India-Sri Lanka Defence Cooperation Agreement: Strategic Realignment Or Regional Imbalance? – OpEd

The recently signed Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between India and Sri Lanka, finalized during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s April visit to Colombo, has been widely praised in both New Delhi and Colombo as a historic milestone. It marks the first time the two nations have formalized their military partnership within a structured framework, ostensibly to address shared maritime threats, deepen defense collaboration, and enhance regional security. However, beyond the celebratory press releases and symbolic gestures lies a far more complex and concerning reality—one that raises significant questions across the region.

Rather than representing a benign step towards regional peace, the DCA signals a recalibration of power that could disrupt the strategic equilibrium in South Asia. Although framed as a bilateral initiative, the implications of this agreement extend well beyond India and Sri Lanka. It reflects a growing trend of bilateralism at the expense of multilateral cooperation in the region. India’s pursuit of bilateral security pacts with its neighbors—whether the Maldives, Bhutan, or now Sri Lanka—suggests a strategic shift aimed at sidelining collective regional platforms such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Pakistan, for instance, has consistently advocated for inclusive regional security dialogues. Instead of fostering trust and transparency across South Asia, the DCA establishes an exclusive military corridor between New Delhi and Colombo, effectively excluding other regional actors and reinforcing perceptions that India seeks to dominate, rather than co-manage, the region’s security architecture.

Sri Lanka’s participation in such exclusive arrangements also risks undermining its traditional foreign policy identity, which has long been anchored in non-alignment. Domestically, concerns are mounting over the lack of transparency surrounding the agreement. According to several Sri Lankan analysts, the DCA was signed with minimal parliamentary debate, limited civil society engagement, and no public disclosure of its full contents. For a country that has endured decades of internal conflict and foreign entanglement, this opacity sets a troubling precedent. Not only does it weaken democratic accountability in Colombo, but it also casts doubt on the true nature of India’s strategic objectives. 

Perhaps the most consequential concern lies in the DCA’s potential to alter the balance of power in the Indian Ocean. Is the DCA genuinely about capacity-building and maritime cooperation, or is it a means of anchoring Sri Lanka more firmly within India’s so called Indo-Pacific strategy, particularly as a counterweight to China? The agreement enhances India’s maritime surveillance capabilities near critical shipping lanes and strategic chokepoints. By providing reconnaissance aircraft, supporting naval infrastructure, and establishing military-to-military communication mechanisms, India is positioning itself as the dominant maritime force in Sri Lanka’s vicinity. This move aligns with New Delhi’s broader ambition to project power from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal. 

While the Indian government has welcomed President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s assurance that Sri Lankan territory will not be used against Indian interests, such statements—repeated with satisfaction by Indian officials—risk casting Colombo in a subordinate role. For smaller South Asian states, this dynamic reinforces narratives of coercion and asymmetrical partnerships. India’s economic and diplomatic influence is frequently leveraged to secure agreements that disproportionately serve its own strategic calculus. In this instance, Sri Lanka appears to be aligning its security doctrine with Indian priorities, potentially at the expense of its ability to maintain a balanced approach between India and China.

Moreover, the defense-centric focus of the DCA does little to address—and may even overshadow—other pressing bilateral issues. Longstanding tensions persist over Indian fishermen encroaching into Sri Lankan waters, environmentally harmful bottom-trawling practices, and the unresolved grievances of Sri Lanka’s Tamil population. Additionally, the re-emergence of the Katchatheevu Island issue in Indian political discourse, especially during election cycles, has further strained relations.

Sri Lanka has historically tried to pursue a foreign policy characterized by strategic balance; although heavily influenced by India, it has simultaneously engaged China for investment and cultivated relationships with Western powers. The DCA, however, risks destabilizing this delicate balancing act. While not overtly anti-China, the agreement aligns Sri Lanka more closely with India. If perceived as a geopolitical pivot, the DCA could prompt a counter-response from China, intensifying great power competition in Colombo and dragging Sri Lanka into the very type of rivalry its non-aligned stance has sought to avoid.

An alternative to this bilateral pact would have been Sri Lanka advocating for a comprehensive South Asian Regional Defense Framework—one inclusive of all stakeholders, irrespective of size. Though challenging to implement due to longstanding mistrust, particularly between India and Pakistan, such a framework could promote genuine collaboration on common threats such as piracy, climate change, and humanitarian crises without turning the region into an arena for strategic contestation. By choosing to bind itself more tightly to India’s defense apparatus, Sri Lanka may have diminished its capacity to shape a more inclusive and balanced regional order.

Ultimately, while the DCA may serve India’s strategic objectives, it does so at the cost of regional cohesion, multilateral engagement, and strategic transparency. South Asia does not require more bilateral assertions of power; it requires inclusive platforms that respect national sovereignty, foster dialogue, and ensure that no country—regardless of size—feels marginalized. There is still time for Sri Lanka to recalibrate its course. Emphasizing transparency, promoting regional consultation, and recommitting to the principles of multilateralism could restore strategic balance. Otherwise, agreements such as the DCA, despite their cooperative façade, risk becoming symbols of strategic overreach rather than instruments of genuine security