The Impact And Complexity Of Saudi Funding On Dissemination Of Wahhabism And Salafism In Indonesia – Analysis
By ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
By A’an Suryana
Saudi Arabia has undergone significant social and political transformations under the new de facto ruler, Muhammad bin Salman, who started governing the country in 2017. Under his rule, the country has been much more open socially and culturally. For example, in 2018, he lifted the 35-year ban on cinemas. In 2019, tourists were welcome as part of the “white-oil” drive, and he took further steps to loosen men’s total authority over women by allowing women to travel without a male “guardian”.[1] These policies marked a shift in the country’s conservative outlook, signalling its embrace of a more “moderate” form of Islam.
The overall policy on religious moderation is part of Muhammad bin Salman’s efforts to promote Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 initiative. Realising that the country can no longer rely solely on oil profit to sustain its social and economic development, the Vision 2030 initiative aims to open Saudi Arabia to foreign investment and tourism, which may prospectively be key drivers of growth in the post-oil era.
One of the social aspects that needs scrutiny in this seismic shift in Saudi Arabia’s policies is the government’s funding programmes and its Wahhabisation project. Saudi funding in this article refers to the money the Saudi government and its people have spent in spreading Wahhabism and Salafism across the world. Salafism is a religious ideology that advocates returning to the practices of Islam as performed by the Prophet Muhammad and Muslims who lived two generations after him. Wahhabism, on the other hand, is an increasingly entrenched global religious movement initiated by Abdul Wahhab in the 18th century to spread his version of Salafi ideology.
It is crucial that Saudi funding be examined since the estimated amount of funds disbursed by the country for promoting both Wahhabism and Salafism has been enormous. James M. Dorsey and James Chin have estimated that the amount of funding disbursed for this purpose is somewhere between US$70 and US$100 billion.[2] While they did not spell out in detail the breakdown of the funding, it is clear that a large sum of money has been set aside to spread Wahhabism and Salafism across the world. Between 1982 and 2005, an official record shows that the Saudi regime under King Fahd spent over US$1 billion “on mosques, schools, preachers and teachers’ salaries, scholarships, and textbooks, which went toward at least 1,500 mosques, 200 Islamic centres, 200 colleges, and 2,000 schools or madrasas” worldwide.[3] Some US$10 million of the total US$1 billion was used to build mosques across the United States. The US$1 billion was provided by the government and does not account for contributions from private funders with similar aims.
Salafism is controversial due to its promotion of an uncompromising form of Islam, such as its penchant for eschewing and even attacking the practice of mysticism or the worship of saints, which Salafis consider to be religious innovations (bid’ah) which have no basis in Islamic teachings. Western and Asian scholars and media have often accused the Saudi government of exporting a radical version of Islam through its funding.[4] Some of the money allegedly even went into funding terrorist activities. For example, the United Nations recommended that assets belonging to a Saudi charity, Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHIF), be frozen between 2004 and 2010 due to alleged links to the terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda.[5]
A substantial number of journal articles, institutional and media reports have been written on the importance of Saudi funding in promoting both Wahhabism and Salafism.[6] While existing literature emphasises the role of ideology in driving Saudi funding, this article argues that the motives behind it are far more complex. As illustrated by an Indonesian case study, the distribution of Saudi funding has not only aimed to promote Wahhabism and Salafism, but has also been influenced by other factors such as geopolitical considerations and domestic political dynamics.
THE IMPACT OF SAUDI FUNDING
The original motivation for the Saudis funding the export of Wahhabism was geopolitics. The first wave began in 1960 when King Fahd introduced policies to modernise Saudi education. He sought to challenge the influence of Al-Azhar University in Cairo, which was regarded as a key intellectual reference for the Islamic world. As a result, he established more universities, schools and other educational and social institutions to promote, among other things, Wahhabism and Salafism. Windfall profits from oil industries that began to fill its pockets gave more leeway for Saudi Arabia to expand their sphere of religious influence through education and other means, such as diplomacy. This occurred in various forms, such as through financial aid for victims of natural disasters.
More intense efforts were made in the 1980s, with many scholars pointing to the Iranian revolution as a key catalyst for Saudi Arabia’s increased efforts to export Wahhabi ideas.[7] Fearing that the influence of the revolution would sideline them, the Saudi government embarked on an offensive mode in spreading Wahhabi ideology globally, including in Indonesia. However, the urgency was not solely driven by the Iranian revolution. Domestic turmoil also contributed to Saudi Arabia’s decision to boost its influence.[8] This was caused by the 1979 Grand Mosque takeover in Mecca, when a group of heavily-armed Islamists led by Juhayman Al-Otaibi, who was frustrated by what he saw as the Saudi regime’s increasing consumerism and declining religiosity in the post oil-boom in the 1970s,[9] took over the mosque for two weeks. The takeover shocked the Saudi regime, and it swiftly crushed the siege.
