Towards Renewed Hope: Rebuilding Indo-US Relations In The Post-Biden Era – OpEd
By Dr. Jagmeet Bawa and Dr. Sandeep Singh
The relationship between India and the US is characterized by complexity. Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee’s characterization of the two nations as “natural allies” implies a significant alignment in their values and geopolitical interests.
President Barack Obama characterized the relationship between India and the United States as “a defining partnership of the 21st century.” President Joe Biden modified it by adding the definite article “the (Prasad, 2025).” Joe Biden, who has now left the office of the U.S. President, oversaw a period of strained relations between India and the United States during his tenure. Historically, India has maintained a strong strategic alignment with the USSR/Russia, a key rival of the United States. However, in the past two decades, successive Indian governments have made concerted efforts to improve ties with the U.S., leading to significant advancements in multiple areas. Unfortunately, these hard-won gains faced setbacks over the last four years, as the Biden administration appeared to target India—its government, its people, and its burgeoning economy. Indian companies, which play a critical role in building the nation’s infrastructure and driving economic growth, were particularly impacted, with the Adani Group being a prominent example.
The Biden administration’s policies often seemed at odds with India’s interests. Allegations and investigations against Indian corporations, such as the Adani Group, sent shockwaves through the business community and disrupted investor confidence. The Hindenburg Report, which accused the Adani Group of stock manipulation and corporate fraud, not only wiped billions off the market capitalization of the company but also indirectly hurt millions of Indian investors. Despite the Adani Group’s recovery and denial of these accusations, the damage highlighted the vulnerabilities of Indian businesses to external attacks. These events were perceived by many in India as attempts to undermine the nation’s economic progress and tarnish its global image. The Biden administration’s support for such narratives, whether directly or indirectly, strained relations further.
Under Biden, there were several contentious moments that aggravated diplomatic tensions. The U.S. administration’s frequent criticisms of India on issues of human rights and democracy were seen as undue interference in domestic affairs. Diplomatic engagements with opposition leaders and civil society groups during sensitive times, such as the farmers’ protests, added fuel to the fire. Prominent U.S. lawmakers and officials voiced support for these protests, which were viewed in India as an endorsement of internal dissent. Such actions not only created mistrust but also raised questions about the U.S. respecting India’s sovereignty.
In stark contrast, Donald Trump’s tenure as President marked a phase of robust Indo-U.S. relations. Trump’s personal rapport with Prime Minister Narendra Modi was evident in events such as the “Howdy Modi” and “Namaste Trump” rallies, which showcased the strong camaraderie between the two leaders. The Trump administration’s hardline stance against China resonated with India’s own security concerns, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. Additionally, Trump’s approach to Pakistan—cutting military aid and openly criticizing its role in harboring terrorism—aligned with India’s strategic interests. His unequivocal support during critical moments, such as the Pulwama terror attack and the abrogation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir, further cemented trust between the two nations.
Economically, the Trump administration’s pro-business policies and potential reforms in high-skilled immigration, such as the H-1B visa program, benefited Indian professionals and industries. Unlike Biden, who emphasized ideological scrutiny, Trump prioritized economic pragmatism, creating a conducive environment for bilateral trade and investment. Indian companies faced fewer hurdles, and the focus on mutual economic growth strengthened ties. Trump’s hands-off approach to India’s domestic affairs also reduced diplomatic friction, allowing for smoother cooperation on various fronts.
Looking ahead, Donald Trump’s potential return to the presidency offers opportunities for India to rebuild and strengthen its partnership with the United States. The foundation laid during Trump’s first tenure provides a blueprint for advancing shared strategic goals. Cooperation in defense, energy, and technology sectors can be revitalized, and India can leverage its position as a critical player in the Indo-Pacific strategy. Furthermore, a Trump administration is likely to take a less critical stance on India’s internal matters, enabling New Delhi to focus on its development priorities without external interference. In addition, India has served as a collaborative partner in the Indo-Pacific, the Quad, G-20, I2U2, and IMEC (all hindered due to the ongoing conflict involving Israel and Hamas/Hezbollah/Iran) and has participated in the G-7 summit when invited, despite not being a formal ally.
India-US defense and economic relations are getting better, offering substantial opportunities for enhanced collaboration. Kumar (2025) indicates that the expanding defense trade offers opportunities for US defense manufacturers to obtain significant contracts, leveraging India’s substantial military inventories, generating employment, and aligning with Trump’s pro-business policies. Defense relations may strengthen if Trump advocates for US companies to establish production in India, utilizing technology transfer agreements such as GE’s collaboration with HAL for the production of F-414 jet engines, which began during Biden’s administration. Recent agreements such as SOSA and ALO, signed in August 2024, are expected to significantly enhance defense cooperation. In a significant advancement of this partnership, Marco Rubio, a fervent advocate for India and a critic of China, presented the “US-India Defense Cooperation Act” in 2024. This legislation seeks to enhance India’s standing to that of prominent US allies such as Japan and Israel, highlighting India’s strategic significance in countering China. Rubio’s promotion of enhanced defense and technological connections is anticipated to strengthen defense cooperation and facilitate technological exchanges between the two countries in the forthcoming years (Siddiqui, 2025).
Energy trade represents an expanding sector. Kumar (2025) notes that US oil and gas exports to India increased to $14.3 billion, a trend expected to grow during Trump’s potential second term. iCET, initiated under the Biden administration, has established a framework for advanced collaboration in fields such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and quantum computing. India should pursue additional agreements in semiconductor manufacturing and advanced technologies under Trump 2.0 to optimize benefits, leveraging mutual strategic and economic interests.
Kumar (2025) indicates that the United States is India’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade in 2023-24 amounting to $118.2 billion, which includes a $36.8 billion surplus for India. To maintain this momentum, India may consider strategically lowering duties on specific imports to align rates with ASEAN levels, while also negotiating improved market access for Indian exports. India, with the objective of becoming the world’s third-largest economy by 2030, should prioritize trade liberalization and growth-oriented policies over the restoration of the GSP regime.
However, navigating Trump’s leadership style will require careful diplomacy. His transactional approach to foreign policy may pose challenges in achieving equitable agreements. Trade disputes, immigration policies, and tariff negotiations could emerge as points of contention. Additionally, Trump’s strained relations with global allies and institutions might complicate India’s aspirations for greater multilateral engagement. Balancing these challenges with the potential benefits of a renewed partnership will demand strategic foresight and adaptability from Indian policymakers.
Regarding the future of US-India ties, Richard Verma—the highest-ranking Indian-American official in the State Department—has voiced optimism, and asserts that the US-India relationship should be grounded in shared values rather than transactional interactions. Verma emphasizes the evolution over 25 years, noting the shift from negligible defense and trade relations in 2000 to a substantial partnership surpassing $20 billion in defense trade and $200 billion in bilateral trade by 2025. He emphasizes that although the distinctions between the two nations contribute to dynamism, the relationship must be anchored in principles such as the rule of law, mutual respect, and inclusivity. Verma emphasizes the significance of bipartisan backing and cooperative initiatives in domains such as technology, intelligence exchange, joint manufacturing, and the preservation of the international order. He considers frameworks such as the Quad vital for preserving a free and secure Indo-Pacific, addressing challenges from adversaries, and influencing 21st-century global norms. Verma maintains a positive outlook on the future of US-India relations, warning against diminishing the partnership to a mere transaction of goods and services.
India’s economic rise and its growing global influence make it a vital partner for the United States. The country’s inclusion among the world’s top five economies and the remarkable performance of its corporations underscore its importance in the global arena. As India continues to build its infrastructure and expand its influence, a strong and stable relationship with the U.S. will be crucial. The lessons learned from the Biden years highlight the need for mutual respect, non-interference, and a focus on shared interests to ensure a prosperous and enduring partnership.
About the authors:
- Prof. Jagmeet Bawa, Department of Political Science, Central University of Himachal Pradesh, Dharmshala.
- Dr. Sandeep Singh, Department of South and Central Asian Studies, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda.