Pakistan: BLA Blowback In Baluchistan – Analysis
By SATP
By Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
On November 9, 2024, at least 31 persons, including 17 Security Forces (SFs) personnel, were killed and more than 60 persons, including 46 SF personnel sustained injuries, when a suicide bomber blew himself up near the ticket counter of the Quetta Railway Station in Balochistan. According to railway authorities, the Jaffar Express was scheduled to depart for Peshawar at 9 am. The train had not yet arrived at the platform when an explosion occurred near the station’s ticket office. Balochistan Inspector General of Police (IGP) Mouzzam Jah Ansari, stated that the target was Army personnel from the Infantry School. The Majeed Brigade of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility for the attack. “This morning, a Fidayee attack was carried out on a Pakistani army unit at Quetta Railway Station as they were returning via Jaffar Express after completing a course at the Infantry School,” the BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch said.
Later in the day, BLA released a detailed statement on its official media Hakkal, claiming it killed at least 31 non-commissioned officers of the Army and injured over 60 others. The BLA identified the suicide bomber as Muhammad Rafiq Bizenjo alias Washen alias Faheem. Bizenjo, a cadres of BLA’s “elite” Majeed Brigade, carried out the attack in response to what the BLA described as Pakistan’s “occupation” of Balochistan. According to the BLA, Bizenjo targeted Army personnel from multiple regiments, including the Punjab Regiment, Northern Light Infantry, Sindh Regiment, Frontier Force, Baloch Regiment, and Azad Kashmir Regiment. The soldiers had recently completed training at the School of Infantry and Tactics in Quetta, the BLA added. The BLA credited its intelligence wing, ZIRAB (Zephyr Intelligence Research and Analysis Bureau), with planning the attack. The group claimed ZIRAB monitored the Army’s movements closely and decided to delay the attack on November 8 to avoid civilian casualties. According to the BLA, November 9 was chosen because over 200 Army personnel were present, with minimal risk to civilians. In its statement, the BLA warned that if Pakistan’s military presence in Balochistan continues, future attacks will escalate and could extend to major cities in Pakistan.
On November 6, 2024, the BLA conducted an operation in station area of Nushki District in Balochistan, killing two “state-backed death squad” members, Israr Muhammad Hassani and Yasir Jamaldini. In a statement, BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch claimed that “Israr, from Badalkarez, and Yasir, from Killi Jamaldini, were on the payroll of the occupying forces.” Jeeyand Baloch added that the two were allegedly involved in military operations that included raids and enforced disappearances of Baloch youth. The group stated that they had been under surveillance prior to the attack and warned that others engaged in similar activities would “face similar consequences.”
On November 4, 2024, at least 10 soldiers were killed and another four sustained injuries, while two BLA cadres were also killed during a clash, after BLA ambushed a military convoy near the Qadirabad area of Nushki District. BLA claimed responsibility for the attack. BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch disclosed that two of the group’s cadres, Adnan Baloch and Yasir Baloch, were killed in the prolonged confrontation. “Despite his injuries, Martyr Adnan Baloch held his position for over an hour, covering his unit’s retreat before sacrificing his life,” Jeeyand Baloch added.
On October 28, 2024, the BLA killed five private security personnel deployed at a construction site in the Diz Paroom area of Panjgur District. BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch released a statement, claiming that the attack was carried out by BLA’s Fatah Squad, based on intelligence from BLA’s intelligence wing, Zirab. The attack targeted members of “death squads” allegedly supported by Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies, whom the BLA claims were engaged in counterinsurgency operations against the Baloch independence movement.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), in 59 BLA-linked incidents recorded in 2024, at least 254 persons, including 83 civilians, 122 SF personnel and 49 militants, have been killed (data till November 10, 2024). During the corresponding period of 2023, 34 such incidents resulted in 69 fatalities, including 16 civilians, 45 SF personnel and eight militants. The whole of 2023 recorded 39 incidents in which 77 persons were killed, including 19 civilians, 50 SF personnel and eight militants. Since the Balochistan tryst with insurgency, year 2024 has so far been the most violent, with BLA leading from the front among all the Baloch insurgent groups, orchestrating most of the attacks.
Since August 1, 2004, when the first BLA-linked incident, was recorded by SATP, at least 912 persons, including 277 civilians, 393 SF personnel, 222 militants, and 20 in the Not Specified category, have been killed (data till November 10, 2024). On August 1, 2004, five soldiers and a civilian were killed when BLA cadres targeted SF vehicles in the Khuzdar District.
The long-term state policy of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings has led to a spiral of retaliatory attacks and violence by Baloch insurgents, targeting SFs and state establishments in the province. Civilians, especially members of state-backed ‘death squad’ have also been targeted. In this environment of chaos, Islamist terrorist groups have also thrived and even joined the Baloch groups. The major active Baloch insurgent groups include the Baloch National Army (BNA), BLA, Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Balochistan Liberation Tigers (BLT) and United Baloch Army (UBA). Among all the Baloch groups, the BLA has proved the most lethal.
