Spy Vs Spy: How ISI-MI Rivalry Is Tearing Pakistan Apart – OpEd
In Pakistan, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Military Intelligence (MI) have historically experienced periods of power struggle, stemming from their differing reporting structures and perceived loyalties to the civilian and military leadership, respectively.
The relationship between the two premier intelligence agencies has been complex, marked by both cooperation and competition, particularly during periods of military rule and political instability. While both agencies are tasked with national security, their roles and priorities have sometimes clashed, leading to friction and even conflict.
In the early years after Pakistan’s independence, both ISI and MI were involved in intelligence gathering and national security operations. However, their roles were not clearly defined, leading to overlapping responsibilities and potential for conflict.
The rise of military regimes, particularly under Ayub Khan, saw the ISI gaining prominence due to its direct connection to the military leadership. The ISI’s focus shifted towards consolidating the regime’s power by monitoring political opposition and suppressing dissent. This contributed to the ISI overshadowing MI.
The ISI, while nominally reporting to the Prime Minister, is ultimately under the organisational control of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), whereas the MI directly reports to the COAS. This difference in reporting lines can lead to conflicts of interest, particularly when the ISI aligns its actions with the political objectives of the civilian government while the MI promotes the interests of the military leadership.
The ISI plays a significant role in both domestic and foreign policy, often influencing political decisions and events. The MI focuses on military intelligence, supporting the operational and strategic objectives of the armed forces.
In the past, the ISI and MI have been known to work against each other, with the ISI promoting the interests of the political leadership while the MI furthers the objectives of the military. This can manifest in various ways, including competing narratives, leaks to the media, and even attempts to undermine each other’s operations.
The Director General ISI is a three-star ranking officer, unlike the DG-MI, who is a two-star ranking officer. The level of leadership also gives the ISI an edge over the MI regarding accessibility and clout in the intelligence community. The ISI brief encompasses both internal and external functions, which are to obtain information that could threaten the security of the state. Also, the ISI coordinates the working of the intelligence directorates of the army, air force and navy.
The MI has a primary objective of generating intelligence required for the armed forces to wage war. Its secondary function is to provide feedback to the military leadership on the state of the armed forces in terms of discipline, morale and security.
While the MI and the ISI both came into being in 1948, the MI did not really evolve a culture of professionalism. This is largely because in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case of 1951, wherein some senior army officers attempted to overthrow the elected leadership, the MI developed an internal orientation as a Criminal Investigation Department (CID) type of organisation, rather than the requisite external focus.
Moreover, under the Zia regime during the 1980s, the ISI’s successes in fighting the guerrilla war by proxy against the Soviets in Afghanistan facilitated its rise to power. It enabled the organisation to evolve from a dedicated defence intelligence agency into a political police, given its increasing involvement in internal politics during General Zia-ul Haq’s military regime.
The ISI and the MI have sought to counter each other’s moves through the medium of inspired “leaks” to the Press. A classic case was the visit of then Punjab Chief Minister and current PM of Pakistan, Shahbaz Sharif and then DG-ISI Lt General Ziauddin to the US, which was supposedly a “secret”. However, the visit became public knowledge only by default after it was leaked to the Press, presumably by the MI.
Likewise, the then COAS and subsequently president of Pakistan, late General Pervez Musharraf’s plans to sack a corps commander, Lt General Tariq Pervez, prior to his departure for Colombo, were again leaked by the ISI to the Press.
According to the BBC, after the attacks of 9/11, the Pakistani government joined the US-led coalition against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but many say the ISI supported the Taliban and even gave them shelter in Pakistani territory.
Musharraf’s attempt to clip the ISI’s wings and hand over its operations to the MI translated into huge political costs for him. It is widely suspected that the Red Mosque militants who challenged the Musharraf regime in Islamabad had the ISI’s backing.
The siege of the Red Mosque in July 2007 led to the killing of more than 100 people holed up in the mosque, including male and female students of a religious seminary. The event sparked the formation of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which continues to launch attacks against Pakistani military and civilian targets.
Thus, it is evident that the internal power tussle between the ISI and MI has proved costly for Pakistan.
