ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Weaknesses – Analysis


By Marguerite Borelli*


Since 2016, the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS), or Daesh, has sustained a propaganda offensive directed at Southeast Asian Muslims as they recruit Indonesians, Malaysians and Filipinos to join the war effort in Iraq and Syria, or to wage armed jihad in their own region.1 IS’ approach to Southeast Asia is a part of its regional, transnational agenda. Similar to Filipino, Indonesian, and Malay fighters being regrouped in the Katibah Nusantara, a Malay-speaking regional battalion on the Syrian-Iraqi front, IS propaganda addressed to local sympathisers calls for Southeast Asian jihadists of all nationalities to come together in Mindanao, located in South Philippines, to train and fight.2

Moreover, as IS is losing ground on the Middle East front, it is actively seeking to establish a global, decentralised network of wilayahs (governorates).3 IS’ efforts to capture territory in Southeast Asia will not stop at Marawi City – a part of which it currently occupies — as the group has previously attempted to establish a foothold in Poso, Indonesia4 and Malaysia.5

Given that the contemporary threat of terrorism within ASEAN is a regional one, it cannot be eradicated by any single state; a regional counter-terrorism strategy is therefore necessary. ASEAN6 stands out as the obvious forum for the development of such a collective response, as paragraph 2.2. of the organisation’s mission statement, written into its founding Bangkok Declaration, states that ASEAN shall “promote regional peace and stability”7. Additionally, the 2007 ASEAN Charter introduces the concept of “collective responsibility in enhancing regional peace, security and prosperity” (Art. 2.2.b.).8

In line with this mission, ASEAN has developed a substantive counter-terrorism arsenal in the years since 9/11. The cornerstones of these measures are the 2007 legally binding ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism (ACCT) and the subsequent 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter Terrorism. In particular, the Association serves as an efficient platform for member states to promote moderation,9 engage in continuous dialogue on counter-terrorism policies, exchange best practices, and promote research into innovative ways of countering violent extremism.

However, as argued in this article, ASEAN’s counter-terrorism arsenal remains insufficient. Jonah Blank of the RAND Corporation notably states, “there are few mechanisms in place for genuine cooperation by all — or even most — ASEAN nations on any issue”.10 In addition, the UN Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) recommended in its 2016 report that ASEAN “[s]trengthen [the] use of sub-regional instruments and mechanisms, including the ASEAN Convention for Counter-Terrorism and Plan of Action and the ASEAN Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance.”11 This article touches upon ASEAN’s current counter- terrorism measures in order to provide an overview of the organisation’s weaknesses in this policy area. The first part presents the counter-terrorism insufficiencies created by structural factors pertaining to the nature of ASEAN, and the second highlights the lack of preventative counter-terrorism measures within the current framework.

Structural obstacles to counter-terrorism

The nature of ASEAN as an intergovernmental organization whose member states are attached to the ‘ASEAN Way’ of policy-making means that it is based on consensus, respect of national sovereignty and non-interference into domestic matters. Therefore, ASEAN’s counter-terrorism role within the region includes being a general agenda-setter and facilitator, rather than acting as a driving force for the implementation of new measures.12 This limited role translates into four overarching weaknesses within ASEAN counter-terrorism efforts.

Slow process

First, ASEAN policy-making is slow in its production of legislation as well as its ratification process and implementation of measures.13 While the time lag may not be as problematic in other policy areas, efficient counter-terrorism requires timeliness. The institution should aim to anticipate and evolve in accordance with transformations and current trends in terrorism.

ACCT exemplifies this well. When the ACCT was signed in 2007, long after the idea for a regional counter-terrorism treaty emerged, Southeast Asia was one of the last regions of the world to adopt such legislation.14 The treaty came into effect in 2011 when six out of ten member states ratified it. But complete ratification within ASEAN only came in 2013 – six years after the treaty’s signature. Similarly, the idea for a regional extradition treaty has been discussed since the Bali bombings, but has not yet materialised, leading to the CTC’s reiteration in 2016 that the region should adopt such an instrument.15 In part due to slow processes, ASEAN has failed to impose itself as the dominant forum for regional counter-terrorism policymaking as regional states tend to prefer using bilateral arrangements.