To prevent further fallout from the revolt and the Iranian revolution, the regime appeased the conservatives by giving them more power to restore conservatism in the country. Domestically, this shift was reflected in a tripling of the budget disbursed to the Committee for Prevention of Vice and Promotion of Virtue, a cleric-led body responsible for enforcing conservative religious practices. The budget increase was also intended to “Islamise” the curricula in all Saudi universities.[10] The conservatives, especially the Wahhabi clerics and descendants of Muhammad Abdul Wahhab, also experienced a growth in influence in their roles abroad as the regime expanded the global dissemination of Wahhabism. In their new roles in educational positions held abroad, their teachings contributed to the growing popularity of Wahhabism.[11]
THE CASE OF INDONESIA
One of the countries that has been on the receiving end of Saudi funding is Indonesia. In 2017, the Saudi regime funded, among others, “scholarly exchanges, a flagship free school in Jakarta, and the construction of masjids (places of worship) and madrassahs and Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) throughout Indonesia”.[12] They also provided “the reviewed and the audited Arabic language textbooks” and taught courses on Shariah.[13]
One of the foremost and influential institutions funded by the Saudis is the Islamic and Arabic College of Indonesia (LIPIA). Established in 1980 in Jakarta, the college is an extension of King Saud University. Apart from improving Indonesians’ command of Arabic, which is seen as a religious language, it also offers classes on both Wahhabi and Salafi ideas.[14] A substantial number of its graduates went on to become religious, social and political leaders. Some became popular religious figures who disseminated Wahhabi and Salafi ideas as taught by their former teachers at LIPIA, such as Syafiq Riza Basalamah, Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas and Ja’far Umar Thalib, while others chose different paths; these latter joined established organisations that promote different ideas of Islam, such as the tarbiyah movement (an education movement inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood). Some even joined the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), a local organisation inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood. These included figures such as Anis Matta, former PKS chairman who is now Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Ahmad Heryawan, former West Java Governor.
Despite the variety of ideas propagated by its alumni, the institution has been successful in producing graduates who follow and promote both Wahhabism and Salafism. As a result, at least 100 Salafi boarding schools have been established throughout Indonesia. Furthermore, LIPIA has expanded to include campuses in Medan (2007), Aceh (2007) and Makassar (2017), along with an increase in student capacity from 2,500 to 10,000 across all four campuses.[15] This is testament to Saudi Arabia’s success in exporting those teachings.
Through such funding, Saudi Arabia has been successful in sidelining Iranian influence and in challenging Al-Azhar’s long-standing influence. Indeed, many Indonesians were attracted to Shi’ism following the 1979 Iranian revolution; Shi’as, however, are still considered a minority and Shi’a teachings are barely seen online and offline, in contrast to the strong presence of Wahhabi and Salafi teachings propagated by clerics in both spheres. In addition, there were only 100 Indonesians studying in Iran in 2022,[16] whereas the corresponding number at the Islamic University of Madinah, Saudi Arabia in 2024 was 1,482.[17]
THE COMPLEXITY OF SAUDI FUNDING
As mentioned earlier, some literature, especially those published in Western academia, have portrayed Saudi funding as primarily aimed at disseminating religious conservatism in the form of Wahhabism and Salafism. While the impact of such funding has been significant—as the case of Indonesia has shown—the reality on the ground has been such that not all funding has been aimed at spreading conservative ideologies. The funding has been used for a variety of purposes, including for diplomatic and economic purposes. The diplomatic purposes, which are aimed at boosting Saudi Arabia-Indonesia ties, include social aid to overcome the impact of natural disasters and to boost “food security”.[18] On 4 April 2023, for example, the Saudi government donated to Indonesia 100 tons of dates “as gifts from King of Saudi Arabia Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud that will be distributed to people in need”.[19] The Saudi government also donated US$50 million to the Indonesian government to support West Sumatra’s social and economic recovery efforts following a major earthquake in the area in 2009, which killed more than 1,100 people.[20] These are just a few examples of Saudi funding disbursed to strengthen bilateral ties between the two countries.
