Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose coalition of nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and movements—largely consisting of members of Pamiri and Garmi regional elites who had long been excluded from political power—tried to take over. Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia, launched a successful counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to Afghanistan. In 1993, the CIS authorized “peacekeeping” in Tajikistan. These forces consisted of Russia’s 201st Rifle Division, based in Tajikistan, and token Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek troops (the Kyrgyz and Uzbek troops pulled out in 1998-1999).
Terrorist actions were carried out by both sides, and international terrorist groups provided some support to the Tajik opposition. Reportedly, these groups included the IMU, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, and Al Qaeda.14 As the civil war wound down in the late 1990s, most of these forces left Tajikistan.
After the Tajik government and opposition agreed to a cease-fire in September 1994, the UNSC established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in December 1994 with a mandate to monitor the cease-fire, later expanded to investigate cease-fire violations, monitor the demobilization of Tajik opposition fighters, assist ex-combatants to integrate into society, and offer advice for holding elections. In December 1996, the two sides agreed to set up a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), an executive body composed equally of government and opposition members. On June 27, 1997, Tajik President Emomaliy Rakhman and opposition leader Seyed Abdullo Nuri signed the comprehensive peace agreement, under which Rakhman remained president but 30% of ministerial posts were allotted to the opposition. Benchmarks of the peace process were largely met, including the return of refugees, demilitarization of rebel forces, legalization of rebel parties, and the holding of elections. In March 2000, the NRC disbanded, and UNMOT pulled out in May 2000. The CIS declared its peacekeeping mandate fulfilled in June 2000, but Russian troops remain under a 25-year basing agreement. Stability in Tajikistan remains fragile.
Actions of the IMU and IJU in Pakistan and Afghanistan According to some estimates, there are some 4,000 IMU fighters in Afghanistan. Pakistan reported in November 2006 that it had arrested IJU members who had placed rockets near presidential offices, the legislature, and the headquarters of military intelligence in Islamabad. Reportedly, the IJU was targeting the government because of its support for the United States.15
Pakistani media reported in March-April 2007 that dozens of IMU members had been killed in northern Pakistan when local tribes turned against them, possibly reducing their strength or forcing them to move into Afghanistan and Central Asia. More alleged IMU and IJU members were reported killed by Pakistani forces during fighting in North Waziristan in October 2007. Indicating a widening of the IMU’s focus, Tohir Yuldash called in January 2008 for creating a Shariah state in Pakistan.
Among other incidents:
* In January 2008, an IJU website seemed to indicate that Abu Laith al-Libi—an al Qaeda official who had been killed by the United States in Pakistan—had been one of the leaders of the IJU.16
* In March 2008, an IJU website claimed that one of its members—the Germanborn Cunyt Ciftci (alias Saad Abu Fourkan)—had assisted Taliban forces in Afghanistan by carrying out a suicide bombing that killed two Afghan and two U.S. troops and wounded several others.17 According to the IJU website and other sources, IJU is playing a more significant role in fighting in Afghanistan.
* In June 2008, an IJU video claimed that one Uzbek IJU member had taken part in the 1999 attack in Kyrgyzstan, and later had fought in Afghanistan against the Northern Alliance and then against U.S. and NATO forces. Another Uzbek member had been trained in Chechnya by Khattab in 1998 and also had fought against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan.18
* In July and September 2009, ISAF and the Afghan military reportedly carried out operations in the northern Konduz province against IMU terrorists who supposedly had moved into the province after being forced out of Pakistan.
* Tohir Yuldash allegedly was killed in Pakistan by a U.S. predator missile on September 26, 2009. A Russian Tatar, Abdur Rakhman, allegedly became the new leader of the IMU.
* On October 11, 2009, 10 terrorists attacked the army headquarters in Rawalpindi, resulting in 20 deaths. The government alleges that three of the attackers belonged to the IMU.
* In late October 2009, Pakistani armed forces reportedly were attacking an IMU base in the town of Kaniguram in South Waziristan.
* In February 2010, Pakistani media reported that a U.S. predator missile killed several terrorists in North Waziristan, including four Uzbek citizens. The terrorists were said to be linked to Al Qaeda.
* In February 2010, alleged IMU terrorists attacked a police station in Bannu, North West Frontier Province, Pakistan, killing 15 police and civilians.
Some officials in Central Asia have warned that the crackdown on the IMU and IJU in Pakistan and Afghanistan may be forcing some of the terrorists to return to Central Asia. Other officials have stated that a large-scale influx has not yet occurred.
Actions of the IMU and IJU in Germany and Elsewhere
Officials in Germany arrested four individuals on September 5, 2007, on charges of planning explosions at the U.S. airbase at Ramstein, at U.S. and Uzbek diplomatic offices, and other targets in Germany. The IJU claimed responsibility and stated that it was targeting U.S. and Uzbek interests because of these countries’ “brutal policies towards Muslims,” and targeting Germany because it has a small military base in Termez, Uzbekistan, which is used to support NATO operations in Afghanistan. Reportedly, the suspects had received their orders from Gofir Salimov (not apprehended), who is wanted in Uzbekistan in connection with the 2004 bombings. The suspects were part of a larger IJU branch in Germany. In U.S. congressional testimony on September 10, 2007, the then-Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, John Redd, and the then-Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, stated that U.S. communications intercepts shared with Germany had facilitated foiling the plot. In July 2009, German media reported that the suspects had confessed that they were trained at an IJU terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. The leader of the IJU was identified as Najmiddin Jalolov (mentioned above), a.k.a. “commander Ahmad.” In testimony in September 2009, two of the defendants admitted that while in Afghanistan in 2006, they had launched attacks against two U.S. military camps.19
Among other incidents:
* In May 2008, French, German, and Dutch authorities reported that they had detained 10 individuals for suspicion of running a network to funnel money to the IMU in Uzbekistan.
* In late September 2008, German authorities reported the arrest of two suspected members of IJU and issued wanted posters for two other suspected members. The four allegedly had received terrorist training in Pakistani IJU camps. German authorities also arrested two people allegedly attempting to leave the country to undergo terrorism training in Pakistan by the IJU (they later were released on the grounds of inconclusive evidence).20
* A video released by the IJU in late October 2008 stated that as long as Germany supports NATO operations in Afghanistan, and uses a base in Uzbekistan to support these operations, it is subject to IJU attacks.
* A video was released by the IJU in January 2009 that threatened German “occupation” troops in Afghanistan.
* Turkish authorities arrested over three dozen alleged IJU members in April 2009.
* German media reported in June 2009 that a video released by the IJU provided more evidence that the terrorist organization was linked to al Qaeda.21
Borders among the five Central Asian states for the most part were delineated by 1936, based partly on where linguistic and ethnic groups had settled, but mainly on the exigencies of Soviet control over the region. The resulting borders are ill-defined in mountainous areas and extremely convoluted in the fertile Fergana Valley, parts of which belong to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Over a dozen tiny enclaves add to the complicated situation, as does Soviet-era decisions to build roads and railways with scant regard to intra-regional borders. Some in Central Asia have demanded that borders be redrawn to incorporate areas inhabited by co-ethnics, or otherwise dispute the location of borders.
Caspian Sea borders have not been fully agreed upon, mainly because of Iranian intransigence, but Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan also have not resolved their mutual claims to undersea oil and gas resources. In August 2009, Turkmenistan called for the issue of the disputed offshore resources to be adjudicated, presumably by the International Court of Justice. In November 2009, Senior Advisor to the US State Department in Eurasian Energy Affairs, Daniel Stein, reportedly offered U.S. good offices to mediate the dispute, but stated that even if such a settlement is not soon reached, the United States believed that trans-Caspian pipelines still could be built. Iran’s foreign minister Manoucher Mottaki reportedly denounced the U.S. offer, asserting that the littoral states will be the sole arbiters of the borders.22 Russia and Kazakhstan have agreed on delineation and shared exploitation of seabed oil resources.