According to a senior ASEAN official, “bilateral cooperation between members has always been the most effective way of managing security issues in the region. There are sensitivities when it comes to security agenda and member countries certainly prefer it to be done on a bilateral basis.”16 However, since the territorial advances of IS in Iraq and Syria in 2014 and its efforts to set up wilayahs by courting and co-opting militant groups in volatile areas of the world such as Afghanistan and Mindanao, there is a greater appreciation for the need for regional cooperation between leaders.

In practice, Southeast Asia’s counter- terrorism landscape is highly complex and asymmetrical in terms of member states’ respective counter-terrorist capabilities, efficiency and involvement in transnational cooperation. These gaps can be exploited by terrorists, notably for the smuggling of foreign fighters and weapons, made evident by the presence of Uyghurs and other non- Southeast Asian militants in Mindanao.17

Weak concrete impact

Second, ASEAN produces ‘soft’ laws, using vague language and imposing “many uncertain obligations [on states].”18 Its counter-terrorism efforts are “a process of ‘norm internalisation’, rather than imposition of legal obligation”.19 As the language in ASEAN legislation allows for different national interpretations, member states display varying levels of commitment to their spirit and implementation.

As such, the ACCT was never given a specific timeframe for implementation, nor did it clearly provide an enforcement mechanism to monitor and review member states’ compliance to the Convention.20 Indeed, the CTC reported in 2016 that, “[the] ASEAN Convention and Plan of Action, adopted in 2007 and 2009, respectively, do not appear to be effectively utilised.”21 As of July 2017, important ACCT provisions such as the creation of a common regional intelligence database to facilitate cooperation between national intelligence services, law enforcement agencies, militaries and judiciaries has yet to be implemented at the regional level. The establishment of such a database is routinely encouraged by experts in the current context.22 It would allow national counter-terrorism professionals to save time and benefit from the context- specific, cultural and linguistic expertise of other member states, while ensuring that research is readily available and not unnecessarily duplicated.

Precedence of domestic issues

Third, very often domestic political considerations impede the development of regional counter-terrorism.23 In fact, despite their strong rhetorical commitment to a regional strategy in ASEAN forums, member states treat counter-terrorism as a domestic issue. National counter-terrorism instruments within Southeast Asia differ widely. For instance, there are differences between the law enforcement in charge of counter- terrorism in Singapore and Malaysia and the military in Thailand and the Philippines.24

Differing national counter-terrorism structures are not in themselves a counter-terrorism weakness of ASEAN but they do require regional policies to account for them, notably through international cross-institutional cooperation. For example, counter-terrorism cooperation between the Malaysian and Philippines police through ASEANAPOL, and between the militaries through ADMM (ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting) is insufficient. Instead, Malaysian law enforcement and the Philippine military should also closely cooperate to obtain optimal results. ASEAN currently lacks a forum or procedure for such international cross-institutional cooperation.

Moreover, states also routinely “prioritise respect for state sovereignty…at the expense of their regional community interest.”25 According to Tan and Nasu, ASEAN counter- terrorism efforts should thus be appraised within the wider regional context where national counter-terrorism policies “are enmeshed with their own political agenda of national harmony and combating dissidents.”26 In the past, the precedence of domestic politics over regional counter-terrorism was visible in Indonesia’s denial of Jemaah Islamiyah’s presence, which allowed the group to flourish.27 And history recently repeated itself, as the Philippines (under former president Aquino) denied the rise of IS on its territory to ease the finalisation of the Moro peace process. In both cases, governments turned a blind eye to terrorism within their borders, ultimately endangering the whole region by allowing the threat to consolidate further. Even as civil society experts warned regional governments of the developing threat,28 other ASEAN members were prevented from taking direct action to protect the region as they adhered to the principle of non-interference. It can then be said that “rethinking the ASEAN principles and the ‘ASEAN Way’ is necessary if ASEAN is to deliver effective multilateral counter- terrorism cooperation.”29

Unresolved territorial claims translate into opportunity for terrorists

Finally, ASEAN counter-terrorism efforts are partially ineffective due to long-lasting administrative gaps within the region. It is no coincidence that the contemporary threat of Daesh in Southeast Asia is concentrated in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas. This tri-border area, where the national borders of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines meet, has historically suffered from weak governance because of ongoing territorial disputes pertaining to islands and maritime borders.30

ASEAN should help resolve these disputes to ensure that state control over this area is re- established. The joint-maritime patrols implemented recently by the aforementioned countries are a clear sign that some member states are willing to move from cooperation to collaboration in order to face contemporary threats.31 However, as stated by the Singaporean Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen:

“[The patrols were] a good start. But we recognize that there [is] a lot to be done, and that information sharing and intelligence [is] also a key area.”32

Lack of preventative counter-terrorism

Beyond counter-terrorism weaknesses endemic to ASEAN, the existing counter- terrorism framework is reaction-oriented and lacks a strong prevention and pre-crime chapter. Rose and Nestorovska assess that ASEAN “measures for prevention and intelligence cooperation are insubstantial. Their main strengths include providing procedures for mutual assistance in investigations and extradition arrangements.”33 Meanwhile, Ahmad also concludes that, “[t]here must be a shift in ASEAN’s counter-terrorism paradigm from reactive measures to more robust preventive and protection strategies.”34

Preventing radicalisation, recruitment and recidivism

In light of the extensive use of modern communication technologies by terrorists, individuals vulnerable to extremist discourse tend to radicalise or self-radicalise online.35 Any strategy aimed at disrupting radicalisation, recruitment and recidivism by former offenders must therefore include an online aspect. But states have so far experienced difficulty in dealing with online propaganda.36

The Internet knows no boundaries and because IS has treated Southeast Asian Muslims as a homogenous target-demographic, ASEAN should occupy a substantial position in regional efforts to counter extremist ideology online. According to Greer and Watson, ASEAN should encourage, subsidise and implement, “local, data-driven restorative approaches to prevent and rehabilitate radicalisation.”37

ASEAN has an advantage when it comes to countering extremism as its member states have considerable expertise especially with regards to rehabilitation and counter-propaganda. Some of ASEAN’s member states have been hailed globally for pioneering many of the most successful initiatives in the world especially with regard to rehabilitation and counter-propaganda. In particular, two examples of such innovative approaches should be mentioned. First, Singapore’s Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), which actively counters radicals’ misperceptions and instrumentalisation of Islam through a grassroots approach. This includes a counselling centre, a smartphone app, publications by religious scholars, conferences and community outreach events.38

The second initiative is the RDC3, the Regional Digital Counter-Messaging Communication Centre recently launched by Malaysia. The centre counters IS propaganda and more specifically its misuse of the Muslim religion in cyberspace by disseminating content which was elaborated upon in collaboration with the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM).39

These admirable national initiatives should be strongly supported, replicated and disseminated in various ASEAN member countries.

Critical infrastructure protection

Despite its high-pace economic growth and proportional reliance on critical systems, infrastructure and information technologies, ASEAN has also been slow in planning for the protection of its critical infrastructure (CIP).40 Indeed, the ASEAN Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience Asia (CIP Asia) conference was only established in mid-2015, and is set to gather industry, governments and agencies every two years to exchange on CIP.

According to the CIP Asia website, ASEAN has established disaster management teams under its Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), but “none is geared towards the protection of critical infrastructure.”41 Moreover, the 2008 CTC report “identifies that vulnerabilities still exist in some areas such as border control…whilst there are shortfalls in the implementation of international standards of aviation, maritime and cargo security.”42

As the integration of the Economic Community progresses, notably through the launch of cross-national projects such as the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline and the ASEAN Power Grid, ASEAN should encourage and participate in efforts to harden new and existing targets to protect critical infrastructure in the region. In addition, ASEAN should increase preparedness in the event of terrorist attacks as, “a terrorist attack against critical infrastructure is likely to have implications beyond national borders.”43

Critical infrastructure in the form of water and energy supplies, transport systems and information infrastructure is a valuable target for terrorists and attacks against such systems are globally on the rise. 44

In particular, ASEAN lacks actionable research on regional vulnerabilities.45 In the future, the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund (AIF) could be assigned the task of raising awareness and promoting CIP knowledge transfers following the example of the Catastrophe and Risk Management in ASEAN (CARMA). CARMA is an online portal where interested parties can research regional risk management systems to reinforce natural disaster preparedness, resilience and mitigation.46

As stated by Feakin, “research is urgently needed to get a better grasp on the threat environment, especially as the region is expected to see rapid expansion in infrastructure delivery [expected to reach a US$20 billion worth by 2020]”.47 Along similar lines, ASEAN should also strongly push for member states to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 2341 (2017) on the protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks.

Finally, the urgent need for CIP within ASEAN does not only apply to the physical realm, but also to cyberspace because modern critical infrastructure is increasingly reliant on the Internet. Multiple reports conclude that ASEAN states are highly vulnerable to cyber-attacks because of their rapidly expanding economies, online presence and parallel digitisation of various critical systems. But ASEAN has, again, been too slow in reacting to the growing threat of cyber-terrorism.

Indeed, in 2014, Heinl estimated that “national and regional efforts to adopt comprehensive cybersecurity strategies have been slow and fragmented. Similarly, the efforts of the ten ASEAN member states to adopt both national and comprehensive regional frameworks for cybersecurity have so far been piecemeal.”48 Two years later in 2016, the situation had not evolved, as summarised by Stacia Lee:

“[o]fficial cyber security and information and communication technology (ICT) policies primarily function as mechanisms to either aid ASEAN’s growing economy or limit crimes that hinder the further development of legal business channels (…) illustrat[ing] ASEAN’s historic function as a regional trade group rather than a cohesive political and legal body. Strong cybersecurity policy in and of itself has never been adequately prioritised, leaving member states vulnerable to cybercrime through a lack of compliance mechanisms, institutional disconnect, and uneven national legal capabilities.”49

In 2015, the discovery of the virus APT30 by Fire Eyes, a cyber-security firm, illustrated the inadequacy of ASEAN cyber-protection. Indeed, the virus, which had gone undetected for 10 years, had infiltrated ASEAN member states’ critical information networks to collect government and military sensitive information, “particularly around the time of official ASEAN meetings.”50

While this virus is believed to have been launched by Chinese-affiliated hackers,51 it does highlight vulnerabilities in ASEAN’s cyber- infrastructure that can be manipulated by terrorists. For instance, IS is known to target individuals with the know-how for sophisticated cyber-attacks for recruitment.52 Furthermore, ASEAN’s vulnerability in cyberspace is increased by a general under- estimation of the threat among leaders in the private and public sectors, as observed by FireEye APAC CTO Bryce Boland. He stated that, “organizations in Asia feel they are not likely to be a target of advanced cyber threat.”53


ASEAN has so far been a successful discussion forum bringing Southeast Asian states together around the topic of counter- terrorism. However, its lack of responsiveness to contemporary developments and a general lack of political appetite for collective security and responsibility in the region have prevented it from acting as a driving force and an architect of regional counter-terrorism.

However, the intrinsic transnational nature of the current threat of IS in Southeast Asia provides a strong impetus for regional cooperation and collaboration, and even more so as regional member states will in the coming months be faced with similar problems linked to the return of IS fighters from the Middle East and Marawi City.

This pressing need for a regional counter- terror strategy is publicly recognised by the ASEAN member states that face the highest threat levels, as exemplified by the tri-lateral sea patrols in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas. However, it will take time for this instance of collaboration to lead to an increase in multilateral counter-terrorism activities under the scope of ASEAN.

About the author:
*Marguerite Borelli
is a graduate student in International Relations at Sciences Po Doctoral School in Paris, France. She has recently completed a research internship at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSiS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and can be contacted at [email protected].