Given that the distribution of the funding often lacks accountability, it is unclear how much has been disbursed for ideological reasons. Furthermore, not all funding comes from the Saudi government; a substantial amount also comes from individual Saudi citizens whether nobleman or commoner. In some cases, the funding is disbursed with strings attached, including the promotion of both Wahhabism and Salafism, such as the distribution of funding to both Wahhabi and Salafi boarding schools. In other cases, funds were disbursed by private individuals without government knowledge of the ideological reasons behind the funding. For example, a Saudi donor made available a sum amounting to Rp 120 million for the construction of Masjid Madinahtul Umidiah in Tangerang regency, Banten province. He gave this money to the mosque construction committee through an Indonesian representative, H. Omin.[21] Being a small-scale fund from a private donor, no accountability has been demanded from the donor, and no approval has been required from the Saudi government. This is in contrast to bigger funds disbursed by large government-backed charity organisations such as the East Jakarta-based Makkah Al Mukarramah Foundation. Between 2004 and 2015, the foundation helped build 800 mosques and 3,400 showers and toilets across Indonesia with financial support from the Saudi government.[22] Much of the financial assistance materialised due to requests by Indonesian institutions and individuals, but others were initiatives by both the Saudi government and their private citizens, such as those in support of Indonesian victims of natural disasters.[23]
SAUDI FUNDING IN THE ERA OF MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN
The relation between Muhammad bin Salman and Saudi funding needs to be put in the context of a social and political pact made between his ancestor (King Muhammad ibn Saud) and influential Muslim cleric Muhammad Abdul Wahhab in the 17th century. Muhammad ibn Saud (1727–1765), who controlled Al-Diriya area on the outskirts of Riyadh, the capital city, socially and politically protected Muhammad Abdul Wahab, while the latter provided religious legitimacy for Muhammad ibn Saud’s rule and policies in return.[24] The pact contributed to the expansion of Muhammad ibn Saud’s rule beyond the Al-Diriya area which resulted in their control over modern-day Saudi Arabia. While certain aspects of the pact have continued till this day, others have changed.
The long-time pact was put to the test when King Faisal (1964–75) introduced modernisation in Saudi Arabia during his rule, such as through the launch of the first television broadcast and the promotion of girls’ education.[25] The conservatives were unhappy with these developments, and King Faisal was assassinated in 1975 by an extended relative.
His successor King Khalid rolled back some of the reforms. For example, women were excluded from public life, and more funds were injected into the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, whose task was to monitor the lives of ordinary Saudis.[26] Subsequent kings of Saudi Arabia kept the pact intact, and no major reforms were introduced.
However, Muhammad bin Salman, who took over the reins of state in 2017, again introduced reforms. Most significantly, he sought to promote “moderate Islam”, and aimed for a more pragmatic approach, rather than solely focusing on a moderate Islamic theology. He balanced these changes with continued support for Saudi Arabia’s promotion of Wahhabism and Salafism.
The policy has been quite effective as narratives being used by the religious establishment in support of his “moderate Islam” project appear more and more mainstream. “Moderate Islam” is merely a label to make the country more acceptable to international audiences and governments; through this innovation, Muhammad bin Salman’s post-oil vision (Vision 2030) has been attained. So far, he has faced little significant resistance to his changes.[27] To be sure, any signals of dissent have been met with repressive actions by Muhammad bin Salman.
Following the 2001 terror attacks in New York, Saudi Arabia imposed strict control on its financial resources to ensure that no funds would be used for terrorism. Muhammad bin Salman continued this policy. To reduce Western suspicion that the Saudi government was involved in funding terrorist activities, Saudi Arabia under Muhammad bin Salman promoted peace and development in Muslim communities abroad more vigorously, including in promoting a more moderate form of Islam. In the context of Indonesia, before the reforms introduced by Muhammad bin Salman, Saudi Arabia mainly channelled funds to modernist groups such as Muhammadiyah,[28] whose ideology is more aligned with Wahhabism, for example, in their fight against religious innovation. However, with Saudi Arabia’s recent efforts at becoming more moderate, they have begun to provide financial support to Nadhlatul Ulama, specifically for the organisation of Religion 20 (R20), an event held on the sidelines of the G20 summit organised in Indonesia in 2023.
At the same time, the country has continued distributing funds for the propagation of Wahhabism and Salafism. As mentioned earlier, the Saudi government officiated the expansion of LIPIA into three more locations in Indonesia, adding to its Jakarta campus, and allowing it to increase its capacity for student enrolment. This complexity is part of Muhammad bin Salman’s efforts to sustain and expand Saudi’s economy while at the same time upholding the longstanding pact between Muhammad Ibn Saud and Muhammad Abdul Wahhab.
CONCLUSION
This article has discussed how Saudi funding has been instrumental in popularising Wahhabism and Salafism in Indonesia, as exemplified by the many graduates from LIPIA who became educators and who promoted the ideology among the masses. A good number of graduates also assumed important positions in society, including as policymakers and politicians. The spread of this uncompromising ideology remains concerning as it has contributed to polarisation within the nation, dividing both Wahabi and Salafi followers from adherents of other streams of Islam such as traditionalists and modernists. This poses a challenge to Indonesia’s nation-building efforts.
Above all, while Muhammad bin Salman has been trying to portray Saudi Arabia as a moderate country, the country has continued to fund the promotion of Wahhabism and Salafism, suggesting a sense of pragmatism in balancing the need to attract tourism and businesses, with respect for history and the religious establishment.
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
- About the author: A’an Suryana is Visiting Fellow with the Regional Soial and Cultural Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and Lecturer at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia (UIII).
- Source: This article was published as a ISEAS Perspective