Turkey: Presidential Election Results Send Erdogan To Second Round – OpEd
The presidential elections in Turkey were held last Sunday, May 14. in which Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, after 20 years of rule with a strong hand — and open claims for the return of the era of the sultans — was challenged by Kemal Kilicdaroglu. The opposition union with his candidacy, as expected, shook Turkish society.
The AKP won an absolute majority in parliament, which Erdogan will be able to use this advantage in the runoff on May 28. The support for Erdogan from the prime minister of Albania and a good part of the Albanian media and opinion in Kosovo and North Macedonia (Albanian part) is based on ideological interdependence, political misery and particular interests.
According to official data from the Supreme Electoral Council, the incumbent received 49.5 percent of the vote in the first round, significantly more votes than his opponent Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who received 44.9 percent. The seat goes to a runoff. But with an advantage of somewhere close to 5% in favor of Erdogan, which is the opposite of what the polls predicted and what the opinion expected.
In Sunday’s parliamentary elections, the alliance led by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan achieved an absolute majority: 322 out of 600 seats in parliament. This could sway many opposition voters or move those who had not voted at all on May 14 to vote for consistency and stability in the runoff elections.
It is the first time in the country’s history that a runoff will be held. The survey was undesirable by Erdogan, therefore he had put into action all the forces at his disposal, including the administration. This result, however, has caused quite a few concerns.
With this result, however, no one seems to be really happy.
Sunday was therefore rightly regarded as D-Day, the turning point for Turkish politics, although the turning point did not take place in the full format expected.
“Some celebrate from the kitchen and some celebrate here on the balcony”, this is how Recep Tayyip Erdogan addressed his supporters. Erdogan stands before a cheering crowd at the AKP headquarters in Ankara. It’s his way of saying to the opposition candidate, Kemal Kilicdaroglu: “I beat you.”
However, in the first round, Erdogan failed to win an absolute majority. He now has to face Kilicdaroglu in a runoff in two weeks. But considering the economic crisis in the country, the poor management of the crisis after the earthquake and the advantages that the opposition had in this case, Erdogan reaped a real victory, much better than even he himself could have expected. For millions of Turks in the country, but also for his supporters abroad, in the Turkish diaspora in Western Europe, his next victory is expected to be crowned on May 28, in a runoff. This fact proves that Erdogan still controls Turkish society; but this fact clearly shows that even a large part of the Turkish society still sees Erdogan as a religious-nationalist leader who is necessary to run the Turkish state for even more than one term, therefore he can be forgiven for anything.
Eyes are now thought to be on the third candidate Sinan Oğan, who won 5.17% [2.8 million votes] and thus became the main reason for Erdogan’s failure to secure victory in the first round.
The remaining two weeks of the political battle will therefore prove that the big behind-the-scenes games and political trading based on implicit demands from the neo-fascist, Sinan Ogan, but also from Moscow and Brussels, will continue to be more intense.
The May 14 election, however, proved that Kilicdaroglu, as head of the secular CHP, is not religious or bigoted enough to deserve the vote of the majority of Turkish citizens. It appears that Turkey is moving East faster than even a good number of Western observers thought.
At the beginning of his rule, Erdogan was a popular figure in Turkey and beyond in the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Turkmen republics in Asia. But he was soon tempted by his idolaters with policies based on the triumphant return of the neo-Ottomans. He thus fell headlong into the mud of pan-Turkish nationalism like a typical narcissist. The bitter confrontation with the political movement, which was likely behind the failed coup, hardened the political climate and divided Turkish society.
Then everything seemed to go downhill.
Kemal Kilicdaroglu is the head of a six-party coalition. Even if he wins, and the chances are slim, at best, he will only be an intermediate figure in the political transition towards Turkey’s return to normalcy. Then Turkey will have a transitional government.
This is a good step, not only for Turkey.
News from Turkey is followed very closely from Brussels. Ursula von der Leyen on Monday spoke of concern. When asked what he thought of Kemal Kilicdaroglu’s announcement that the country would join the EU if he won the presidential election against incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
For Brussels, Turkey is an important partner, she answered with a diplomatic tone. However, “we’ll have to see what the second round brings.”
Council President Charles Michel, who joined von der Leyen at this press conference to talk about the upcoming G-7 summit, agreed with her assertions.
Even before the first round, Brussels had been cautious in its public statements during the Turkish election campaign. Despite this, Erdoğan has repeatedly accused his competitor that he is actually an agent of the Western powers. Erdogan seems to have been clear that Brussels would like to win over Kilicdaroglu, who has signaled that he is more cooperative.
Even in NATO, where people are generally less interested in the internal politics of member countries, the presidential elections were and are being followed very closely. The question here is whether Sweden can sit at the alliance table as the 32nd member at the next summit. This hope is also related to the name of the leader of the opposition.
In the Albanian space, however, these elections have been followed with increased attention. The preliminary declaration of the prime minister of political Albania in favor of Erdoğan’s victory was not only an expression of diplomatic imprudence, one can only guess where that act is based. It goes beyond friendship between authoritarians anyway. Meanwhile, in Kosovo and North Macedonia there was no institutional support, but a good part of the media and opinion were also aligned in favor of Erdogan. This support for Erdogan is based on ideological interdependence, political misery and particular interests.
Neo-Ottomanism, clothed in the guise of political Islam that Turkey has cultivated throughout the Erdogan era, has already taken hold even within state institutions and has begun to bear its fruits, especially in Kosovo. Meanwhile, the Islamic Community [BIK] over time has turned into a superstructure of this influence.
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The parliamentary and presidential elections in Turkey were not without reason called “elections of fate”. If Erdogan remains in office as president, and the chances are that he will continue to be full-power president of Turkey, while the parliament is already clearly under his full control, it should be expected that he will continue his harsh course against opposition figures and critics in the country. But he will maintain this course also in relation to the West.
Meanwhile, I will continue to treat the Western Balkans as “remnants of the Ottoman Empire”, where it has a “legitimate and historical” right to restore its influence.
The concentration of power further in the hands of Recep Tayyip Erdogan will inevitably increase tensions in Turkey. First of all in the areas inhabited by Kurds. But not only. The subsequent elections could therefore be extraordinary, as Turkey could slide into political instability.
The course of the war in Ukraine will also help this slide, but also the attitude of the right in Europe. Right now, on the eve of the runoff, right-wing violence in France is increasing. It is also reflected in relation to Turkish citizens living in the West and Turkey’s own relations with the West.
* Dr. Sadri Ramabaja. ILIRIA University / Director of the Albanian Institute for Geopolitics, Pristina, Republic of Kosovo