This article was published by RSIS in Counter Terrorist Trends And Analysis, September 2017 Volume 9, Issue 9, pages 14-20 (PDF)

1 See Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani and Jasminder Singh. “Daesh-isation” of Southeast Asia’s Jihadists.” RSIS Commentaries. N°080. April 11, 2016. publication/icpvtr/co16080-daesh-isation-of- southeast-asias-jihadists/
2 United Nations Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC). Global survey of the implementation by Member States of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). (2016), 52 and 54. 3 See Rohan Gunaratna. “Global Threat Forecast 2017.” RSIS Commentary. N°316. December 19, 2016. . publication/icpvtr/co16316-global-threat-forecast- 2017/
4 See Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani and Jasminder Singh. “Daesh-isation” of Southeast Asia’s Jihadists.” RSIS Commentaries. N°080. April 11, 2016. publication/icpvtr/co16080-daesh-isation-of- southeast-asias-jihadists/
5 Parameswaran, Prashanth. “Malaysia Says New Terror Group Trying to Create Islamic State.” The Diplomat. January 8, 2015. terror-group-trying-to-create-islamic-state/
6 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) includes Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia*, Laos, Malaysia*, Myanmar, the Philippines*, Singapore*, Thailand*, and Vietnam (*founding member).
7 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Asean Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) Bangkok, 8 August 1967. (1967). declaration-bangkok-8-august-1967/
8Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. November 20, 2007.
9 ASEAN formally endorsed the Global Movement of Moderates (GMM). See Global Movement of Moderates Foundation. “Introduction on GMMF.” [date unknown]. us/introduction-on-gmmf/
10 Chandran, Nyshka. “Is fighting terrorism key to ASEAN unity and credibility?” CNBC. October 9, 2016. terrorism-key-to-asean-unity-and-credibility.html
11 See note 2, 52.
12 Tan See Seng and Hitoshi Nasu. “ASEAN and the development of counter-terrorism law and policy in Southeast Asia.” UNSW Law Journal, Vol. 39 No.3 (2016): 1219-1238.
13 Ahmad, Abdul Razak. “The ASEAN Convention on Counter-terrorism 2007.” Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and Law, Vol.14 No.1-2, (2013):93- 147.
14 The treaty was in the works prior to 2003. See Human Rights Watch. In the Name of Counter- Terrorism: Human Rights Abuses Worldwide. March 25, 2003, 8. terrorism-bck.pdf
15 See note 2, “Priority issues/recommendations.” p.53.
16 See note 13, p.97.
17 See Ho, Ben and Yee, Chen May. “Danger close: Mindanao, and the terrorists next door.” Today online. June 9, 2017.. terrorists-next-door-and-danger-close-mindano
18 See note 12, p. 1236. 19 Ibid, p. 1238.
20 Ibid.
21 See note 2, p. 52.
22 According to Professor R. Gunaratna “Governments must build common databases, exchange personnel (and) conduct joint training and operations to make the Asia-Pacific region hostile to ISIS and unfriendly to ISIS supporters.” As quoted in Sim, Melissa. “’Cooperation is key for Asean to fight terror’ say experts.” The Straits Times. June 29, 2015. asia/cooperation-is-key-for-asean-to-fight-terror-say- experts
23 See note 13.
24 Almuttaqi, Ibrahim. “Countering ISIS in Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s Efforts at the Regional Level.” Habibie Center, ASEAN Studies Program. February 18, 2016. [presentation slides] s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUK EwionozViaTVAhVGl5QKHWPhAKEQFggkMAA&url 2Fuploads%2Ffile%2F2016%2F02%2FA._Ibrahim_ Almuttaqi_Presentation_-_THC_- _31st_TA.pdf&usg=AFQjCNFs_YQsuc8T2ZYBE- QHzpBDDoYRVQ
25 See note 12, p.1236.
26 See note 12, p. 1238.
27 See the diplomatic incident between Singapore and Indonesia after Lee Kuan Yew (former PM) accused Indonesia of being soft on terrorists. See: “Lee Kuan Yew Interview Transcript.” CNN. February 12, 2002. lkasia.lee.script/ ; and ”Jakarta: Singapore is too Authoritarian to Understand Us; Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Gets in Jab at the Republic, Saying that in a Democratic System, Terrorism must be Dealt with Differently.” The Straits Times. February 25, 2002.
28 For the case of the Philippines, see Mangosing, Frances. “Marawi crisis was a lesson for us – Lorenzana.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. July 25, 2017. was-a-lesson-for-us-lorenzana; and Ylagan, Lea. “DND admits being unappreciative of intel reports on Maute-ISIS attacks in Mindanao.” UNTV. July 27, 2017. being-unappreciative-of-intel-reports-on-maute-isis- attacks-in-mindanao/