China has largely settled border delineation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, reportedly involving “splitting the difference” on many of the disputed territories, which are usually in unpopulated areas. Popular passions were aroused in Kyrgyzstan after a 1999 China-Kyrgyzstan border agreement ceded about 9,000 hectares of mountainous Kyrgyz terrain. Kyrgyz legislators in 2001 opened a hearing and even threatened to try to impeach then-President Akayev. He arrested the leader of the impeachment effort, leading to violent demonstrations in 2002 calling for his ouster and the reversal of the “traitorous” border agreement. Dissident legislators appealed the border agreement to the Constitutional Court, which ruled in 2003 that it was legal. In June 2006, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev visited China and assuaged Chinese concerns by signing a joint declaration with Chairman Hu Jintao which re-affirmed that “the parties will abide strictly by all the agreements and documents signed between the two countries on the border issue.” In July 2009, the Kyrgyz Border Service reportedly rebutted claims by some Kyrgyz legislators and others that some territory was being ceded to China and confirmed that all border demarcation issues with China had been resolved.23
The problem of delineating their 4,200 mile border has been an important source of concern to Russia and Kazakhstan. During most of the 1990s, neither Russia nor Kazakhstan wished to push border delineation, Russia because of concerns that it would be conceding that Kazakhstan’s heavily ethnic Russian northern regions are part of Kazakhstan, and Kazakhstan because of concerns that delineation might inflame separatism. In 1998, Russia established border patrols along its border with Kazakhstan for security reasons, and determined to delineate the border. By late 2004, most of the Russian-Kazakh border had in principle been delimited, but the sides are still involved in the placement of border signs and border posts.24 To head off separatist proclivities in the north, Kazakhstan reorganized administrative borders in northern regions to dilute the influence of ethnic Russians, established a strongly centralized government to limit local rule, and moved its capital northward. These and other moves apparently contributed to political resignation among many ethnic Russians, and many emigrated to Russia.
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have agreed on the delimitation of about one-half of their 579 mile shared border and pledged in September 2007 to peacefully settle contentious disputes involving borders in the Fergana Valley. These disputes have resulted in some deaths and injuries. Tensions have increased because of demographic shifts along the border. Some Kyrgyz allege that Tajiks have moved into lands in Kyrgyzstan that have been vacated by Kyrgyz, who have moved to cities or become migrant workers. Conversely, some Tajiks allege that Kyrgyz have moved into their lands.25 In January 2010, Tajik Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi stated that the delineation of borders with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was “very complicated since quite often the borderline crosses towns, cities, streets and even separate houses,” but that Russia recently had provided archival information that might facilitate the settlement of border disputes.26
Uzbekistan has had contentious border talks with all the other Central Asian states. According to Kyrgyz Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov, about 40% of Kyrgyzstan’s 680-mile border with Uzbekistan remains to be demarcated.27 Legislators and others in Kyrgyzstan in 2001 vehemently protested a border delineation agreement with Uzbekistan reached by the two prime ministers that ceded a swath of the Kyrgyz Batken region, ostensibly to improve Uzbek access to its Sokh enclave in Kyrgyzstan. Faced with this protest, the Kyrgyz government sent a demarche to Uzbekistan repudiating any intention to cede territory. Similarly, in late 2004 Kyrgyz legislators demanded that Uzbekistan’s Shohimardon enclave in Kyrgyzstan (ceded in the 1930s) be returned.28 These and other contentious issues resulted in the cessation of border talks between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan for five years until they resumed in December 2009.
