ASEAN’s Balancing Act: Challenges And Opportunities In Trump’s 2025 Return – OpEd

ASEAN is a regional organization in Southeast Asia that acts as a link between the superpowers and ensures stability in the region of interest. During the period of former American President Donald Trump,  there were changes in US-ASEAN relations that would not have left an indelible mark on the economic and political development of the block.

Protectionism, selective engagement in diplomatic relations, and the growing American-Chinese rivalry over Trump’s “America First” policy brought ASEAN into a more complex international environment. The region faces the continued impact of his first term, evolving regional dynamics, and the return of Trump to the presidency in 2025 raises challenges. This question paper aims to contribute to the debate on the current state and future of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), considering the return of Donald Trump to the White House in 2025.

Given the complexity of the above-mentioned issues, the paper employs an analytical approach to understand the implications of the return of Donald Trump for his second term in dealing with ASEAN. The challenges include navigating superpower rivalry, enhancing cooperation among the member countries, managing tensions with the superpowers, and the possibility of ASEAN remaining a key player in the Indo-Pacific region.

During his first term, Trump’s policies had a significant impact on ASEAN’s development. For instance, his decision to quit the Trans-Pacific Partnership Partnership (TPP) was a big blow to the ASEAN trade facilitation agenda.  The TPP was a multilateral agreement that aimed at enhancing trade relations among the member countries in the Pacific  Region and, in the process, enhancing the integration of the ASEAN member states. Bilateralism vs. multilateralism shift by Trump left ASEAN searching for new and alternative trade agreements, including the  Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) signed in 2020. This trade agreement, which comprises all the member states of ASEAN, as well as China, Japan, South Korea,  Australia, and New Zealand, has since become the largest free trade agreement in the world. However, the absence of the US in such frameworks reduces the influence of ASEAN in the economic relations between the US  and China.

In addition, the trade war between the United States and China has had a significant impact on the economies of Southeast Asia. Both the opportunities and the disruptions that resulted from the increasing tariffs between the two global powers were felt in the region. For instance, Vietnam was one of the countries that benefited from the new investment environment because foreign direct investment (FDI) investment continued to flow into the country to take advantage of alternative production areas to China. In 2024,  FDI in Vietnam was $27.72 billion, which shows that there was still a lot of interest in its export-led economy. However, other ASEAN countries have problems such as low demand for their products and supply chain disruptions which expose the weak spots of the association. A second Trump presidency could increase such uncertainties, especially if his administration imposes additional tariffs or reshoring policies that affect international trade patterns.

In the political diplomacy arena, Trump’s ASEAN policy has been characterized as unconstant and pro-China. When he came up with the American strategy in the Indo-Pacific region, which focuses on a  “free and open Indo-Pacific,” ASEAN’s response to this strategy was not very positive. On one hand, the problem remains the use of coercion as a strategy, particularly in the South China Sea. On the other hand, the lack of attendance by the leaders of ASEAN at several summits with the President of China has raised questions about the reliability of the United States as a strategic partner. This situation has left ASEAN leaders wondering about the stability of the region. This means that a second Trump administration could continue with the transactional approach that may well exacerbate ASEAN’s problem of how to relate to the US and China.

Other challenges that make  ASEAN’s situation worse include internal factors. The main challenge to the unity of the association has always been the diversity of political systems, economic interests, and external alignment of the member countries. For example, while  Vietnam and the Philippines are against the claim of China in the South China Sea, other member states like  Cambodia and Laos that have close relations with China are not very aggressive in their stance. This division makes it difficult for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to present a united front on important issues such as the South China Sea dispute. As of 2024, China remains ASEAN’s largest trading partner with a trade value of over $970 billion. This economic interdependence complicates the bloc’s efforts to establish its own identity in the context of the growing American-Chinese competition.

On the external front, ASEAN is facing several pressures from changing international circumstances. The Belt and Road Initiative  (BRI) of China has enhanced the influence of China in the region because many countries in the region are participating in huge infrastructure projects that are changing the face of economics in these countries. However,  debt sustainability and sovereignty concerns persist, as seen in Laos, which has a debt-to-GDP ratio of over 60%. In addition, the focus of the US. Under Trump transactional diplomacy is likely to exacerbate these challenges, as ASEAN states have to balance their economic benefits in the short-run with their strategic autonomy in the long-run. Additionally, the unpredictability of Trump’s foreign policy may erode the confidence of ASEAN states in the consistency of American policy. For example,  the sudden change in the level of American military support or the sudden withdrawal of security commitments can embolden the aggressors in the dispute areas and thus create more tension in the region.

However, there are some opportunities through which ASEAN can prove its relevance and resilience. The gross domestic product  (GDP) of the association was $3.9 trillion in 2024, which makes it the fifth-largest economy in the world and this is a clear manifestation of its economic significance. For instance,  the AOIP (ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific) is a clear manifestation of the association’s vision to stand in the middle of the map and promote the principle of inclusivity in the region. Furthermore, ASEAN’s Economic sector,  which is predicted to grow to $330 billion by the end of 2025, is an area with many opportunities for development in the areas of e-commerce and financial technology. Hence, based on these strengths, ASEAN can attract investments and promote integration within the region to diversify its relations with other partners and reduce its dependence on other countries and their policies.

In conclusion,  the return of Donald Trump to the presidency in 2025 is both an opportunity and a threat to ASEAN. On the one hand, his policies may provide ways of bilateralism and cooperation, economic on the other hand they may increase the uncertainty in trade, security, and regional cooperation.  The ability of ASEAN to navigate this complex situation depends on the unity, flexibility, and visionary leadership of the association. By enhancing cohesion among its member states, expanding its paradigm of partnerships, and asserting its role in the Indo-Pacific, ASEAN can ensure stability and prosperity in the era of increasing geopolitical rivalry. Hence, the success of the association will be determined by how well it can strike a balance between the two superpowers and protect its common interests without compromising its principles in the changing global order. 

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.

References

•  Acharya, Amitav. The End of American World Order (2nd ed.). Polity Press, 2017.
•  Capannelli, Giovanni, & Menon, Jayant. Realizing the ASEAN Economic Community: A Comprehensive Assessment. Asian Development Bank Institute, 2019.
•  Ikenberry, G. John. A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order. Yale University Press, 2020.