29 See note 13, p.119.
30 Greer, Adam, and Watson, Zachary. “Countering radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism in Southeast Asia.” Quilliam Foundation. August 10, 2016. radicalisation-extremism-and-terrorism-in-southeast- asia/
31 “ASEAN defence ministers sign joint declaration on combating terrorism.” Channel NewsAsia. May 25, 2016. [author unknown] ean-defence-ministers-sign-joint-declaration-on- combating-terr-8039886
32 Chen Zixian. “Greater ASEAN-US cooperation in counter-terrorism, maritime security & disaster relief.” CyberPioneer, Singaporean Ministry of Defence. October 2, 2016. berpioneer/topics/articles/news/2016/oct/02oct16_ne ws.html
33 See note 12, p. 1236. 34 See note 13, p. 147.
35 See for instance Jasmine Jahwar. Terrorists’ use of the Internet: The case of Daesh. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: The Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2016).
36 See note 2, para 190-191.
37 See note 30.
38 See Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG). “About RRG.” [date unknown]. 39 Bernama. “Malaysia’s Counter-Messaging Centre combating terrorism, radical activities, says DPM.” New Straits Times. November 8, 2016. ysias-counter-messaging-centre-combating- terrorism-radical-activities-says
40 ASEAN defines critical infrastructure as the “primary physical structures, technical facilities and systems which are socially, economically or operationally essential to the functioning of a society or community, both in routine circumstances and in the extreme circumstances of an emergency.” See Amul, Gianna Gayle. “ASEAN’s Critical Infrastructure and Pandemic Preparedness.” RSiS Centre for Non- Traditional Security (NTS) blog. January 22, 2013. critical-infrastructure-and-pandemic-preparedness/
41 Critical Infrastructure Protection & Resilience Asia. [no title]. [date unknown]
42 Hafidz, Tatik S. “A Long Row to Hoe: A Critical Assessment of ASEAN Cooperation on Counter- Terrorism.” Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, Vol.11 (December 2009). 11/a-long-row-to-hoe-a-critical-assessment-of- asean-cooperation-on-counter-terrorism/
43 United Nations Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) Executive Directorate. “Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure Against Terrorist Attacks.” CTED Trends Report. (2016):12.
44 Zahri Yunos. “Cybersecurity Initiatives in Securing ASEAN Cyberspace.” CyberSecurity Malaysia. May 11, 2016. [presentation slides] events/news/details/Towards-new-avenues-in-EU- ASEAN-ICT-collaboration-Highlights-and- presentations.html?file=files/connect2sea/files/Works hops/Final%20conference/Session%203/11%20- %20CyberSecurity%20Initiatives%20- %20Dr%20Zahri%20Yunos.pdf
45Tobias Feakin. “Building critical infrastructure resilience in the Asia-Pacific.” Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), The Strategist. August 5, 2015. critical-infrastructure-resilience-in-the-asia%C2%AD- pacific/
46 See Catastrophe and Risk Management in ASEAN (CARMA). “About us.” [date unknown]
47 See note 45.
48 Caitríona H. Heinl. “Regional Cybersecurity: Moving Toward a Resilient ASEAN Cybersecurity Region.” Asia Policy. Vol. 18 (July 2014).
49 Stacia Lee. “ASEAN Cybersecurity Profile: Finding a Path to a Resilient Regime.” The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington. April 4, 2016. cybersecurity-profile-finding-path-resilient-regime/
50 Fire Eye Labs/Fire Eye Threat Intelligence.
Special Report: APT30 and the mechanics of a long- running cyber espionage operation. April 2015:19. apt30.pdf
51 Ibid.
52 See note 44.
53 Boland, Bryce. “APT30 and Lessons for ASEAN.” Fire Eye. April 12, 2015. perspective/2015/04/apt30_and_lessonsfo.html
collaboration to lead to an increase in multilateral counter-terrorism activities under the scope of ASEAN.
Marguerite Borelli is a graduate student in International Relations at Sciences Po Doctoral School in Paris, France. She has recently completed a research internship at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSiS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and can be contacted at [email protected].


RSIS Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the author/s are their own and do not represent the official position of the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU, which produces the Commentaries. For any republishing of RSIS articles, consent must be obtained from S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS).

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