability in Thai institutions. But neither the monarchy, whose authority rests on waning charismatic and traditional legitimacy, nor the military, on whose coercive power the monarchy ultimately depends, was prepared to permit this.

The ‘secret deal’ in 2023 between the conservative establishment and the Pheu Thai party allowed exiled former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra to return home at the cost of entering a toxic alliance with his former nemeses — the military-proxy parties. This was a workaround to neutralise the MFP and maintain the facade of constitutional rule, obviating the need for a military coup.

With the deep rules largely settled, 2024 should have been the year the coalition government, led by former prime minister Srettha Thavisin, focused on restoring dynamism to the Thai economy — a difficult task given that serious educational or economic reform remains off the table. But instability seems embedded in Thai politics in the 21st century through three key features.

The first is the abundance of legal weapons that can be easily mobilised against political opponents. The 2017 constitution enables the removal of executive officeholders on vague character grounds. It also proclaims Thailand as a democracy with the monarch as head of state, meaning any party mentioning monarchical reform can be accused of seeking to overthrow the state.

Then there is Section 112 of the Thai Criminal Code, known as the lese–majeste law — a securitised defamation law that allows anyone to lodge an allegation at any police station without needing to provide evidence. It is a charge against which there is no defence based on truth.

The second feature is the class of ‘illiberal entrepreneurs’ — lower-tier elites who are broadly part of the regime but are not members of the selectorate (the top-tier of decision-making actors). These groups compete to demonstrate loyalty, settle factional scores and gain promotion. In doing so they exploit the legal tools mentioned above, undermining the stability of the executive government.

In August 2024, forty lame-duck senators aligned with former powerbroker and minister of defence Prawit Wongsuwan who used the 2017 constitution to bring down Pheu Thai prime minister Srettha Thavisin. The charge that Srettha had breached Section 160 of the constitution — which requires ministers to ‘not have behaviour which is a serious violation of or failure to comply with ethical standards’ — was weak. It was based on his appointment of an official who had previously offered a bribe to judges, a crime for which the official had already been punished.

The third feature is ‘uncivil society’ — conservative elements within Thai society who vehemently and occasionally violently oppose liberal sentiments and those who espouse them. In 2024, these groups targeted young people bold enough to question royal prerogatives, such as the practice of motorcade protocol.

Thaksin, a much less secure politician now than in his era of unrivalled popularity and power in the early 2000s, also became a target of the wrath of uncivil society. Cases under Section 112 and ‘overthrowing’ cases against Thaksin and his party remain active in the Thai legal system, meaning 2025 could well lead to more instability.

Meanwhile, Sondhi Limthongkul — a political agitator who had previously brought down a Thaksin-led government in 2006 — sought to mobilise nationalist sentiment over negotiations with Cambodia regarding maritime resources in the Gulf of Thailand.

Amid this turbulence, further steps were taken to consolidate the deep rules of the system. The junta-appointed senate was replaced through an opaque and byzantine process of self-nomination and internal voting, resulting in a new senate dominated by senators affiliated with the conservative and royalist Bhum Jai Thai party.

While the new senate will no longer appoint future prime ministers, it still appoints constitutional court judges and votes on matters concerning constitutional reform. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court finished the crackdown on the MFP, dissolving the party and banning its leaders from politics for attempting to reform Section 112.

As the year ended, the Pheu Thai party leadership demonstrated awareness of the deep rules that define the boundaries of acceptable policy. Thaksin and his daughter, current Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, swiftly shut down a proposal from within the party to move control of military appointments from the army chief to the Cabinet. After Section 112 reform, it is hard to think of a move that would have antagonised the palace-military complex more than seeking to take hold of military appointments.

In sum, 2024 was Thailand’s first full calendar year of civilian government under the 2017 constitution. It offered insights into the key dynamics of Thai politics for the foreseeable future, given that this constitution will be more difficult to change than previous iterations and that the military will continue to prefer mechanisms other than coups to counter perceived threats.

• About the author: Greg Raymond is Senior Lecturer at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, The Australian National University.
• Source: This article is part of an EAF special feature series on 2024 and the year ahead.