Islamist Factions Derail Sudan Peace – OpEd
As the balance shifts in Khartoum, Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan and allied Islamist factions collaborate “for future control of the state…in the de facto, military-controlled government in Port Sudan.” Islamists have no interests in the December Revolution, or a role for civil society. Militant factions’ disregard for peaceful governance grants the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leadership a perfect instrument to avoid accountability as crimes against civilians surge. Islamist factions want to seize opportunities granted by military rule, their influence over SAF leaders continues to obstruct regional and international efforts to restart the peace process.
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), armed groups that fight “alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces, intentionally targeted civilians and their property.” Deliberately killing civilians as retribution for alleged support for rival groups “may also constitute potential crimes against humanity.” The surge in crimes against civilians comes at a time when international organizations lack funds to investigate incidents and respond to the deepening humanitarian crisis. Widespread armed clashes continue to displace vulnerable civilians beyond Sudan’s borders, exacerbating the conflict and dragging neighbors into direct conflict with rival parties.
SAF leaders like al-Burhan remain under a microscope, accused of “atrocities, including targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, and executing civilians” along with weaponizing “starvation, systematically obstructed the flow of humanitarian assistance, tortured detainees” under US sanctions, while deflecting by pointing to other parties. Allied Islamist armed groups like Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Brigade (BMB) and Sudan Shield Forces (SSF) raise concerns over crimes committed at Tayba village, Khartoum and Sennar State, and links to the Muslim Brotherhood and the National Congress Party (NCP).
Islamist factions
According to Sudanese media, there are “approximately 20 armed militias…fighting alongside the army,” in an alliance with actors like the former Islamist National Congress Party (NCP). This alliance is seen as the primary opposition to democratic governance and role of civil society. The influence of Islamist actors includes “issuing fatwas to shoot and kill men accused of cooperating with the RSF,” aggravating crimes perpetuated by the army.
Two Islamist militias fighting alongside the SAF since start of the civil war are the Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Brigade, reportedly led by Al-Misbah Abu Zaid Talha, Anas Omar and Hudhayfah Istanbul, and the Sudan Shield Forces, led by Abu Aqla Keikel. The SAF have relied heavily on the Brigade due to its opposition to “any call for the return of civilian forces” in direct contradiction to the “December Revolution that toppled Omar al-Bashir.” The Islamist movement’s support for the SAF may be united in opposing the rise of a civil state but are not without internal differences that could fragment the movement along the way. Leaders like Abdel Hai Youssef have caused tension between factions with warnings that the “Muslim Brotherhood are everywhere in the country,” an indirect threat to SAF leader Abdel-Fattah al Burhan.
Another militia are the Sudan Shield Forces, accused of “intentionally targeted civilians in Tayba village” on January 10, 2025 around Gezira state, reportedly formed in 2022 and “described as Arab” forces. HRW has described acts by the Shield Forces as “deliberate killings of civilians, [constituting] potential crimes against humanity.” The Brigade and Shield Forces fight alongside SAF providing a degree of cover for elements under US sanctioned al-Burhan who have “weaponized starvation, systematically obstructed the flow of humanitarian assistance, tortured detainees, and attacked civilians and civilian infrastructure.”
Leaders of these Islamist groups are seen as highly influential in foreign policy, reportedly in “control [of] the foreign relations file now. They [the Islamists] forced the military establishment to turn to the Iranian alliance and establish relations with Tehran.” Islamist also attract a large segment of the young technocrats and have a stronghold on the country’s judiciary.
SAF roots in institutions
The relationship between the SAF and the Islamist movement is highly symbiotic. The army needs both religious legitimacy and a cadre of efficient technocrats, while Islamists need a strong military to hold on to power and deter threats from civil democratic forces. Since the take-over of Khartoum by SAF in March, Islamist have strengthened their hand across state institutions.
Beyond the capital, the alliance illustrates how “political collaboration between the army and Islamists [design] for future control of the state [is] already apparent in the de facto, military-controlled government in Port Sudan.” Young educated technocrats within the Islamist movement grants actors like the NCP and the Brigade a cadre of experienced affiliates in the banking sector, the judiciary and the port that “will work with state institutions, ensuring Islamists remain in power.” The alliance has already facilitated the “military government in Port Sudan…further measures to repress any pro-democracy leaders from restoring civilian rule.”
Islamist factions like the Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Brigade, reportedly “20,000 strong and equipped with sophisticated weaponry,” also represent a viable threat to the SAF leadership. The balance maintained between the army and militia is fragile but vital to opposition to pro-democracy forces. This interdependence has also directly influenced the SAF decisions to refuse peace talks and prolong the conflict. The alliance has also gravitated toward Iran, who not only facilitates access to weapons but has also opened new territory for proxies like Yemen’s Houthi rebels.
