Understanding Indonesia’s Ukraine Peace Summit Scepticism – Analysis

By Trystanto Sanjaya

Indonesia refused to sign on to or explicitly support the June 2024 Ukraine peace summit’s final communique, justifying its action by emphasising the need to have an ‘inclusive’ dialogue by inviting all parties involved, including Russia. This action may seem puzzling, as the final communique does not deviate from UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions Indonesia voted in favour of in 2022.

But unlike the 2022 UNGA votes on resolutions condemning the Russian invasion, Indonesia sees the 2024 peace summit as a primarily Western-led initiative that carries little ability to make substantive progress to end the war.

The composition of the signatories of the final joint communique could partially explain Indonesia’s actions. Of the 85 signatories, 53 are Western countries or organisations, and Russia did not participate in the proceedings. Since the majority of the signatories are Global North countries and the proceedings did not include Moscow, the Indonesian government was keen to avoid being seen as being excessively aligned with the Western countries in a Western-dominated conference. Such an alignment could be perceived as being inconsistent with Indonesia’s ‘free and active’ foreign policy.

The exclusivity of the summit contrasts with proceedings at formal international organisations, such as the United Nations, where states are generally more confident expressing their views on international issues, especially towards a great power, due to these forums’ supposed neutrality and convening power.

Indonesia was more confident in voting to condemn Russia in 2022 on the UNGA stage given its inclusivity — nearly all UN members, Russia included, took part in the proceedings. It was held in the neutral environment of the UNGA stage and had greater legitimacy than the Ukraine peace summit in Switzerland.

But while Indonesia has some reservations regarding the procedures and composition of participants in the Ukraine peace summit, Indonesia continues to support the basic principles of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and peace.

A few days before the summit, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Indonesia’s Defence Minister and President-elect Prabowo Subianto during the 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue. They discussed the need for peace, and the Ukrainian president indicated that he ‘look[s] forward’ to Indonesia’s support in upholding his country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. He also expressed Ukraine’s hope that Indonesia would send a delegation ‘at the highest level’ to the Ukraine peace summit.

Indonesia’s actions could be seen as an attempt to reconcile its competing interests of supporting Ukraine by attending the summit while trying to recuse itself of any alignment with the West by refusing to sign the final communique.

Indonesia’s insistence on Russian participation in peace negotiations also reflects its desire for the fighting to end as soon as possible, justly or unjustly for Ukraine. Such an attitude is reflected by Prabowo’s 2023 Shangri-La Dialogue peace plan proposal, which includes a ceasefire and a UN-supervised referendum.

This attitude was also visible during outgoing Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s visit to Ukraine in 2022. Widodo overwhelmingly focused on the need for global economic stability, particularly the rising costs of food and energy, rather than on Ukraine’s struggle against the Russian invasion. Indonesia may hope that a negotiation between Russia and Ukraine can freeze combat engagements and allow the world economy to stabilise.

When Prabowo is sworn in as Indonesia’s president in October 2024, Indonesia’s policy towards Ukraine will remain largely unchanged. At the 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue, Prabowo expressed his conviction that his 2023 ceasefire proposal is still ‘[n]ecessary as an intermediate solution’.

Yet while the Widodo administration does not make many comments on Ukraine unless Indonesian interests are concerned, the incoming administration could be more vocal on the need for a ceasefire. Prabowo has expressed his desire for Indonesia to play a more assertive role in world affairs.

While a freeze on fighting in Ukraine would partially fulfill Indonesia’s domestic needs, the long-term effect of degraded compliance with international law, especially by a great power, must be considered. Insisting on a ceasefire after a superpower invades its neighbour could set a dangerous precedent — it would leave the invading power in functional control of the invaded territory.

It could also embolden China to undertake dangerous military actions, such as invading a disputed island in the South China Sea controlled by the Philippines or Vietnam. China knows there would be pressure to implement a ceasefire and lock in its gains. An upsurge in great power adventurism in the Asia Pacific, emboldened by the precedent set in Ukraine, would not be in Indonesia’s interests and could undermine Indonesia’s security.

• About the author: Trystanto Sanjaya is a Master of Science candidate in Geopolitics and Business at the Ecole Superieure de Commerce de Rennes, France, and a recipient of the ‘France Excellence’ scholarship.
• Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum