By Dr. Graeme Bannerman for MEI
If the current crisis in Egypt is to be resolved peacefully, the Egyptian military will play a central role. Few, if any outside the Egyptian armed forces, however, truly understand the Egyptian military. The following is an attempt to begin the process of better understanding this crucial institution.
The Egyptian army is very different from the American army. The Egyptian army is an institution–largely self-sustained through enterprises such as farms, factories, hospitals and the like– with the dual purposes of defending the nation against external threats and preserving domestic stability. It considers itself the defenders of the Egyptian people, a view also widely shared in the society at large. It performs the function of a National Guard as well as that of a national army.
Separation from Egyptian Society
One is struck by the degree of separation between the army and Egyptian society as a whole. Members of the military live on cantonments and do not participate in the national political process. They cannot vote in elections.
Egyptians do not know the army. The Defense Minister, the Chief of Staff, and the commanding generals are not nationally known personalities. For example, several years ago I was sitting in the lobby of a Washington hotel with the Major General who commanded the Presidential Guard and six months later would be the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed forces. Two Egyptian Ambassadors passed by and I had to introduce them to the general. They did not know him or even his name.
In Egypt, the Minister of Defense is also the Minister of Military Production. The armed forces produce many of their own essential goods and services. They own large farms and produce most commodities consumed by the army. They have bakeries, water bottling facilities, and clothing manufacturing factories. All of these are in addition to the military production factories. The logic of these operations is that it assures the military of essential supplies and insulates them from corruption in the private sector.
This industrial capacity also gives the military the ability to influence Egyptian society in ways not seen in other countries. Two years ago, riots occurred in the Delta over the manipulation of the supply of bread by private bakeries. The army was able to intervene and produce enough bread in its bakeries to meet short term popular demand which gave the government a peaceful window of opportunity to resolve the corruption issue. (Please note: The Egyptian Government supplies wheat to private bakeries at subsidized prices. The bakeries are to use this wheat to make bread for the poor. Some bakers in the Delta discovered that if they used this wheat to bake full-price bread instead, profits were much higher. The result was insufficient bread at subsidized prices.)
The armed forces also consider their farms and industrial facilities as a means to have a positive impact on the life of the Egyptian people. When young men are drafted into the army, they are evaluated. Some do not possess the skills and capabilities necessary to be a soldier. These individuals instead serve their required duty working at a military farm or factory, thus gaining valuable training and job skills that will help them make a living for the rest of their lives.
The Egyptian military also has a large social support structure to take care of its own. Service clubs provide officers a place to have social occasions such as wedding receptions and formal dinners at a price they could not afford in the private sector. By ordinary Egyptian standards, the perks are quite nice. They are modest, however, when compared to the new Egyptian business class and western standards. Living standards in the military are good, but nowhere near that of Egyptian business elite.
The New Army
Thirty years of military cooperation between Egypt and the United States in some ways has transformed the Egyptian military. Thirty years ago the officer corps was trained and educated in the Soviet bloc. Americans were viewed with suspicion, and as subverting Egyptian national interests. Being associated with Americans could be harmful to one’s career. Today, thousands of military officers have trained with Americans. They undergo the same human rights training as does the American military. They understand us and many have close personal friends in the American military. Americans officers and troops are no longer seen as threatening. Differences of policy are recognized, but these are issues to be discussed and not barriers to cooperation.
Despite its separation from the population as a whole the Egyptian military is equally concerned about many of the same social trends that have caused the wave of popular discontent in Egypt. Egyptian officers openly express their displeasure with Egyptian police. They cannot accept the brutality unleashed on the civilian population they are supposed to protect. They take affront at the lack of training and discipline among the police. This feeling is longstanding and has not just developed over the last couple of years.
The Egyptian military has viewed with concern Egypt’s economic transformation during the last several years. On the one hand, as nationalists, members of the armed forces are proud that Egypt is developing its economy and entering the world market. On the other, many have doubts that the radical transformation of the Egyptian economy has benefited the Egyptian people. In the process of making the Egyptian economy more open, many Egyptians were harmed. The privatization of several hundred businesses resulted in the firing of thousands of employees, because bloated payrolls, while providing jobs, were economically unjustified. At the same time, again at the urging of the international community, government subsidies for a variety of essential commodities were reduced or eliminated. Therefore, the same people who were losing their jobs were also losing the social safety net that the government historically provided.
In stark comparison, the new Egyptian business class became richer and richer. Conspicuous consumption became the new standard of wealth. Gated communities and nicely watered golf courses sprang up in a land where millions of people have no regularly running water. The military leadership was concerned about what effect the increasing wealth disparity would have on the general population. This concern was clearly illustrated in the January cabinet reshuffle. All of the ministers who engineered Egypt’s economic transformation were removed.
The military will likely focus its attention on making certain that even the poorest Egyptians are able to get basic commodities. Disagreements could develop between the protestors and the military, if the military believes that continuing protests are causing great economic hardship for the Egyptian citizenry.
The Military Leadership
Outsiders really do not know the military leadership. Thus, all the current speculation related to the ongoing crisis is based on limited knowledge.
The most senior level of the military is the equivalent of the American World War II generation. Its officers fought in Egypt’s great wars: the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the war of attrition and the 1973 war. Their entire lives have been devoted to the security and stability of Egypt. If they have personal ambitions, these are not openly displayed. They work long hours and expect others to work equally as hard. They are disciplined and professional. Order and structure are important to them. These are serious men who will not act precipitously. While listening to foreign views, they will not give in to foreign pressure and absolutely do not want to be seen as giving into foreign pressure. They are first and foremost Egyptian nationalists.
For a time, senior Egyptian military personnel worked closely with their counterparts in Soviet bloc countries. This relationship soured when the Soviet military overplayed its hand in Egypt, compelling Sadat to expel Soviet advisors from the country, despite the risk of compromising Egyptian military capabilities in the process. By contrast, the American military, well aware of the reasons for Soviet failure in Egypt, has been careful not to be seen as trying to control the Egyptian armed forces. The Americans respect Egyptian national sensitivities and have been largely successful in conveying this to the Egyptian military leadership.
Unlike the senior officers, the younger cadre of Egyptian officers does not share the same battlefield experience and has little or no recollection of the Soviet experience. They do know the American military and have trained with them. They know the United States and feel comfortable with Americans. As such, they are more willing than the senior officers to engage in wide ranging political discussions with their American counterparts. They are more comfortable being critical of American Middle East policy and do not consider this as being anti-American. They are above all Egyptian nationalists.
Military relations with the Muslim Brotherhood are strained. President Sadat was assassinated by Islamic fundamentalists within the military. Islamic terrorist attacks in the 1990’s were considered unacceptable to the military as a partially foreign inspired assault upon Egypt. After the 1997 terrorist attack on tourists in Luxor, the military had to intervene to help reestablish civil order. General Intelligence Services under Omar Suleiman, however, was responsible for the crackdown on the Brotherhood that followed. The Brotherhood is still seen as a potential threat to civil order and, therefore needs to be watched.
The Current Crisis
The Egyptian military only reluctantly intervenes in Egyptian domestic affairs. In the previous thirty five years, they have interceded in internal affairs only three times —the 1977 IMF bread riots, the 1985 police recruit riots, and the 1997 terrorist attack in Luxor. Protecting civilians and restoring order were their primary objectives. In the context of the current situation, the military clearly faces more challenges than they ever have in the past. The violence of the last several weeks is beyond what anyone anticipated. They are balancing their desire for order and discipline with their duty to protect Egyptian civilians. The military will move cautiously, but firmly, with full awareness of their stabilizing role.
Political negotiations with the protestors and others over the future of Egypt will be in the hands of the Vice President and the Prime Minister. The military leadership will be informed and will keep a watchful eye on the negotiations. They are unlikely to be directly involved. Negotiating the details of the form of the future Government of Egypt is not their responsibility, but they do have a keen interest in it.
Dr. Graeme Bannerman is a Scholar at the Middle East Institute, the founder of Bannerman Associates, an international consulting firm, and a former Staff Director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Assertions and opinions in this Policy Insight are solely those of the above-mentioned author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.