Shifting Tides: China’s Rise And Its Impact On Southeast Asia’s Balance Of Power – OpEd
Southeast Asia stands at a strategic crossroads as China’s multifaceted ascendancy reshapes the Indo-Pacific. The thesis of this essay is that China’s economic and diplomatic military rise in 2025 fundamentally altered the regional balance of power, compelling ASEAN states to recalibrate their policies amid intensifying great-competition, divergent power threat perceptions, evolving domestic priorities, and more.
China’s momentum is a key driver of its influence. By 2025, Beijing’s GDP is expected to grow by approximately four percent, outpacing its Southeast Asian neighbors and reinforcing its role as the region’s linchpin. In the first quarter of the Chinese year, ASEAN bilateral trade surged to an estimated US$234 billion, marking the fifth consecutive year that China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner. Exports to China and Southeast Asia increased by one percent year-on-year in April, fueled by Beijing’s targeted efforts to supply integrated supply chains and the rising regional demand for manufactured goods. Since 2013, China has invested over US$140 billion in infrastructure projects within the bloc under its Belt and Road Initiative, including port expansions in Malaysia, railway construction in Laos, and digital connectivity corridors in Indonesia. In early 2025, Chinese state banks pledged additional loans for a high-speed rail link connecting Bangkok and Nong Khai, as well as power installations in Myanmar, underscoring China’s use of development finance as a strategic instrument.
In 2024, China’s defense budget is estimated to reach approximately US$314 billion, accounting for nearly twelve percent of global arms spending. This budget is expected to grow by 72 percent in 2025. Such expansion will facilitate the procurement of additional stealth aircraft, surface combatants, and air-integrated defense systems. Additionally, China’s garrisons on disputed reefs in the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos have been upgraded to accommodate anti-cruise ship missiles, advanced systems, radar, and surface-to-air batteries, thereby extending its power projection into contested maritime zones. Since January 2024, Chinese militia and coastguard vessels have carried out over a hundred grey-zone operations, including shadowing foreign boats, interfering with fishing activities, blocking transits, and staging coercive encounters. These actions have tested ASEAN navies and increased the risk of accidental clashes.
Beijing has strengthened its influence by actively guiding ASEAN agendas in economic and security issues. Initially marked by vaccine diplomacy during the early stages of the pandemic, China’s engagement evolved in 2025 to include commitments to green energy and investments in 5G technology transfers. An expanded network of Confucius Institutes and state-affiliated media has played a role in shaping regional narratives. By early 2025, annual summits between ASEAN heads of state and the Chinese Politburo Standing Committee became routine, highlighting Beijing’s dedication to high-level engagement and establishing norms within the bloc.
ASEAN’s collective response has fluctuated between solidarity and fragmentation. Consensus-based communiqués have reaffirmed support for a rules-based order and called for the swift conclusion of a legally binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. Diverging security perceptions have deepened strategic rifts among Southeast Asian nations. Cambodia and Laos have openly aligned with Beijing to secure concessional loans and preferential market access. In contrast, Vietnam and the Philippines, aware of recent maritime coercion, have accelerated their naval modernization efforts and strengthened defense partnerships with the United States, including expanded joint patrols and training programs.
External Powers intensified their involvement, adding complexity to ASEAN’s strategic calculations. In 2025, the United States expanded its Enhanced Defense Cooperation with the Philippines by opening three additional rotational facilities, which facilitated advanced reconnaissance and missile defense exercises closer to contested waters. Additionally, the U.S. deployed P-8A maritime patrol aircraft to Singapore’s Changi Air Base and participated in trilateral naval drills with Indonesia and Thailand. Meanwhile, Japan’s infrastructure received a boost through its Quality Initiative. Additionally, India deployed a long-range patrol aircraft for joint exercises in the Bay of Bengal, while the European Union launched its Global Gateway projects in Vietnam and Indonesia to provide alternative development financing.
Despite these, the adaptations face formidable challenges. ASEAN’s consensus often rules out timely responses to coercive incidents, as evidenced by the bloc’s slow diplomatic reaction to collisions between Chinese coastguard cutters and Vietnamese fishing vessels in October 2024. Economic dependence on China leaves member states vulnerable to tariffs or project suspensions, as Beijing wielded strategic leverage when it briefly halted sugar exports to the Philippines in March 2025 following Manila’s protest. Furthermore, rising defense expenditures, fueled by an arms procurement race in response to China’s budget increase, are straining national finances. This diverts crucial resources away from social development and threatens to initiate an arms spiral in the Asia-Pacific region.
To navigate these complexities, ASEAN must evolve toward more flexible and resilient mechanisms. Maritime shared domain awareness, facilitated by jointly operated surveillance and real-time information-sharing agreements, could significantly enhance collective awareness and situational deterrence. Additionally, formalizing rapid-response crisis management protocols and conducting regular multilateral exercises with external partners would improve interoperability and build confidence among ASEAN militaries. Economic diversification through deeper trade and investment with ties to India, Japan, and Australia, the European Union can mitigate dependency risks, foster sustainable growth, and safeguard policy autonomy.
In conclusion, China’s rise in 2025 has fundamentally transformed the strategic landscape of Southeast Asia and revealed inherent weaknesses within ASEAN. This thesis is reinforced: Beijing’s economic initiatives and its military and diplomatic modernization have reshaped the regional order, forcing Southeast Asian nations to navigate a complex interplay of balance, cooperation, and competition. By strengthening defense cooperation, diversifying economic partnerships, and reforming consensus-based decision-making, ASEAN can enhance its centrality and resilience, ensuring that Southeast Asia remains a cornerstone of a stable, multipolar Indo-Pacific order.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.
References
- Sahashi, Ryo, Yasuhiro Matsuda, and Waka Aoyama, eds. Asia Rising: A Handbook of History and International Relations in East, South, and Southeast Asia. Springer, 2024.
- Singh, Daljit, and Hoang Thi Ha, eds. Southeast Asian Affairs 2024. ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2024.
- Josukutty, C. A., and Joyce Sabina Lobo, eds. The New World Politics of the Indo-Pacific: Perceptions, Policies and Interests. Routledge, 2024. for Southeast Asia.
