Beijing Grows Anxious Over Internationalization Of Cross-Strait Relations – Analysis

By Yi-Chuan Chiu

Four days after Taiwan’s National Day on 10 October 2024, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched another large-scale military exercise around Taiwan, dubbed ‘Joint Sword-2024B’. While Taiwanese and US officials condemned these drills as ‘military provocations’, China’s justification included a phrase key to understanding Beijing’s anxiety about recent tensions in the Taiwan Strait— ‘the internationalisation of the Taiwan issue’. The term reflects Beijing and Taipei’s different views of the status quo and how this complicates cross-strait dynamics.

‘Internationalisation’ refers to framing China–Taiwan relations as a state-to-state relationship and an international dispute open to third-party intervention. Though the term originated in the 1950s, it resurfaced in Chinese official discourse when Beijing resisted comparisons between Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan. Such rejections reflect Beijing’s long-standing assertion that Taiwan belongs to China, is an unresolved issue of the Chinese Civil War and that solving the issue in any way is a domestic Chinese matter.

Beijing’s disdain for internationalisation has been repeatedly quoted in its justification for launching PLA exercises protesting Taiwanese President Lai Ching-Te’s inauguration speech in May 2024 and National Day address in October. 

Lai’s speeches sought to frame cross-strait relations as state-to-state, which differed from the cautious approach of his predecessor, Tsai Ing-Wen.

Unlike Tsai’s inaugural speeches in 2016 and 2020, Lai did not pledge to manage cross-strait affairs according to the Constitution of the Republic of China (ROC) and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. These documents nominally commit to unification while also portraying cross-strait relations as an area-to-area relationship rather than a typical foreign relationship. Tsai referenced these legal texts to circumvent Beijing’s ‘One China Principle’ while seeking political common ground. She also referred to the governments in Beijing and Taipei as ‘both sides’ instead of using official country names.

Lai’s citation of the ROC Constitution aimed to assert that Taiwan is an independent sovereign country and that ‘the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other’. While Lai’s claim partly originated from Tsai’s 2021 National Day address, Beijing has criticised it as a new two-state theory and a disguisedpursuit of Taiwanese independence. 

Lai’s cross-strait approach indicates a priority for broadening domestic support rather than engaging Beijing. Most Taiwanese prefer a distinct Taiwanese identity without formally declaring independence. Lai intends to unify Taiwanese advocating for Taiwanese independence and those valuing the legacy of the ROC, which originated in mainland China. He has asserted that the 75-year-old People’s Republic of China (PRC) could not be the motherland of the 113-year-old ROC. Lai’s claim was condemned by Beijing as absurd but supported by 57 per cent of Taiwanese. 

Lai’s sharp rhetoric to carve Taiwan out of China not only reflects his self-defined pragmatismtowards Taiwanese independence, but also shows that Taiwanese politicians are constrained by the status quo preferred by the Taiwanese electorate. Most Taiwanese prefer to maintain de facto independence under the ROC banner and reframing cross-strait relations under an ambiguous One China concept — like the 1992 Consensus — is unpopular.

Taiwan’s idea of the status quo differs from Beijing’s. Beijing’s ideal of the status quo stresses that most countries have de-recognised the ROC to formalise relations with the PRC. Therefore, Beijing finds it unacceptable for other countries to show diplomatic support for Taipei, especially when Taipei seeks to resist unification with Beijing.

Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation benefits Beijing’s multifaceted campaign to coerce Taipei into unification and keep the Taiwan issue a domestic matter. This includes denying the Taiwan Strait’s status as international waters, increasing Chinese maritime patrols near Taiwanese territory and renewing efforts to reinterpret the United Nations’ resolution 2758. 

Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, Beijing refused Tsai’s cross-strait engagement proposal — which lacked a direct mention of the 1992 Consensus — and has been unilaterally pushing for unificationunder the PRC. This has led to a cycle of action and reaction where both sides fear that ambiguity would either formalise continued separation or lead to forced unification. 

It is a difficult balancing act for Beijing to counter internationalisation while deterring Taiwanese independence with military means. On the one hand, Beijing aims to repel Western accusations of China as a systemic rival or revisionist power. Consequently, Chinese rhetoric has sought to characterise the One China Principle as an international norm integral to the post-World War II global order. 

On the other hand, massive PLA drills have the countereffect of drawing global attention to Taiwan. Other countries are likely uninterested in the contentious debate over the nuances of cross-strait terminology, but would be concerned about Beijing’s appetite for wielding its military power. The Chinese threat of war has so far deterred Taipei from abandoning the ROC name and establishing a Taiwanese republic. Yet it fails to dim Taiwanese aspirations for international participation and cannot force a Chinese identity on Taiwanese voters.

Though cross-strait divergence is deepening, whether another Taiwan Strait crisis will happen depends on US actions. Unable to change Taiwanese public opinion in the short term, Beijing is more concerned about Washington amplifyinginternationalisation. Under President Joe Biden, former US Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit in August 2022 triggered massive PLA exercises but heightened Taiwan’s international visibility. Washington has also continuously raised international concerns about Taiwan Strait stability with US allies. 

With US President-elect Donald Trump’s isolationist and transactional style returning to the White House, it is uncertain whether Biden’s Taiwan approach will continue. Symbolic gestures that might trigger another military crisis and Beijing’s requests to change US language regarding Taiwan must be treated cautiously if the second Trump administration intends to keep the fragile cross-strait balance.

• About the author: Yi-Chuan Chiu, also known as Nicholas Chiu, is pursuing a DPhil in Area Studies (China) at St Cross College, University of Oxford.
• Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum