Tripolar Instability: Nuclear Competition Among The United States, Russia, And China – Book Review

The development of nuclear weapons by the erstwhile Soviet Union (USSR) in 1949 marked the beginning of nuclear polarisation between the USSR and the US, which became the major element of the Cold War. China joined the nuclear club when it crossed the nuclear threshold in 1964 and maintained a minimum deterrence policy with a No First Use (NFU) doctrine.

However, recent developments in Taiwan Straits, South and East China Seas have transformed the strategic status quo compelling China to work towards achieving a more favorable nuclear equation vis-a-vis the US in terms of warheads and delivery systems, altering the strategic landscape in response to the changing global environment. In his book Tripolar Instability: Nuclear Competition among the United States, Russia and China, Robert Litwak explores the transition from a bipolar nuclear world to what Henry Kissinger called “a new era” of tripolar nuclear security and rivalry between the US, Russia and China. 

The book comprises four chapters. First chapter addresses the destabilising shift from the two great powers (US and USSR) to an emergent tripolar nuclear order in which China seeks to maintain a balance of power with the US and Russia. Chapters two and three describe the strategic stability as an interaction between arms race stability and crisis stability. The final chapter assesses the risks and challenges to security in the event of a tripolar world phenomenon in which the rules-based system has been largely destroyed.

The theme of the book revolves around the argument that the combination of emerging nuclear tripolarity and geostrategic tensions over Ukraine and Taiwan are recreating two interlocking Cold War risks. These factors threaten to undermine both arms race stability and crisis stability – the two elements that comprise strategic stability (p.6). Analysts have identified two major risks in the emergent tripolar nuclear order: (i) the stability-instability paradox; and (ii) balance of terror. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was a clear example of the potentially catastrophic consequences of “unmanaged competition” between the US and the USSR. In its aftermath, a key factor in strategic stability has been the threat of retaliation, based on assured second-strike nuclear capability. From this perspective, China’s development of a larger survivable nuclear force may play a stabilising role (p.87) by deterring potential aggression from other nuclear powers and reducing the risk of nuclear conflict. 

Litwak, in describing the transition period of the post-Cold War era, argues that the triangular relationship among the three powers – US, Russia and China – has created new strategic challenges and complexities that are not adequately addressed by existing nuclear deterrence theories and arms control agreements. According to the author, each leg of the triangle is not equivalent because of the uneven distribution of their power (economic and military) and trilateral politics, which have evolved over the decades. (p.22) 

One of the book’s strengths lies in its thorough analysis of each country’s nuclear strategy and posture. Litwak delves into the doctrinal shifts, modernisation efforts, and strategic calculations that underpin the nuclear policies of the US, Russia and China. He provides a nuanced understanding of how these countries perceive each other’s capabilities and intentions, and how these perceptions shape their respective approaches to deterrence and arms control. For example, the US withdrawal from Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, had implications for the sufficiency of China’s minimum deterrent posture. Secondly, the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, concluded with the Soviet Union in 1988, could now permit US deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Asia to counter China. (p.33)

The author has also explored the implications of emerging technologies, such as hypersonic weapons, missile defense systems, cyber capabilities and artificial intelligence, on the strategic stability of the tripolar nuclear competition. The extension of strategic competition into the domains of cyberspace and outer space creates additional escalatory risks that undermine crisis stability. He raises important questions about the potential for miscalculation and inadvertent escalation in today’s more complex and less predictable environment.

Beyond assessment, Litwak also offers thoughtful policy recommendations aimed at mitigating the risks associated with tripolar nuclear competition. He advocates renewed diplomatic engagement and avoiding the use of conventional military weapons to prevent inadvertent escalation among the three powers, emphasising the need for innovative arms control frameworks that account for the realities of the current strategic landscape. The author also underscores the importance of crisis communication mechanisms to reduce the likelihood of accidental or unintended conflict. (p.107)

The book is well-researched and comprehensive in its contents. The issues discussed are complex and require close attention of the reader. However, for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners in the field of global security, Litwak’s analysis provides invaluable insights and a fresh perspective on the evolving dynamics of nuclear competition in the 21st century. The author’s work stands out for its depth of analysis and relevance to contemporary global security challenges. The book not only elucidates the dangers inherent in the current tripolar nuclear order but also offers a constructive path forward for reducing the risks associated with catastrophic conflicts. The book is a timely contribution to the discourse on global security, particularly in an era marked by growing geopolitical tensions and the erosion of established arms control frameworks.