Franco-German Military Cooperation – OpEd
In an era marked by escalating geopolitical tensions and evolving security concerns, the military collaboration between Germany and France has become a cornerstone of Europe’s defense architecture. The post-Cold War landscape and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, have highlighted the urgent need for strategic autonomy within the European Union.
The EU’s Strategic Compass, released in March 2023, emphasizes the importance of rapid deployment, joint capabilities, procurement mechanisms, and coordinated threat analysis. Additionally, the rise of cyber and hybrid warfare challenges has further underscored the necessity for both bilateral and multilateral cooperation. This essay argues that the deepening defence partnership between Berlin and Paris, through high-technology development projects, strategic policy alignment, operational and support missions, constitutes the cornerstone of a sovereign, capable, and unified European defence posture, even as it confronts considerable political, industrial, and institutional hurdles.
Since 2014, European defense spending has seen a significant increase due to the war in Ukraine. Germany’s defense outlays rose from 1.19 percent of GDP in 2014 to 2.12 percent in 2024, indicating a fundamental shift in budgetary priorities. France followed this trend, raising its defense expenditure to approximately 2 percent of GDP in 2024, thereby exceeding NATO’s percentage guideline and signaling Paris’s commitment to modernization. Under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who was sworn in on 23 April 2025, Germany is targeting an increase of up to 3% of GDP over the next five years. This goal aligns with allied calls to close capability gaps with the United States.
At the heart of bilateral innovation is the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS), a next-generation battle tank intended to replace Germany’s Leopard 2 and Leclerc tanks. On April 10, 2025, the MGCS Project Company GmbH was officially established in Cologne, with the consortium KNDS—comprising Nexter and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann—taking the lead in development oversight. The 2025 budget allocates nearly €98 million for MGCS research and development, as well as industrial efforts in France. This funding will support advanced digital architecture, modular weapons systems, and cross-border supply integration. However, diverging progress, differing national requirements, disputes over workforce distribution, and controversies surrounding cost-sharing have delayed the demonstrator phase, pushing the projected service entry date to 2040.
Complementing land cooperation is the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), a tripartite initiative involving Germany, France, and Spain aimed at developing a sixth-generation fighter that integrates networked unmanned systems and a secure “combat cloud.” As of April 2025, Phase 1B of FCAS has a dedicated budget of €3.2 billion for demonstrator fabrication, sensor integration, and emerging technologies. This phase accounts for roughly 25 percent of the industrial workshare, with Germany and France sharing the remainder. France’s 2025 defense appropriation continues to support Phase 2, which targets prototype maturation and first flight demonstrations by 2028–2029. However, competition between Dassault and Airbus, along with intermittent funding shortfalls, threatens to derail the planned milestones.
The Franco-German security agenda extends beyond flagship programmes to support operational Ukraine in demonstrating practical solidarity. In early 2025, KNDS inaugurated an assembly joint and maintenance facility near Kyiv for the local production and repair of 2 Leopard and CAESAR howitzers. The site is designed to assemble up to fifty vehicles per year and service one hundred units annually. This will help alleviate logistical bottlenecks in the West and strengthen Ukraine’s frontline resilience. Additionally, it provides training for Ukrainian engineers, fostering indigenous maintenance capacity and reducing reliance on external supply chains.
Reactions from other EU member states reveal a tapestry of complex endorsement and reservations. A Eurobarometer poll in February 2025 found that 79 percent of respondents favour deeper EU-defence level cooperation, while 65 percent support increased collective spending. Spain views its FCAS as a validation of its aerospace industry’s technological maturity and a launchpad for high-value exports. Italy divides its support between the FCAS and the UK-led Global Combat Air Programme, reflecting Rome’s commitment to maintaining its industrially diverse relationships. Eastern European states, particularly Poland and the Baltic countries, appreciate Franco-German initiatives that strengthen NATO’s eastern flank, but they remain cautious about the EU’s potential overcentralization of defense decision-making.
Despite its momentum, the Franco-German model encounters significant challenges. Industrial integration is hindered by procurement practices, complex national export controls, and rivalries among key players, leading to cost overruns and schedule delays in both the MGCS and FCAS programs. Additionally, political differences complicate collaboration: France’s expeditionary doctrine and dependence on an independent nuclear deterrent often clash with Germany’s more strategic, cautious, and restrictive arms export policies. Institutional complexities emerge from overlapping EU initiatives like PESCO and the SAFE fund, alongside NATO’s Defense Planning Process. This overlap creates risks of duplicative structures and inefficient resource allocation.
Dynamic shifts in U.S. foreign policy, increasing challenges from cyber and hybrid warfare, and strategic competition with China over critical technologies further complicate the tasks of European defense planners. The EU’s new Action Security for Europe fund, valued at €150 billion, aims to finance collaborative R&D procurement. However, its success depends on transparent governance, fair distribution, and alignment with NATO priorities. Harmonizing the SAFE fund with national and program planning remains a key task for NATO in Brussels.
In conclusion, the increasing military cooperation between Germany and France represents a significant step toward achieving a more autonomous, integrated, and resilient European defense posture. Their key programs—MGCS and FCAS—illustrate their ambition to create advanced land and air capabilities within a cohesive framework. Additionally, operational initiatives in Ukraine showcase their commitment to turning industrial efforts into effective synergies and strategic outcomes. Consolidate these gains into a sustainable European identity, Paris and Berlin must address industrial disputes, harmonize differing doctrines, and promote inclusive governance that engages all member states, effectively leveraging collective resources.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.
References
- Deschaux-Dutard, Delphine. French-German Military Cooperation and European Defence: From Driving Engine to Divergence of Interests? Routledge, 2023.
- Krotz, Ulrich, and Katharina Wolf. “Franco-German Defence and Security Cooperation.” In The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces, Oxford University Press, 2023.
De Vergeron, Karine. “Franco-German Cooperation Will Be Crucial for the Future of European Security.” Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), April 2023.
