China’s LAC Infrastructure In Xinjiang: A Colonial Perspective – Analysis

By Ayjaz Wani

In a tactical move to reduce the travel time between northern and southern Xinjiang from seven hours to three hours while protecting goods from harsh winter conditions, China completed excavating the world’s longest roadway tunnel in the Tianshan Mountains of Xinjiang in December 2024. The 22.13 km tunnel, set to open in 2025, is crucial to China’s ambitious 319.72 km Urumqi-Yuli Expressway.

Around the same time, China’s Central Committee of the Communist Party (CCCP) and State Council approved the creation of two new counties, He’an and Hekang, in the Aksai Chin region of India, which was unlawfully ceded to China by Pakistan through a border agreement in 1963. The illegal creation of new counties in the Aksai Chin region, close on the heels of the recent rapprochement with India, shows Beijing’s colonial mentality, adding to the complexities of Sino-India bilateral relations.

The new counties managed by Khotan prefecture and the establishment of counties in the uninhabited region close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) represent an effort aimed at building infrastructure and increasing the Han population along the border, reminiscent of actions taken during the Great Leap Forward in 1958. However, China has maintained that the tunnel will enhance connectivity and support the socio-economic development of southern regions predominantly inhabited by Uyghurs, thus strengthening unity among ethnicities.

China’s Xinjiang border policy post-1949

Xinjiang’s history is marked by conflicts over its autonomy and independence. Chinese imperial rule lasted only 400 years, until 1949. In 1720, the Qing dynasty extended its control into the area for the first time since the Tang dynasty, but sustaining authority was challenging. This historical context is crucial to understanding China’s current Xinjiang border policy. After 1760, Qing leaders began relocating Han criminals from the mainland to Xinjiang, providing them subsidies and loans to settle and farm.

After 1950, Beijing initiated the mass migration of the Han people to the province to leverage its natural resources, establish political dominance, and integrate the local population into Chinese culture. Following 1949, this migration aimed to exploit resources and safeguard the frontier from external influences, particularly those of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Following 1958, 60,000 Kazaks moved to the former Soviet Central Asian Republics.

Beijing responded by sealing the border and forcibly relocating thousands of non-Han families from the border area, replacing them with Han citizens. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), established in 1954, facilitated all these population transfers. Comprising primarily of demobilised troops, XPCC functions as an economic enterprise and military force, wielding considerable governmental authority that impacts the region’s socio-political and financial dynamics. The organisation aimed to relocate Han individuals outside existing cities by establishing colonies, promoting the slogan of ‘transforming nature and reforming man’ to reclaim land, build industries, explore natural resources, and construct strategic roads and railway lines. XPCC assisted Beijing in extracting oil and gas from Xinjiang. Estimates indicate the region has 23.4 billion tonnes of oil reserves and 13 trillion cubic meters of gas reserves.

The XPCC constructed the Xinjiang-Xizang highway through Aksai Chin. By 1958, over 6,000 miles of roads had been built. The highway network expanded from 17,830 km in 2015 to 20,920 km in 2020. After 2021, Beijing commenced the construction of new roads towards the LAC from the G219 highway, which runs along the border. Beijing has prioritised building strategic roads and highways in the 14^th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) to upgrade the LAC infrastructure in Tibet and Xinjiang. Similarly, China is also constructing the rail networks in Xinjiang, which have expanded from 5,900 km in 2015 to approximately 7,800 km in 2020.

Colonial rationale behind the new counties and infrastructure

Most Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang reside in the southern regions, particularly in Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, and Kurla, where they have managed to resist the Chinese Communist Party’s enforced sinicisation, a process of assimilating non-Chinese communities into Chinese culture. Beijing’s growing security and economic interests in neighbouring Central and South Asia and concerns about potential unrest within southern Xinjiang have forced China to create new counties and increase its push for infrastructure. Despite its draconian policies in Xinjiang,

Beijing is increasingly concerned about the rising security dilemmas along the Pakistan border, making enhancing security measures there and along Uyghur-dominated regions a priority. The new Han migrants are mostly retired army personnel and work as a security force wielding administrative powers. Additionally, due to the rising demand for lithium and the estimated presence of 2 million tons of lithium in the vicinity of these new counties, XPCC intends to promote mining in the area.

The Tianshan Shengli Tunnel will enhance Xinjiang’s connectivity and boost Chinese trade and commerce with Central Asia, especially after the completion of the China- Kyrgyzstan- Uzbekistan railway line. Enhanced connectivity will attract more Chinese companies and further integrate the south of Xinjiang with Eurasian nations under the Belt and Road Initiative. Similarly, establishing two new counties in the parts of the Aksai Chin region of India will facilitate the transfer of Han migrants to the area through XPCC to develop new infrastructure and logistics to support the Chinese army in the region, which will have geostrategic implications along the LAC for India.

India’s response

After 1991, China capitalised on Central Asia’s economic and political instability to extend its influence into the tumultuous Xinjiang region. Beijing exploited the economic and political upheaval in the Central Asian countries bordering Xinjiang, securing 22 per cent, 32 per cent, and 3.5 per cent of land claimed from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, respectively. Beijing tried the same towards India after 2020, which heightened tensions along the LAC and increased standoffs.  Unlike other neighbouring countries in restive Xinjiang, New Delhi has intensified its infrastructure initiatives in Kashmir and Ladakh. It has built the impressive Chenab Bridge, recognised as the tallest cable-stayed bridge in the world, alongside the 12.77 km T49 rail tunnel.

Additionally, the ongoing construction of the 13.5 km Zojila Tunnel showcases India’s exceptional engineering feats and strategic edge over its rivals. Since 2019, India’s Prime Minister has personally overseen many of these geoeconomic and geostrategic projects. On 13 January 2025, the Prime Minister formally opened the Z-Mohr tunnel on the critical Srinagar-Leh highway. The Zojila Tunnel is anticipated to be finished by 2026, further boosting New Delhi’s strategic influence in Eastern Ladakh and along the LAC. India has also expanded its road and bridge infrastructure along the LAC in Ladakh. In 2021, 87 bridges were completed, while in 2022, the Defence Minister inaugurated projects costing INR 2,180 crores, including 18 solely dedicated to Ladakh. Following the successful rail connection with Kashmir, New Delhi should prioritise the 489 km Bilaspur-Manali-Leh railway line to swiftly deploy forces and equipment along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh.

To maintain its pace and strategic advantage over Beijing along the LAC, India requires a multi-faceted strategy that includes expedited infrastructure development, enhanced defence capabilities, and collaborative international efforts with allied nations to counter Chinese deceptive tactics.

• About the author: Ayjaz Wani is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
• Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation