India: Final Battle In Chhattisgarh? – Analysis
By SATP
By Deepak Kumar Nayak
On January 12, 2025, at least five Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres, including two women, were killed in an encounter with the Security Forces (SFs) in a forest in the Indravati National Park area of Bijapur District in the Bastar Division. Based on specific inputs about the presence of Maoists in the jungle area of the National Park, a team of SFs launched an anti-Maoist operation during which there was an intermittent exchange of fire between the forces and the Maoists. SFs recovered five dead bodies of the Maoists (identities are yet to be ascertained) in uniform, along with a Self-Loading Rifle (SLR), two rifles, a 12-bore gun, a grenade launcher, country made guns and explosives, from the encounter site. No security personnel sustained injuries in the gun battle.
On January 9, 2025, SFs, aided by drones, killed three wanted CPI-Maoist cadres in an encounter in the hilly terrains between the Paliguda and Gundarajgudem villages in Sukma District in the Bastar Division. The bodies were recovered by SFs along with a huge cache of arms and ammunition, including two Barrel Grenade Launchers (BGLs), a 12-bore rifle, three tiffin bombs, five BGL shells and a cache of explosives and Maoist-related items from the site. Police said that among the three killed in Sukma was IED expert Mahesh Korsaz, a Maoist ‘deputy commander’ in platoon no. 30, who was earlier a part of the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) Battalion 1 – the strongest armed group of the Maoists. Superintendent of Police (SP) Kiran G. Chavan disclosed that Korsaz was a mastermind in the 2023 Bedre attack [December 17, 2023, in which a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) sub-inspector (SI) was killed and a constable was seriously injured] and the 2024 Jagargunda attack [November 3, 2024, in which two security personnel sustained injuries and their weapons looted]. Mahesh carried a bounty of INR 800,000 on his head. The two others, Madvi Naveen and Avlam Bheema, were ‘area committee members (ACMs)’ and carried a bounty of INR 500,000 each.
On January 6, 2025, eight security personnel of the District Reserve Guard (DRG) and a driver were killed on the Kutru-Bedre route in Bijapur District of the Bastar Division, when CPI-Maoist cadres triggered an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blast and blew up their vehicle. The SFs were returning from an operation when the IED blew up the Scorpio SUV at Kutru in the Bastar region at around 2:15 PM [IST].
On January 5, 2025, five CPI-Maoist cadres in uniform and one SF trooper were killed during an encounter in the Abujhmadh area of Narayanpur District in the Bastar Division. Bodies of five Maoists were recovered along with automatic weapons, including an AK-47 rifle and an SLR, from the encounter site. Police suspect that senior cadres of the CPI-Maoist’s PLGA platoon number 32 of the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC) were among the deceased, though definitive identification was still to be made at the time of writing. Head Constable Sannu Karam of the Dantewada DRG was also killed.
On January 3, 2025, a CPI-Maoist cadre was shot dead in the Sornamal Forest area of Gariabandh District, in a joint interstate operation launched by the Chhattisgarh and Odisha Police. The body of the slain Maoist and automatic weapons were recovered from the site of the encounter.
Since the beginning of 2025, at least five incidents of clashes between the Maoists and SFs have already been recorded in Chhattisgarh, yielding 24 fatalities (one civilian, nine SF personnel, and 14 Maoists), where the ongoing battle to end Naxalism [Left Wing Extremism, LWE] is going on (data till January 12).
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Chhattisgarh registered 313 fatalities, including 57 civilians, 21 SF personnel, and 235 Maoists, in Maoist-related violence in 2024. In 2023, there were a total of 86 fatalities, including 37 civilians, 26 SF personnel, and 23 Maoists. Thus, a spike of a whopping 263.95 per cent was documented in terms of overall fatalities in the state. Moreover, in 2024, Chhattisgarh continued to hold its top spot in terms of fatalities (313 out of a total of 400 nationwide) registered in a state during the course of a year, with Maharashtra a distant second, with 27 fatalities, and Jharkhand at third, with 26. Chhattisgarh has been in the top spot since 2014. Jharkhand secured the top spot in 2013, with 130 fatalities, as compared to 125 in Chhattisgarh, in second place.
Despite tremendous gains, civilians remain vulnerable to Maoist depredations, and faced an increased threat in the State in 2024, with fatalities in this category increasing from 37 to 57, or 54.05 per cent, in comparison to 2023. Civilian fatalities in 2024 were the highest recorded in the state since 2018, when they stood at 59. The 2024 civilian fatalities are the sixth highest recorded since March 6, 2000, when SATP started compiling data on LWE-linked insurgency in the state as well as in the country. A maximum of 186 fatalities was recorded in 2006. A low of six civilian fatalities was recorded in 2001. Civilian fatalities in Chhattisgarh have registered a cyclical trend, on year-on-year basis, since then.
In the fight against the extremists, there has been a sharp improvement in SF dominance on the ground in Chhattisgarh, with the SF:Maoist kill ratio in 2024 at 1:11.19, as compared to 1.13:1 in favour of the Maoists in 2023. Over the past quarter century, since 2000, the ratio has been in favour of SFs for 13 years and has favoured the Maoists in nine, while it was at par twice (2015 and 2021). No fatality was recorded in either category in 2000. The most positive ratio in favour of SFs was 1:20, in 2004. The overall kill ratio since 2020 has favoured the SFs at 1:1.32.
Meanwhile, at least 265 Maoists were arrested in the State in 2024, in addition to 134 in 2023. At least 76 Maoists were arrested in 2022, 132 in 2021, and 99 in 2020. In addition, 332 Maoists surrendered in 2024, in addition to 201 in 2023. There were 184 surrenders in 2022, 328 in 2021, and 238 in 2020.
The State recorded 24 major incidents (each involving three or more fatalities) in 2024, in addition to four in 2023. There were 76 exchanges of fire between SFs and the Maoists in 2024 in Chhattisgarh, as against 44 in 2023. The Maoists also orchestrated 32 incidents of IED blasts in 2024, in addition to 31 in 2023.
In total, 288 Maoist-linked incidents were reported in 2024 as compared to 246 such incidents in 2023.
Violence in the ‘Bastar Division’ which remained the major challenge for the State in particular and the country at large, also registered a spike of 287.34 per cent (from 79 fatalities in 2023 to 306 in 2024). The Bastar Division comprises seven of Chhattisgarh’s 33 Districts – Bastar, Bijapur, Dantewada, Kanker, Kondagaon, Narayanpur, and Sukma – in the southernmost region in the State.
According to the SATP database, Maoist-linked fatalities were reported from nine districts in 2024: Bijapur (102), Narayanpur (101), Sukma (39), Kanker (37), Dantewada (26), Dhamtari (two), Kondagaon (one), Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki (one), and Raipur (one). Six of these nine Districts (excluding Dhamtari, Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki and Raipur) fall in the troubled ‘Bastar Division’.
Fatalities were reported from 10 Districts in 2023: Bijapur (18), Dantewada (18), Sukma (17), Kanker (14), Narayanpur (12), Gariabandh (three), Kondagaon (two), Rajnandgaon (two), Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki (one), and Dhamtari (one).
An analysis of underground and over-ground activities of the Maoists in 2024, indicated that two Districts (Bijapur and Narayanpur) remained extremely affected; three Districts (Dantewada, Kanker, and Sukma) were highly-affected; four (Dhamtari, Kondagaon, Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki, and Raipur) were moderately affected; while Bastar, Gariabandh, Kabirdham, Jashpur, and Rajnandgaon, remained marginally affected. By comparison, in 2023, five Districts (Bijapur, Dantewada, Kanker, Narayanpur, and Sukma) were highly-affected; five (Dhamtari, Gariabandh, Kondagaon, Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki, and Rajnandgaon) were moderately affected; and four (Bastar, Balrampur, Jashpur, and Khairagarh-Chhuikhadan-Gandai), were marginally affected.
The all-out fight against the Maoist rebels under the Vishnu Deo Sai Government has seen technology driven interventions, such as aerial surveillance and tracking mechanisms, as well as the setting up of security camps in hitherto inaccessible areas, as well as the facilitation of development projects in areas of erstwhile Maoist dominance. Most recently, on January 9, 2025, SFs launched a massive offensive against the Maoists, aided by drones.
An unnamed security official attached to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) observed, “The UAVs are being used to launch offensives against the Maoists and also to keep an eye on the personnel conducting operations and area-domination exercises in rebel strongholds… But it’s still a big challenge as the rebels have total control inside the jungle.”
Meanwhile, according to a December 9, 2024, report, the Chhattisgarh Government established a new security camp, Zidpalli 2, in the PLGA core zone of Zidpalli village in Bijapur District. The move is part of Chief Minister Sai’s flagship scheme, Niyad Nellanar (Your Good Village), aimed at enhancing security, infrastructure, and public services in Maoist-affected areas. Under the scheme, essential services such as medical care, ration outlets, schools, and electricity are being provided in insurgency-hit districts.
The National Investigation Agency (NIA) also took proactive action on 14 occasions against the Maoist rebels to contain their activities and influences. Most recently, on December 20, 2024, the NIA chargesheeted three CPI-Maoist cadres in Chhattisgarh for the murder of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Ratan Dubey (November 4, 2024). The trio, Sainuram Korram, Laluram Korram, and one armed cadre, were charged under sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) in the supplementary chargesheet filed before the NIA Special Court at Jagdalpur in the Bastar District. The accused were found actively involved in the criminal conspiracy to kill Dubey. Sainuram Korram and Laluram Korram were arrested on June 27, 2024.
Earlier, on March 8, 2024, NIA took over the probe into approximately eight cases of violence associated with the CPI-Maoist, including the January ambush on a CRPF camp in Bijapur District, an IED blast in Kanker, and the killing of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Ratan Dubey in Narayanpur District. An official disclosed that NIA would also investigate the role of supporters of Madvi Hidma, the ‘commander’ of Battalion-I of the PLGA, who carries a reward of close to INR 4 million.
Moreover, on August 10, 2024, the Chhattisgarh Police arrested five so-called ‘urban Naxals’ – alleged overground supporters – identified as Sonaram Farsa (28), Vijay Jurri (32), Ramlal Karma (35), Vivek Singh (35), and Rajendra Kadti (30), for involvement in a CPI-Maoist extortion racket that collected at least INR 6 million for the insurgent network from the Bijapur and Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki Districts. This money was used to buy supplies and also to book flight tickets for ‘tribal leader and Maoist sympathiser’ Sarju Tekam. Tekam was arrested from his home in Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki on April 2, 2024, and charged under UAPA and the Explosives Act for possession of explosives, detonators and Maoist material. Jurri is from Raipur and the others are residents of Bijapur. They were arrested from various parts of the Mohla Manpur region, their area of operation. Police kept a watch on Vivek Singh and found that he was engaged in continuously supporting and strengthening the Naxalites’ urban network. According to Police, the Maoists had threatened tendu leaf contractors in the Bhairamgarh area (Bijapur district) in 2022 and demanded INR 10 million. Farsa, Jurri, Karma and Kadti were deputed to collect this extortion money and managed to extract INR 6 million from an officer. This cash made its way into the Maoist coffers.
On August 24, 2024, at a press conference after chairing a key security meet on anti-Naxalite operations in Chhattisgarh, Union Home Minister (UHM) Amit Shah proclaimed, “We will free India from Naxal violence by March 2026. The time has come for the final assault on Left Wing Extremism.”
Again, on December 15, 2024, while addressing the President’s Police Colour Award function at the Police Parade Ground in Raipur, UHM Shah reiterated, “The state leadership, the chief minister, the home minister of the state, have taken a pledge and the Government of India is also committed to your pledge. Together, we will completely eradicate Naxalism from Chhattisgarh before March 31, 2026. We all are committed to free Chhattisgarh from the clutches of Naxalism before March 31, 2026.”
The imposed deadline – to eradicate the menace of Naxalism from the state before March 31, 2026 – has resulted in over-reach and produced disasters such as the January 6, 2025, incident. Time and again, unforgivably, the same excuses have been given in the past past, after each tragedy. The state and its forces must, of course, be given a defined objective and target, but one that is aligned to the realities of the ground. The ‘complete eradication’ of the Maoist movement is not such as objective. While the movement is likely to be substantially contained over the coming year, occasional incidents by survivors cannot be discounted.
Moreover, Chhattisgarh continues to suffer critical gaps in the strength and quality in the State Police Force, which constitutes the first line of defence against any kind of internal challenge. According to the latest Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) data, as on January 1, 2023, there was a vacancy of 19.50 per cent in the State Police Force (sanctioned 80,135; actual 64,502). Police personnel per 100,000 population in Chhattisgarh currently stand at a sanctioned 266.79, while those actually available are 214.74. Worse, with an extraordinarily challenging terrain in large parts of state, the critical Police/Area Ratio (number of policemen per 100 square kilometres) is just 47.71, as against the national average of 65.14. Both the State and national averages on the Police/Area ratio are well below their sanctioned strength, at 59.27 and 82.82, respectively. Further, of a sanctioned strength of 142 apex Indian Police Service (IPS) Officers in the State, 23 posts, i.e., 16.19 per cent remained vacant, considerably weakening executive command of the Force. As against a sanctioned strength of 482 Police Stations, there were 474 in the State and, inexcusably, at least 24 of these had no telephones.
Despite suffering heavy losses, the Maoists have persevered, demonstrating significant fighting capabilities whenever there is any neglect on the part of the state’s Forces and administration. The rebels have, moreover, demonstrated significant endurance and capacities for revival, even in the face of near-comprehensive defeat. While the objective of their containment is rational and attainable, a measure of haste and artificial deadlines can only push the state’s Forces into sometimes ill-considered deployments and operations. Moreover, at a time when the SFs have established dominance across wide areas of past Maoist influence, it is necessary not to completely exclude the possibilities of a political outreach to end this enduring insurgency.
- Deepak Kumar Nayak
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management