Myanmar Is Reeling From Devastating Earthquake, But Military Junta More Concerned With Its Own Survival – OpEd

The March 28 earthquake, measuring 7.7 on the Richter scale, has hit Myanmar hard. It was the strongest since 1912, with its epicentre in Mandalay, the country’s second-most populous city, the United States Geological Survey reported. The official death toll continues to rise. By the end of April, 3,800 people had been killed, 5,100 injured and 116 missing, according to the ASEAN Disaster Relief Coordination Centre (AHA Centre). That number has risen to 5,352 dead in Myanmar and 96 in Thailand. Up to 11,404 people were injured and hundreds more were missing, including those from a collapsed construction site in Bangkok.

As Frontier reports from Nay Pyi Taw, Mandalay and Sagaing, the vast majority of relief workers were ill-equipped volunteers with insufficient tools. NASA analyses show that the ground has shifted as much as 20 feet in some places.

The vastly more resourced military, unlike during previous disasters such as Typhoon Yagi in 2024 and Cyclone Mocha in 2023, has generally deployed only small groups of soldiers to protect prominent buildings, escort visiting generals and clear rubble from important Buddhist sites. Tatmadaw troops, notably, have not been recalled from the front lines to help with earthquake relief. Mandalay residents say the military has failed to prevent looting in the city.

Numerous foreign rescue teams have pulled survivors out of some of the worst-hit areas, but in some cases the junta has banned access. Groups that rely on private donations have seen their budgets shrink in tandem with the economy. Some have channeled foreign aid, particularly from the West, but President Donald Trump’s dismantling of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) means there is far less money to distribute.

The substantial aid provided by China and Russia has largely been channeled through the junta, making it subject to its whims and minimal transparency.

Aid workers told Frontier that the junta is in disarray and too disorganized to impose drastic restrictions. With tens of thousands of people still homeless as the monsoon season approaches, aid agencies warn of major challenges ahead.

But with months of recovery work ahead, the regime is likely to try to exert more control. Ominously, it already seems to be establishing new reporting rules for aid agencies and journalists. Western international news outlets, particularly Radio Free Asia and Voice of America, are also struggling as a result of Trump’s ‘decrees’. However, “China is wasting no time in filling the void left by the US withdrawal from the information sector in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.”

Global media attention is rapidly waning.

The junta’s priorities

Although the military junta declared a ceasefire to allow humanitarian aid to flow, it has continued aggressive operations – including airstrikes and artillery fire – even after the ceasefire was supposed to take effect on April 2. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), at least 172 attacks took place during the first ceasefire, 73 of them in earthquake-affected areas. In Oe Htein Kwin, a village about 100 kilometers northwest of the quake’s epicenter, 20 schoolchildren and two teachers were killed in an airstrike by the junta. UN chief Antonio Guterres was “deeply shocked” by the reports of the attack, his spokesman told reporters in New York. He added that “schools must remain places where children can learn safely and are not bombed.”

Equally alarming is the growing repression within Myanmar’s prison system. In March 2025, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) reported that more than 22,100 people had been charged by the junta since the 2021 coup, of whom more than 10,700 had been convicted. Although the regime announced a mass amnesty in April 2025, releasing nearly 4,900 prisoners, there were still 380 political prisoners. At least 87 people died in custody between September and December 2024 alone, many as a result of torture, denial of medical care and inhuman treatment. The continued imprisonment of elected officials, journalists, human rights defenders and student activists illustrates the regime’s relentless campaign to silence dissent.

As Myanmar’s people mourn the dead, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing visited Bangkok. It was his first trip to a Southeast Asian country since the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus agreed in Jakarta two months after the 2021 coup. He shook hands with Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the 6th Summit of the Heads of State/Government of the Member States of BIMSTEC  (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) held in Bangkok on April 4. 

The International Parliamentary Inquiry into the Global Response to the Coup in Myanmar (IPI), organized by ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR), already stated in its final report of November 2022 that “it is clear that the Five Point Consensus has failed and that a new form of engagement is needed.” As a witness for the IPI noted, “it was abundantly clear from the outset that Min Aung Hlaing was dishonest in signing it and had no intention of adhering to it.” But the other ASEAN leaders also appear to use double standards.

Increasing food insecurity

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) warns that the earthquake will worsen food insecurity in Myanmar. After four years of war, half of the 55 million population already lives in poverty and 3.5 million people were displaced before the earthquake. The FAO estimated that the quake affected more than 3.7 million hectares of cropland in the Sagaing, Mandalay and Magway regions, as well as Shan State. These areas account for a third of Myanmar’s grain production and almost 80 percent of its maize production. Widespread damage was reported to cropland, storage facilities, agricultural machinery and irrigation systems, the UN agency said. The quake also affected Myanmar’s fisheries and “significant” livestock production, the agency said.

The ‘resistance’ remains internally divided

It is important to note that ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and anti-coup groups do not reflect real unity or alliances. Beneath the surface of the anti-military alliance lurks a deeper internal struggle, shaped by complex divisions over class, ethnicity and national identity. While the majority of the Bamar population sees the revolution primarily as a class struggle against the military elite, the country’s ethnic minorities see it as a crucial attempt to protect their cultural identity and gain greater autonomy. These divergent perspectives reflect historical tensions between the Bamar dominant and Myanmar’s marginalized ethnic groups, exacerbated by decades of military rule, Burmanization, and the exclusionary politics of the state. Thus, these tensions between ethnic armed groups and between anti-coup groups do not all share the same political goals beyond simply fighting the Myanmar military.

Before the earthquake, the military was in talks with certain ethnic armed organizations, such as the Kokang Army or the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNTJP/MNDAA) and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP). Both groups are members of the Federal Political Negotiations Advisory Committee, led by the powerful United Wa State Army. 

However, the military has consistently refused to recognize the National Unity Government (NUG), offer peace talks with the anti-coup groups operating under the NUG (most of which are active in the two earthquake-affected regions), or acknowledge their demands.

The military has consistently ignored calls from resistance groups for grassroots federalism and has never suggested that practical steps would be taken toward national reconciliation. Instead, the junta leader has announced that the December elections will go ahead as planned, which resistance groups have dismissed as a stunt. This insistence on going ahead with the elections indicates that the military is still not interested in meaningful peace negotiations.

The current ceasefire with the MNDAA and the return of Lashio to the military appear to have come about only because of intense pressure from China on the MNTJP/MNDAA, rather than because of the goodwill of the military. Both the humanitarian ceasefire between the army and the Arakan Army (ULA/AA) in November 2022 and the Haigen Agreement signed by the army and the Three Brotherhood Alliance in January 2024 were broken within a year.

APHR Fact-Finding Mission

From April 28 to May 1 2025, an ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) fact-finding mission to Mae Sot, Thailand, took place. Traditionally a haven for displaced Myanmar communities, Mae Sot now hosts overstretched civil society actors, informal schools and makeshift shelters, which struggle to provide protection to the large numbers of displaced people and refugees without legal recognition or formal support.

The mission reveals a worsening humanitarian and political crisis along the Thailand-Myanmar border, exacerbated by continued military aggression, reduced humanitarian assistance and regional diplomatic inertia.

APHR calls on ASEAN and its member states to address the challenge with urgency and determination:

• Thailand must provide legal protection to refugees from Myanmar, including access to employment, health care, education, protection and humanitarian assistance, keep the border open and allow refugees safe passage.

• ASEAN must urgently establish a comprehensive humanitarian architecture and financing by establishing a regional cross-border aid mechanism, with transparent disbursement and oversight, that bypasses the junta.

• ASEAN must also exert sustained pressure on the Myanmar military and all armed actors to cease attacks on civilians and the indiscriminate use of explosive weapons in populated areas. Compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights obligations – in particular the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure such as hospitals and schools.

• ASEAN must stop treating the junta as a legitimate stakeholder and instead engage directly with Myanmar’s democratic forces, ethnic authorities and civil society actors. 

The junta’s continued violation of the Five-Point Consensus of ASEAN underscores the urgent need for a new regional approach – one based on accountability, inclusion and the protection of civilians. 

Yuyun Wahyuningrum, Executive Director of APHR, concluded: “This is no longer just Thailand’s problem – it is ASEAN’s crisis that must be addressed. The continued airstrikes, systematic repression and exploitation of humanitarian channels reveal the junta’s true intentions.” She went on to say: “ASEAN’s inability to act decisively only reinforces its impunity. The time for vague consensus is over. ASEAN must reorient itself. Focus its diplomacy on justice, protection of civilians and the restoration of democracy in Myanmar. Its credibility depends on it.”

China’s strategic calculation

With more than 3.5 million people still homeless as the monsoon season approaches, aid agencies are warning of the major challenges ahead. The junta of Min Aung Hlaing is apparently less concerned about this. They are working on a diplomatic charm offensive towards ASEAN, China and Russia. 

Although China and Russia have provided substantial aid since the earthquake, much of it has been channeled through the junta and is therefore subject to its whims and minimal transparency.

Min Aung Hlaing and China’s President Xi Jinping met for the first time since the coup in Moscow, on the sidelines of Russia’s Victory Day celebrations of May 9.

Initially, China’s stance was not always clear. At times it seemed as if, based on historically developed ties of friendship, it was prioritizing the interests of the resistance over those of the junta. But based on more recent actions, it seems clear that there are limits to how far the resistance can go before Beijing draws a line.

Importantly, this is not simply a matter of China siding with the junta or the resistance. Rather, it reflects a broader strategic calculation.

From Beijing’s perspective, a politically fragmented Myanmar is far more manageable than a territorially fragmented country. A weak and divided country—but still intact—serves China’s long-term interests better, allowing it to exert influence without the risks of state rupture or regional instability. The ideal situation for Beijing is a Myanmar that is weak enough to be pliable, but intact enough to serve China’s strategic interests.

A second important implication is the emergence of a “conflict resolution model with Chinese characteristics” that could become a defining reference point for Myanmar. Western donors and governments have invested heavily in Myanmar’s peace process for years—supporting ceasefire monitoring, facilitating dialogue, and developing institutional mechanisms.

Yet the results have been modest at best, with few lasting outcomes. China, by contrast, is now developing its own model, a model characterized by assertive mediation and direct participation in monitoring the ceasefire, as evidenced by its role in the recent handover in Lashio. If the Lashio process proves effective, it could set a precedent for how future conflicts in Myanmar are handled – and shaped by Beijing’s strategic calculations.

Min Aung Hlaing and his cohort must go!

Australian economist Sean Turnell served as “special economic adviser” to NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi during the National League for Democracy (NLD) term, an experience he describes in his recent book “Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of Reform in Aung San Suu Kyi’s Myanmar.”

He held this position from 2016 until the 2021 coup, after which he was arrested by the military and spent 650 days in prison before being released in late 2022 and ordered to leave Myanmar. In a wide-ranging interview with Sebastian Strangio in The Diplomat, he recounts ambitious efforts to loosen the military’s grip on the economy, rationalize Myanmar’s institutions, attract foreign investment, and accelerate the long process of catching up with its neighbors. 

His hope: “The earthquake and the junta’s vicious and opportunistic response to it should remind everyone, but especially the international community, that real improvement in the situation in Myanmar will only come with the removal of Min Aung Hlaing and his cohort from their positions of power. I believe that will happen. The junta has run out of money, has run out of ideas. I hope and expect their end will come sooner rather than later.”