The Operational And Strategic Genius Of The Kursk Offensive – Analysis

By Dan Cox

(FPRI) — Current analysis of the recent offensive conducted by Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region of Russia is incomplete at best and misguided at worst. Most of the pundits are focused on speculating whether the recent offensive will anger American politicians, lead to an eventual victory, or halt the Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine. Dealing with the anger of American politicians first, it is unlikely that Ukraine conducted this counteroffensive in a vacuum. American politicians were likely aware of the operation. Dealing with the next question, speculating on whether one operation will “tip the scales” fits into the American culture of viewing events, wars, and almost everything as a black-and-white or win-lose dichotomy. Finally, the attack on Russia was not intended to halt the main Russian offensive in Pokrovsk. At most, this attack was aimed at drawing troops from the Russian attack on Kharkiv, which, being one of the largest population centers in Ukraine, would represent a major loss for Ukraine, should it fall into Russian hands.

Instead of entering this American cultural quagmire, this essay examines the situation by looking at the Kursk campaign holistically and through the intersection of military operations and strategy. This intersection is often referred to as the area where operational art occurs. By examining the Kursk offensive holistically, this approach does not fall into the rut of determining winners and losers. Instead, myriad potential opportunities and pitfalls can be examined simultaneously. The evidence shows a great deal of cleverness and foresight in developing the Kursk battle plan. The West should support this new propensity in the system as it puts Vladimir Putin and his military planning staff on the horns of multiple dilemmas.

A Brief Analysis of the Kursk Campaign So Far

One of the best analyses of the Kursk campaign comes from Foreign Policy Magazine. However, the debate is emblematic of the narrowness and black-and-white construct of argumentation over the Ukrainian military campaign. This debate between two Foreign Policy Magazine columnists produces some curious insights into the Kursk offensive.

Emma Ashford took the con side of the debate, arguing that it was unlikely that Ukrainian forces could hold what they had taken. She painted the operation as producing, at best, a short-term narrative shift in Zelensky’s favor. She concluded that the offensive is not likely to produce lasting positive results; although, she admits later in the debate that Putin has at least temporarily lost the claim of freezing the conflict and easily controlling what they have already taken in Ukraine.

Matt Kroenig countered by noting that the offensive accomplished several key strategic aims, such as taking the war home to Russia (hundreds of thousands of Russians had to be evacuated), challenging Putin as a wartime leader, buoying Ukrainian morale, and shocking the West. The narrative of “shocking the West” is common in analyzing the Kursk offensive and is dubious. It is doubtful that NATO military planners had no idea of this offensive. Whether or not Ukraine directly informed the US and other Western policymakers, the level of coordination between Ukrainian and Western military planners makes it likely that Ukraine’s partners were able to infer an impending operation. This assertion may prove untrue in the future, but that would only point to deeper strategic problems between the West and Ukraine. It is not the case that any of the assertions are necessarily wrong. The main complaint is that they are incomplete and largely reside in narrow strategic and political arguments and assertions. 

Other standard refrains in the analysis so far are that this operation was a gamble for Ukraine and the offensive was ineffective at stopping the Russians’ forward progression in eastern Ukraine. Few military operations are a true gamble despite current assertions to the contrary. Military planning revolves around assumptions and risk. The main risk in this mission is that the assumptions are wrong. I would posit that the most likely assumptions that preceded this operation have, so far, proven to be correct.

Likely Assumptions and Risks in the Kursk Campaign

The first set of assumptions had to be that Putin’s military had no strategic reserve and was so desperately trying to win in Ukraine that Russia had devoted little or no attention to defending the Russo–Ukrainian border from the Russian-controlled Donbas Region to the border of Belarus. The ease with which fifteen thousand soldiers were able to take land in Kursk supports such assumptions on the ground. A little over a few divisions’ worth of Ukrainian forces expanded past the initial incursion of a few hundred square kilometers to more than double that area in just a few weeks. The Ukrainian planners also likely assumed that they could make it far enough into Russian territory to threaten logistical lines and necessary electrical and gas hubs supplying troops in Ukraine. Since Ukrainian forces have been able to destroy several critical Russian bridges that resupply its troops and an oil depot, this assumption has borne fruit as well.

The planners must have also assumed it was better to use fifteen thousand troops to advance into Russia and build defensive positions than to hold positions that would likely be overrun. Therefore, fifteen thousand Ukrainians could potentially hold out against a force five times that size or larger in Russia depending on whether the force sent to dislodge is ill-trained and ill-equipped conscripts. Putin ordered thirty thousand soldiers from eastern Ukraine to march to the Kursk region to defend it, and he has also apparently thrown some eight thousand against the Ukrainian incursion. This represents a significant expansion of war and a de facto admission of Russia’s limited ability to generate labor. Eventually, the Russian offensive in Donetsk might be put at risk because of the Kursk campaign, even though this was not the main point of invading Russia.

Finally, the Ukrainian military and political leaders assessed that an invasion of Kursk would change the narrative in their favor. Further, this would place Putin at a strategic disadvantage and expose fundamental weaknesses in Russia continuing the war. The discussion below points to these assumptions also being true.

Placing Putin on the Horns of Multiple Dilemmas

The Kursk offensive exposed many deficiencies and vulnerabilities in the Russian offensive as the war approached the third-year mark. Unfortunately, some pundits and news outlets prefer to view the Kursk offensive as a gamble or even a failure. France 24 recently reported that Russia is making gains in eastern Ukraine despite the Kursk action. The news outlet also reported that Ukrainian planners had hoped to draw Russian troops away from this offensive, but it did not happen. This is factually incorrect and an overly narrow view of the Kursk offensive. It is factually incorrect to assert there was no effect on the Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine. Russia redeployed thirty thousand troops to stop the advancement of the Ukrainian forces into Russia. Whether this puts the Russian offensive at risk remains to be seen, but it does not matter as much as some think. The move illustrates to the world that Putin has no strategic reserve to put into the fight and is likely desperate. Further, arguing that delaying the Russian offensive was the only operational objective is short-sighted. The fact that Russia is pressing on with its offensive may counterintuitively be good for the Ukrainian war effort. Russia continues to take unsustainable losses, and the Kursk offensive has accelerated that trend. They have already taken an additional 6,600 casualties and lost 70 tanks because the Ukrainian military infiltrated Russia. 

Putin panicked and made yet another strategic mistake by telling his own people that the Ukrainian forces would be dislodged from Kursk by October 1 of this year. By early November, Putin had finally garnered a force to attack the Kursk oblast. However, the ground retaken is negligible and the losses the Russians are suffering are great. Putin is desperate. Every day beyond October 1 that the Ukrainian forces remain in Russia, Putin is losing political credibility.

Further, this is the second summer in a row that Putin has faced a major credibility challenge. Last summer, the leader of the Wagner Group private military organization, Yevgeny Prigozhin, mounted an insurgency that briefly marched toward Moscow. This summer, Ukrainian forces successfully invaded Russia in the historic Kursk region. To add insult to injury, the Ukrainian success in Russia came mere months after Putin gave a speech commemorating the Russian sacrifices during World War II in Kursk.

The Kursk offensive has also increased the Ukrainian military’s operational reach. The Ukrainian forces have already destroyed some key supply bridges supporting Russian forces in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have also been able to destroy fuel depots, particularly oil, deeper into Russia, threatening both the Russian economy and the ability of Russia to continue to supply its mechanized units. Ukraine has also been able to hit an oil refinery and a power station deeper into Russia. The loss of the refinery could seriously damage oil exports, which are already lagging due to economic sanctions imposed by the West.

Putin is also suffering from a foreign policy and narrative perspective. Several pundits have noted that Putin seems to be losing allied support as Ukraine demonstrates its ability to compete with Russia in Ukraine and, shockingly, take Russian territory. Putin cannot carpet-bomb Ukrainian positions now that they are on Russian soil. Further, even though Putin diverted thirty thousand troops in an attempt to repel the Kursk incursion, their move will likely be insufficient for the task. The recent addition of some ten to twelve thousand North Korean troops to the Russian counter-offensive may tilt the odds a bit in Russia’s favor, but also telegraphs Russia’s lack of a strategic reserve and was the catalyst for Western countries to allow Ukraine to use their weapons to strike inside Russia. Now, Putin is facing a dilemma that he may have to throw poorly trained conscripts at the situation. He promised he would not do this; many of these conscripts are ethnically Russian, so their deaths carry more negative political weight for Putin, who cannot afford a collapse in support for his war among ethnic Russians.

All of these negative strategic dilemmas are now on Putin’s shoulders. Further, he now has to consider that a long border between the Donbas region, which Russia controls, and Belarus is now at risk. He can hardly respond to the Kursk incursion. Another incursion at a different point along the border would be devastating.

Pundits reporting that the Kursk offensive has failed because Putin continues a costly advance at a snail’s pace in eastern Ukraine are short-sighted. Recent polls show that trust in Putin has fallen precipitously in the wake of the Kursk offensive. Putin might find himself in political trouble because the planners of the Ukrainian offensive successfully linked operations to strategic ends, placing Putin on the horns of multiple dilemmas.

This analysis represents the opinions of the author and does not represent in any way the US Army, School of Advanced Military Studies, or any Department of Defense or US government office.

• About the author: Dan Cox has been teaching at the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies for almost two decades and has had the honor of participating in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. The author is currently researching issues of disinformation, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and the future of warfare.  The author is also interested in the role design and systems thinking plays in tackling military problems
• Source: This article was published by FPRI