The Baltic Electricity Grid: Synchronizing Symphony – Analysis

By Jason Moyer

(FPRI) — The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have an enduring connection to their occupation by the Soviet Union — they are all still on the Soviet-era power grid, controlled today by Moscow. The project to decouple the power grid of the three Baltic states from Russia has been in the works since the 2000s but became more urgent after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It will finally come to fruition in February 2025.

This project has been a careful orchestration between European Union officials, multiple governments — including the three Baltic nations, Poland, and Russia — as well as private sector interests to ensure a smooth and successful transition to the EU energy grid. For the Baltic states — all three of whom are NATO allies and EU member states — synchronizing with the EU grid shores up critical infrastructure, deepens energy security in the region, and removes one lever of influence Russia might attempt to wield against them.

The legacy of the Soviet electrical grid has been a pernicious thorn in the side of the three Baltic states. In the late 2000s, they began negotiating their exit from the Soviet-era joint BRELL (Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) agreement, which also provides western Russia and Belarus with electricity. It took nearly a decade of negotiations, but in 2018 an agreement and nearly one billion euros in funding from the EU paved the way for them to join the EU’s grid: the Continental Synchronous Area.

The Baltic countries, long considered an “energy island” cut off from other EU member states, have steadily made efforts to better integrate with their neighbors via Poland (LitPol Link), Sweden (NordBalt) and Finland (Estlink 1 and Estlink 2). On July 16, 2024, the Baltic nations provided formal notice of their exit from the BRELL agreement on February 7, 2025. The EU has now committed 1.2 billion euros ($1.3 billion) to prepare the region for decoupling from the old grid, covering about three-fourths of the total costs. Lithuania was ready as of 2023 to synchronize with the EU grid but, in a show of Baltic solidarity with Estonia and Latvia, agreed to wait and de-sync from Moscow as a triad.

The control of the grid underpinning the three highly developed Baltic states — whose combined GDP has increased approximately fourfold since joining the EU 20 years ago — has been managed from Moscow, raising the specter of potential abuse by the Kremlin. Russia has a history of weaponizing energy, notably against Ukraine, utilizing its upstream production of cheap gas as leverage in disagreements with European countries. Russia’s weaponization of energy resources has prompted EU member states to stockpile gas, somewhat removing this lever from Russia’s arsenal while at the same time securing prices for consumers.

Through the Three Seas Initiative, jointly backed by both the EU and the United States, enhancing north-south energy connections and bolstering energy security have received renewed attention and funding. Despite this renewed interest, the Baltic states are prepared for potential Russian retaliation. In the event of an emergency or a disruption in service from Moscow, the Baltic states are able to synchronize with the EU grid on an accelerated timetable. Estonia’s former Prime Minister Kaja Kallas warned, “Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and its use of energy as a weapon proves that it’s a dangerous and unpredictable country, and therefore being on the Russian electricity grid is a risk for Estonian consumers.” Additionally, Russian propaganda is seeking to undermine Baltic energy security, the energy policies of the three states, and heighten distrust in switching off of the BRELL system. The targeted nature of Russia’s propaganda machine demonstrates Moscow is none too pleased with the Baltic countries switching off of the Soviet-era grid.

Energy security in the region has become more urgent following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the removal of Russian gas from their energy mix. The project to bring the Baltic states into sync with the EU grid was moved up from late 2025 to February as a result. In 2022, all three states stopped importing Russian gas — which accounted for 75% of the region’s gas demands pre-invasion — instead turning towards renewables, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and slashing consumption.

Two shared LNG terminals have been established in the region: 1) a floating LNG regasification terminal (FSRU) in Inkoo/Ingå for use by Finland and Estonia, operational since January 2023 for 10 years, and 2) in Klaipeda since 2014 for Lithuania and Latvia. A new terminal has been proposed in Paldiski, Estonia where the Balticconnector pipeline (connecting Finland and Estonia) makes landfall, however, there have been no public reports of it being developed in over a year and its status is unclear. The Paldiski terminal would likely receive renewed attention during disruption at one of the other LNG terminals. After a Hong Kong-flagged vessel, the Newnew Polar Bear damaged the Balticonnector pipeline connecting Finland and Estonia in 2023, increased attention has been paid to energy and undersea infrastructure. Over the years, there has been talk of adding more LNG terminals across the Baltics to further strengthen energy security in the region, including in Skulte (Latvia), Tallinn, and Riga. Then Latvian energy minister, Raimonds Čudars, in 2023 saidthe existing energy infrastructure in the region was sufficient and stockpiles have held strong after two mild winters. 

One of the final vestiges of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states, the electricity grid underpinning the three nations, is on track to be removed in February 2025. Russia will lose a vital lever and means of influencing the three countries, while the three Baltic countries are set to attain new levels of energy security. The concert of activities from the EU to the national level to the companies managing electricity to bring about this change is nothing short of herculean, with February 2025 due to bring about another new layer of security for the Baltic states.

• About the author: Jason C. Moyer is the Program Associate for the Global Europe Program at The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. His research focuses on NATO, the Baltics, the Nordics, and the European Union. He also teaches on the Nordics and Baltics at the Foreign Service Institute.
• Source: This article was published by FPRI