Kuala Lumpur – Jakarta: Strategic Fallback Options – Analysis
Indonesia President Prabowo Subianto ‘s visit to Malaysia on January 9 was as a symbol to further reaffirm bilateral ties and to cement closer personal ties, bond and trust at the highest level, with Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim.
It also cements the notion that both countries still value the importance of historical and cultural roots and ties despite the existing loggerheads over territorial disputes and the constant competition over geopolitical interests and investment opportunities.
In 2023, Indonesia ranked as Malaysia’s seventh-largest trading partner globally and third-largest among ASEAN member states, with total trade of RM111.21billion (USD24.39 billion).
Prabowo also wanted to further deepen his new development agenda for Indonesia in increasing its fallback options and in widening the diversification efforts, reflecting the same efforts and momentum that Malaysia is doing now under Anwar in increasing dependence on other growing powers and BRICS.
Prabowo realises that both countries share the same dilemma of security threats and the complexities of responding to big powers’ tailor made manouvres for the region and individual states, and in navigating the new hard power traditional threats. All these while both states are trying not to jeopardise the economic interests and the subsequent domestic political support and returns that are mutually entangled with current or new powers.
Both nations share the same policy outlook and approach that focus on getting the best out of both sides of the power rivalry between the West and traditional partners in China and Russia, and Prabowo also realizes that the way forward in this approach will face greater challenges and scrutiny especially under the new Trump administration.
Each will need to prove its worth in the eyes of Trump and how each will display new forms of confidence building measures in reinventing ties with the US and the West, and how this will translate into tangible measures and impact on economic and key geopolitical returns to both parties without inviting potential retaliatory measures both in economic and hard power tenets.
In distinguishing himself from his predecessor, Prabowo will need a more realistic, reliable and a distinct set of domestic and foreign policy of his own, and there is no indication for now that he intends to drastically change the conventional strategic hedging and balancing approach of Indonesia as in the past years.
Realising that he still trapped in the quandary of elevating Indonesia’s coming of global age status while balancing the need to take sides that will be needed if Indonesia was to reap the full benefits from different quarters, he is looking into the similar trap setting faced by Anwar and Malaysia in this regard, while striving to lessen mutual competition and wariness. Both have to face the geographically inevitable fact of mutually dependable economic and political connotations in weathering the same set of potential storms and current threats.
Prabowo sees Malaysia as a needed partner in softening Indonesia’s similar pursuit of this policy, and using Malaysia as an example where a regional emerging force of combined strength and similarity in development and economic model and potential as an added advantage in complementing Indonesia’s rise and ambition to be a global player.
Both nations share similar traps, limitations and openings in the field of the wider geopolitical power equation, and both see that it will be wiser and strategic in the long term to minimize mutual competition and wariness two build a deeper fallback and interdependent option for mutual benefits.
Both are emerging voices in global affairs and stakes in the supply chain and key emerging industries and sectors which play a central role in the global power rivalry and the fierce competition for these critical resources and advantages including critical minerals, semiconductor, digital economy, new energy transition, EV, artificial intelligence and others.
The West looks at both Malaysia and Indonesia as not only having the future economic potential of altering the stakes, but also more importantly in consolidating and leading the voices of the Islamic world and the developing world, particularly in dealing with Russia and China led mechanisms including BRICS.
Indonesia under Prabowo will most likely see a new rise of both economic and military power and capacity, and this drive will bring both potential and challenges for Jakarta’s future regional and global leadership role and the impact on regional power entanglement.
With this, the ambitions of Indonesia is already beyond ASEAN, and Prabowo realises that Malaysia and its leadership of ASEAN are thus imperative for Indonesia to serve as the needed equal partner and supporter in facing potential headwinds and retaliations for its growing ambitions, hunger and stakes in the bigger schemes of power rivalry in the world and in playing a deeper role in solving global conflicts.
With these greater overarching needs and goals, Prabowo will not want to have a diversion of attention by having to deal with existing regional tensions or issues either with Malaysia or in dealing with the fallout of the South China Sea dispute.
Prabowo needed a strong and pragmatic Malaysian role and leadership at the ASEAN level in keeping off external threats and ensuring a stable regional economic dynamism, which will help Indonesia to project and expand its role and influence at the wider level. Without Malaysia being at the forefront of keeping both the country and the region stable and safe, Indonesia will be forced to make alterations to its foreign policy extent and scope which will inhibit its larger intention to move away beyond ASEAN.
Malaysia is also needed as a positive ripple effects of renewed attraction for the right inflow of external security assurances, economic and investment capacity and the needed technological and trade inflows and injections which will also create spillover impact for Indonesia.
\For Malaysia, Indonesia is seen as the interdependent partner for a multi-domain and multi-faceted structure of geopolitical, economic and political factors. Indonesia is the de facto regional leader in terms of joint historical foundation of ASEAN, and its growing military and economic prowess and influence is seen as a needed partner and a platform for capitalization of positive mutual interdependence.
Both nations realise that both serve as the central essence of strength for ASEAN and in reducing internal wariness and in improving internal trade gap, and both also tried to be a higher power trendsetter with greater influence in the Global South and the Islamic world either through the OIC or though direct bilateral engagements with key Muslim powers in the Middle East or through regional groupings in a wider array of diplomatic, economic and geopolitical friendshoring.
Indonesia will want Malaysia to continue to steer ASEAN through the conventional safety and returns of the status quo, in serving as the practical bridge and hedging capacity against the external power rivalry and in preserving regional stability without rocking the current dynamics, lest inviting greater external interference that will complicate Indonesia’s policy options.
Malaysia will also need Indonesia’s growing global clout and similar foreign policy approach of strategic balancing and hedging while quietly navigating the best returns from a deepening inroads into the alternative system of economic friendshoring dependence.
For Indonesia, Malaysia is getting the needed returns of security assurances from existing mechanism including the Five Powers Defence Arrangement (FPDA) and also a wide range of American defence support, which is seen as also giving the region and Jakarta the needed spillover greater regional defence and security assurance and counterbalancing effect.
For both nations’ defence and economic friendshoring efforts and in enhancing positive long term guardrails for one’s own and the region’s security resilience, each nation’s unique strength is needed.
Both will also want to redouble efforts to boost economic and energy and food and energy resilience and security, especially with the similar current trajectories of both nations in transforming their economic fundamentals and resilience.