Comprised mostly of Marri and Bugti tribe members, BLA was formed in response to the growing resentment in Balochistan over the continuous Government exploitation of the province’s natural resources and the neglect of development and welfare in the province. The group has about 6,000 cadres spread across Balochistan and in the bordering areas of Afghanistan. Sardar Akbar Khan Bugti, former Chief Minister of Balochistan is considered one of the ‘grandfathers’ of the organization and was killed in an Army operation on August 26, 2006. After Akbar Khan Bugti’s death, Balach Marri led the group, till his death in Afghanistan on 21 November 2007. After Balach’s death, his brother, Hyrbyair Marri has led the group since 2007, from exile in London. Bashir Zeb Baloch is the ‘commander-in-chief’ of the outfit.
Out of all Baloch insurgent groups, the BLA is the only one that has a dedicated suicide attack squad, the ‘Majeed Brigade’, named after two brothers, Majeed Langove Senior and Majeed Langove Junior, who carried out suicide attacks in August 1974 and March 2010, respectively. Majeed Senior tried to assassinate then Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto when he was on an official visit to Quetta. He wanted to kill the Prime Minister for his dismissal of the National Awami Party’s government in Balochistan, but Majeed Senior lost his life during the operation. Majeed Junior ‘sacrificed’ himself to save his associates when SFs raided the house where they were staying in Quetta’s Wahdat Colony. Majeed Junior held back the SF raiders to give his associates time to escape. Following Majeed Junior’s death, a BLA leader, Aslam Achu, established the insurgent group’s suicide squad, and named it the Majeed Brigade, currently led by Hammal Rehan Baloch. The Brigade carried out its first vehicle-borne suicide attack on December 30, 2011, when Baaz Khan Marri targeted tribal elder Shafiq Mengal, son of former acting Chief Minister and Federal Minister Naseer Mengal, on the Arbab Karam Khan Road in Quetta. Shafeeq, who had run a ‘death squad’ targeting Baloch insurgents in different parts of the province, escaped unhurt, but 14 persons, including women and children, were killed, and 35 were injured.
Apart from Majeed Brigade, BLA have a has special forces, the Special Tactical Operations Squad (STOS), under the command of Bashir Zeb Baloch, which has been monitoring and eliminating Army officers and their local “death squad” collaborators. STOS’ main function is the tracking of and intelligence gathering on targets.
BLA formed a new elite group, the ‘Fateh Squad’, whose cadres are known for their specialised skills. The Fateh Squad was formed in May 2021 after one of BLA’s ‘martyrs’, Fateh Qambrani, was killed during an operation to capture a Pakistani Army camp in the Meshdari area of Shahrag in Harnai District in September 2018. His action enabled the full capture of the Army camp. Fateh Qambrani also played a prominent role in various other operations. The cadres of the Fateh Squad are selected on the basis of their exceptional skills and face-to-face battle experience. They lead their fighters directly into Pakistani Army and paramilitary camps, paving the way for other fighters to enter the camps.
The growing strength and lethality of the BLA can be assessed by the August 25-26, 2024, coordinated and simultaneous attacks across seven Districts, ‘Operation Hereof’ (Operation Dark Storm). This was the largest act of retribution by any Baloch insurgent group. In the early morning of August 26, 2024, BLA cadres offloaded passengers from trucks and buses in the Rarasham area of Musakhail District and shot them after checking their identities. At least 23 Punjabi travellers were killed. The armed men also set fire to 10 vehicles. As the day progressed, Balochistan recorded multiple attacks across the province, which left at least 38 people dead, including the 23 in Musakhail. In response, SFs neutralised 21 terrorists and injured several others. BLA cadres then targeted Levies Forces and Police Stations in Mastung, Kalat, Pasni, and Suntsar, resulting in numerous casualties. Explosions and grenade attacks were reported in Sibi, Panjgur, Mastung, Turbat, Bela, and Quetta, with militants blowing up a railway track near Mastung. The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) issued a statement later in the day, claiming that 21 terrorists had been killed, while 14 SF personnel, including four from law enforcement agencies, were killed during ‘clearance operations’.
However, in a statement released on its official media, Hakkal, BLA announced the successful completion of its Fidayeen Operation Hereof, claiming to have killed 130 military personnel during a series of coordinated attacks across Balochistan. BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch claimed that the group’s elite fidayeen unit, the Majeed Brigade, had “maintained control over the Bela Camp for 20 hours,” during which “68 military personnel were killed and dozens more injured.” The BLA also reported that its Fateh Squad and Special Tactical Operations Squad (STOS) had set up blockades on major highways across Balochistan, leading to the deaths of 62 military personnel. “After achieving the objectives of Operation Herof, the roadblocks on all highways were lifted,” the statement read.
Some of the other major attacks by the BLA in 2024 include:
October 8: Eight soldiers were killed and three were injured in two consecutive attacks by BLA cadres in the Gonden Marao area of Ispelanji in Mastung District. In a statement to the media, BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeeyand Baloch said the attack took place in the Gonden Marao area of Ispelanji, where BLA cadres ambushed a Security Force convoy using heavy and automatic weapons.
June 24: At least 11 soldiers were killed and an unspecified number sustained injuries when BLA cadres attacked a military camp in the Iskalko area of Kalat District.
April 29: At least ten soldiers were killed and their military vehicle was completely destroyed in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack by BLA cadres in the Peer Ismail Indus area of Bolan District.
April 12: BLA cadres shot dead 11 passengers of Punjabi ethnicity on N-40 Regional Corporations Development (RCD) highway after checking their identities from a passenger bus in the Nushki. The victims were from Wazirabad, Mandi Bahauddin and Gujranwala Districts of Punjab. BLA claimed that they were Government employees.
March 25: Majeed Brigade cadres attacked the PNS Siddique Naval Air Station in the Turbat town of Kech District and claimed that more than 30 soldiers were killed. The Army, however, stated it thwarted the attack and killed four BLA cadres, while one soldier was killed.
March 20: Majeed Brigade cadres attacked the Gwadar Port Authority (GPA) Complex in Gwadar town (Gwadar District) and killed two soldiers. SFs, however, stated that they thwarted the attack and killed eight BLA cadres.
January 29: Nine BLA cadres, four Railway Police personnel and two civilians were killed, while four others, including two SF personnel and one child, sustained injuries when the Majeed Brigade launched three coordinated attacks targeting the Frontier Corps Headquarters, the Railway Station and the District Jail in the Mach town of Kachhi District. BLA ‘spokesperson’, Jeeyand Baloch claimed the attack, stating that it was a joint attack in coordination with other factions, during which BLA insurgents controlled Mach city and surrounding areas for over 72 hours.
Horrified with continuous and escalating BLA attacks, security personnel have started hesitating to serve in Balochistan. After the August 25-26 coordinated attacks, while chairing the Provincial Apex Committee in Quetta on August 30, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif emphasized the need for the deployment of capable and talented officers in Balochistan, acknowledging that, due to security concerns, some officers hesitate to serve in the province. However, under a new policy regarding officer deployment, officers from the 48th Common Training Program will be posted in Balochistan for one year, while officers from the 49th Common Training Program will be posted for one and a half years, after completing one year. Prime Minister Sharif also announced that special incentives would be provided to officers deployed in Balochistan, including four air tickets for their families every three months.
Heightening tensions, the Balochistan Police issued a notification on October 28, warning officers that the BLA was planning abductions of Government officials in Panjgur, Kech and Awaran Districts. “High-ranking officials such as DPOs, DCs, or ACs could be targeted in retaliation for the recent disappearance of BLA leader Basheer Zeb’s brother, Zaheer Baloch,” the Police notification stated. Zaheer Baloch went ‘missing’ on June 27 en route from his office on Quetta’s Zarghoon Road to his home on Sariab Road.
Instead of dealing with the Baloch insurgency through constructive measures such as peace-talks, negotiations or economic and relief measures to improve the abysmal developmental profile of the province, the Pakistan establishments has been following a ruthless approach of suppression of the Baloch people. On August 22, 2024, the Government approved PKR 60 billion to carry out Operation Azm-e-Istehkam (Commitment for Stability) to fight militancy in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In response, the BLA-led Baloch Raj Aajoi Sangar (BRAS), an umbrella organization of Baloch ‘pro-independence’ groups, issued a statement on July 8, 2024, against Pakistan’s military campaign. In a media release, BRAS ‘spokesperson’ Baloch Khan condemned the operation as a blatant intensification of the ongoing ‘genocide’ against the Baloch people. He asserted that BRAS and its allied organizations were prepared to defend their land and people against any form of military action, promising to defeat the ‘invading’ forces.
While the violence in the province has social and developmental grievances, the Federal Government’s recent plan for the establishment of “internment centres” for terrorism suspects in the province and the November 1 proposed amendment to the Anti-Terrorism Act, granting the armed forces and paramilitary units the authority to detain individuals involved in serious crimes for up to three months, will further aggravate the issues of enforced disappearances in the province, likely provoking more BLA orchestrated attacks in the coming days.
- Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
The obvious thing is some kind of twin-track approach, continuing to go after and eliminate the militants but alongside significant, long-term, fully embedded, high-profile and popular changes to improve the lives of the people in this province? What is stopping that obvious thing from happening?