South Korea’s Defining Vote: The 2025 Presidential Election – OpEd

The 2025 South Korean presidential election marks a crucial turning point, occurring on June 3, 2025, as a snap vote following the impeachment of President Yoon Suk. This election serves as a referendum on the nation’s economic and strategic direction.

Four prominent candidates are in the race. Jae Lee-myung of the Democratic Party advocates for pragmatic diplomacy, alongside significant government investment in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and renewable energy. Meanwhile, Moon Kim-soo, representing the conservative People Power Party, pushes for extensive deregulation and a reduction in corporate tax rates from 22 percent to 18 percent. He also proposes a transactional approach to the U.S.–Korea alliance, emphasizing increased burden-sharing for the 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in Korea. Jun Lee-seok of the New Reform Party promotes a libertarian approach to conservatism, advocating for meritocratic competition over government aid, with an unwavering stance against unconditional support for North Korea. He also supports private-sector initiatives focused on defense-led digital advancements and interoperability. In contrast, Young Kwon-guk of the Justice Party champions social-liberal policies, including enhanced labor rights, anti-discrimination legislation, and humanitarian efforts aimed at achieving reunification based on equality and human rights.

South Korea’s export-oriented economy is heavily reliant on semiconductors, which accounted for 21 percent of exports in 2024, totaling $141.9 billion. U.S. “reciprocal” tariffs of up to 25 percent on chips and steel have put pressure on manufacturers and contributed to a sluggish GDP growth of just 1.2 percent in early 2025. In response, Acting President Han Duck-soo announced a support package worth 33 trillion won (approximately $25 billion) in April 2025. This package increases low-interest loans for chipmakers from 17 trillion to 20 trillion won and introduces production tax credits of up to 10 percent to help offset U.S. duties and maintain global competitiveness. Additionally, Lee Jae-myung has proposed a $12 billion stabilization fund along with incentives for AI startups, while Lee Jun-seok criticizes protectionism as detrimental to fair competition and advocates for merit-based market reforms instead. Kwon Young-guk suggests providing targeted assistance for small and medium-sized enterprises, along with enhanced social safety nets, while dismissing broad corporate subsidies as financially imprudent.

The United States–South Korea military alliance, supported by approximately 500 American troops under the 1966 Status of Forces Agreement, is crucial for deterring North Korean aggression. Seoul’s current annual contribution of USD 1.09 billion, renegotiated in October, became contentious for 2024 when former President Trump demanded an increase to USD 2.2 billion. Kim Moon-ha has indicated a willingness to consider higher payments in exchange for permanent basing guarantees and joint development programs in missile defense and cybersecurity. Meanwhile, Jae Lee-myung cautions that financial contributions should be balanced against reciprocal U.S. commitments, including conditional technology transfers and joint military exercises. In contrast, Lee Jun-seok advocates for private-sector-led defense collaborations and frameworks for digital interoperability. Kwon Young-guk, on the other hand, advocates for a shift in U.S. bases towards international peacekeeping training centers. He emphasizes prioritizing diplomatic conflict resolution measures instead of engaging in escalatory burden-sharing standoffs.

Engagement with Russia and the legacy of Soviet-era ties to North Korea add further strategic complexities. In 2024, bilateral trade with Moscow totaled only USD 16 billion, less than 3 percent of South Korea’s total trade. Nevertheless, Russia remains a crucial energy conduit, and Pyongyang historically retains leverage from its cooperation with the USSR. Lee Jae advocates for cautious cooperation in civil nuclear research and the opening of Arctic shipping routes, which could reduce freight times by up to ten days. This approach aims to diversify energy imports and mitigate the impact of U.S. spillover tariffs, according to Reuters. However, Moon Kim-soo warns that a close alignment with Moscow could fracture consensus within the Atlantic alliance and compromise Seoul’s commitments to Ukraine and liberal democratic norms. Lee Jun echoes pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong and advocates for targeted sanctions on Russian entities, rejecting any broad energy deals that could enable the Kremlin’s overreach. Young Kwon urges restraint and proposes that South Korea lead a coalition prioritizing human rights in Russian engagement, while also avoiding sanctions spillover on domestic firms.

Reunification of the Korean Peninsula remains a complex issue, with the IMF projecting integration costs exceeding USD 1.5 trillion over twenty years. An HRC Opinion survey indicates that 82 percent of South Koreans support eventual reunification; however, only 37 percent are willing to accept concessions as immediate preconditions. Jae Lee suggests a phased engagement strategy through special economic zones, which could boost inter-Korean trade by eight percent annually. He also advocates for the resumption of family reunions and joint infrastructure projects, such as reconnecting rail links, all under strict compliance metrics.  While Kim Moon insists that credible verification of denuclearization and the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear assets must occur before any substantive economic integration, to protect taxpayers. Lee Jun champions the idea that reunification should facilitate the peaceful absorption of North Korea into a democratic system, firmly opposing the current regime and emphasizing the need for a regime transition. Finally, Kwon Young-guk emphasizes humanitarian priorities, including the urgent delivery of food and medicine, protections for North Korean defectors, and the establishment of a National Reconciliation Commission to promote equitable social integration.

The intersection of policy, economic resilience, alliance management, multipolar diversification, and reunification creates a complex landscape for the incoming administration. Innovative fiscal tools, such as sovereign wealth funds and digital levies, can help balance social welfare priorities with the demands of defense modernization. Diplomatic coherence will be essential for guiding multilateral engagements and preventing diplomatic drift or punitive backlashes. Additionally, leveraging public-private partnerships in technology and innovation can enhance efficiency, but it is crucial to ensure ethical oversight to safeguard transparency and accountability. Any approach to reunification must balance moral imperatives with fiscal realities and human rights protections.

In conclusion, the election on June 3, 2025, will decide whether South Korea embarks on a new path of adaptive multilateralism—utilizing diversified partnerships and state-guided technological investments—or returns to a transactional approach focused on market liberalization, alliances, and consolidation. The four candidates—Lee Jae-myung, Kim Moon-soo, Lee Jun-seok, and Kwon Young-guk—highlight the strategic crossroads facing the nation: a choice between state resilience and unfettered markets, the primacy of alliances versus multipolarity, and a balance between militarized deterrence and conditional dialogue with Pyongyang.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.

REFERENCES

• Kim, H.-J. & Song, S. A. (2025, May 18). South Korea’s presidential candidates face off in a fiery debate. Reuters. 
• Jeong, H. (2025, May 19). South Korea presidential candidate Kim says open to discussing US troop cost. Reuters. 
• Lee, J. (2025, May 13). South Korean presidential frontrunner Lee Jae-myung’s policy pledges. Reuters