Uzbekistan’s unilateral efforts to delineate and fortify its borders with Kazakhstan in the late 1990s led to tensions. In September 2002, however, the Kazakh and Uzbek presidents announced that delineation of their 1,400 mile border was complete, and some people in previously disputed border villages began to relocate if they felt that the new borders cut them off from their “homeland.” However, many people continued to ignore the new border or were uncertain of its location, leading to several shootings of Kazakh citizens by Uzbek border troops. In one case, transit between the villages of Arnasay and Kostakyr in South Kazakhstan and the rest of Kazakhstan was cut off when an area of the sole roadway from the towns was ceded to Uzbekistan. Residents complained that Uzbek border guards were constantly arresting them for violating the border, while Kazakh officials called for the residents to relocate.29
The Uzbek and Tajik presidents signed an accord in October 2002 delimiting most of their 720-mile joint border. Contention has continued over about 15-20% of the border. In October 2006, the head of the Tajik border guard service complained that demarcation was being hindered by Uzbekistan’s peremptory placement of border markers, barbed wire and fences.30 Some Tajiks have raised concerns that Uzbekistan wants to redraw borders in order to take possession of the Farhod reservoir on the Syr Darya River.31
Besides border claims, other problems revolve around whether borders are open or closed. Open borders within the Central Asian states after the breakup of the Soviet Union were widely viewed as fostering trafficking in drugs and contraband and free migration, so border controls increasingly have been tightened in all the states.
Uzbekistan mined areas of its borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 1999, intending to protect it against terrorist incursions, but in fact leading to many civilian Kyrgyz and Tajik casualties. Kyrgyzstan has demanded that Uzbekistan clear mines it has sown along the borders, including some allegedly sown on Kyrgyz territory, but Uzbekistan has asserted that it will maintain the minefields to combat terrorism. (Kyrgyzstan too has raised tensions by sowing mines and blowing up mountain passes along its borders with Tajikistan.) Border tensions between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also flared in late 2002, after Turkmenistan accused Uzbek officials of complicity in the coup attempt. Uzbekistan’s economic problems led it in mid-2002 to impose heavy duties on imports and at the beginning of 2003 to close its borders to “suitcase trading” (small-scale, unregulated trading), heightening tensions with bordering states.
Sharp disagreements remain between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on mine clearing, Uzbek restrictions on Tajik transportation, clashes between Uzbek and Tajik border guards, and the Uzbek visa regime with Tajikistan. In July 2009, Tajikistan began building a short railway spur to link the capital more directly with the Qurghonteppa region to the south, to circumvent a longer route through Uzbekistan that involved complicated customs requirements.32
After terrorists carried out several attacks in Uzbekistan in May 2009, Uzbekistan alleged that they had entered the country from Kyrgyzstan, and built more concrete walls, trenches, and ditches along the border. The Kyrgyz Border Service stated in June 2009 that Uzbekistan was violating bilateral accords that stipulated that such border fortifications should not be built “until the delineation and demarcation of the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan state borders is completed.” Uzbek officials reportedly alleged that they were forced to make unilateral decisions about the location of borders while emplacing fortifications because Kyrgyzstan had refused to meet to demarcate borders. One trench reportedly was moved to accommodate Kyrgyz concerns.33
Iran’s intransigence in settling on Caspian Sea borders has contributed to the build-up of naval forces and the failure to build trans-Caspian oil and gas pipelines. In August 2002, Russia conducted the largest naval maneuvers in its history in the northern Caspian. Kazakhstan announced its intent to form a navy in early 2003, leading to protests from the Russian Foreign Ministry, but Kazakh military officials emphasized their determination to proceed with plans to protect their offshore oil fields and maritime borders. There reportedly were about 3,000 naval personnel in late 2008. Turkmenistan’s dispute with Azerbaijan over sea borders and the ownership of offshore oilfields also has stymied the development of trans-Caspian pipelines.
Crime and Corruption
Organized crime networks have expanded in all the Central Asian states, and have established ties with crime groups worldwide that are involved in drug, arms, and human trafficking. All the states serve as origin, transit, or destination states for human trafficking. Crime groups collude with local border and other officials to transport people to the Middle East or other destinations for forced labor or prostitution.34
Corruption is a serious threat to democratization and economic growth in all the states. The increasing amount of foreign currency entering the states as the result of foreign oil and natural gas investments, the low pay of most government bureaucrats, and inadequate laws and norms are conducive to the growth of corruption. Perhaps most significantly, the weakness of the rule of law permits the Soviet-era political patronage and spoils system to continue.
According to the World Bank:
* in Kazakhstan, corruption showed relatively little change over the period from 1996-2008. The country was at the 16th percentile in 2008 (that is, 178 of 212 countries had better records in combating corruption);
* in Kyrgyzstan, corruption increased over the time period 1996-2007, but declined slightly in 2008. The country was at the 13th percentile in 2008;
* in Tajikistan, corruption declined slightly over the time period 1996-2007, but increased in 2008. The country was at the 14th percentile in 2008;
* in Turkmenistan, corruption showed relatively little change over the time period 1996-2008. The country was at the 5th percentile in 2008;
* in Uzbekistan, corruption showed relatively little change over the time period 1996-2008. The country was at the 11th percentile in 2008.35
Corrupt officials in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have been able to siphon off massive revenues from oil and gas exports, according to some observers. The Turkmen president controls a “presidential fund,” that receives 50% of gas revenues and is ostensibly used for economic development, though budgetary transparency is lacking on how the fund is used.36 Perhaps the most sensational allegations of corruption have involved signing bonuses and other payments in the 1990s by U.S. energy companies operating in Kazakhstan (or by their proxies) that allegedly were funneled into Swiss bank accounts linked to Kazakh officials, allegedly including Nazarbayev. U.S. officials concurred with a Swiss decision to freeze the funds and open investigations in 1999-2000. The New York Times reported that Nazarbayev unsuccessfully raised the issue of unfreezing some of these accounts during his visit with then-President Bush in December 2001.37 Kazakhstan set up a National Fund in 2001 under the National Bank for receipt of oil revenues that reportedly operates under strict international accounting standards.
Source: This article is an edited portion of the March 11, 2010 Congressional Research Service report, “Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests”, prepared by Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs. A full copy of the report may be found at here at the Open CRS website.
1 Central Asia consists of the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. For overviews, see CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol; CRS Report 97-690, Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol; CRS Report 98-594, Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol; CRS Report 97-1055, Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol; and CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
2 Asad Alam, Mamta Murthi, Ruslan Yemtsov, Edmundo Murrugarra, Nora Dudwick, Ellen Hamilton, and Erwin Tiongson, Growth, Poverty, and Inequality: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, The World Bank, 2005.
3 Michael Mihalka, “Counter-Insurgency, Counter-Terrorism, State-Building and Security Cooperation in Central Asia,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2006. pp. 131-151.
4 Most Central Asian Muslims traditionally have belonged to the Sunni branch and the Hanafi school of interpretation. Islamic Sufiism has been significant, as have pre-Islamic customs such as ancestor veneration and visits to shrines.
5 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Yale: Yale University Press, 2002; T. Jeremy Gunn, Sociology of Religion, Fall 2003, pp. 389-410; Pinar Akcali, Central Asian Survey, June 1998, pp. 267-284; Aziz Niyazi, Religion, State & Society, March 1998, pp. 39-50.
6 Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell, Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus:
Implications for the EU, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2006.
7 U.S. Department of State. International Religious Freedom Report 2006, September 15, 2006. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. Annual Report, May 2, 2005; Annual Report, May 3, 2006; Annual Report, May 1, 2007; Annual Report, May 1, 2008; Annual Report, May 1, 2009. USCIRF first urged that Uzbekistan be designated a CPC in its 2005 report.
8 Cheryl Bernard has argued that HT writings borrow heavily from Marxism-Leninism and rely much less on Islamic principles. HT publications have stated that the movement “has adopted the amount [of Islam] which it needs as a political party,” that the Islamic world is the last hope for establishing communism, and that terrorist acts against Western interests are appropriate. Hizb ut Tahrir—Bolsheviks in the Mosque, RAND Corporation, nd.
9 HT literature has demanded the withdrawal of U.S.-led coalition forces and the closure of the coalition’s Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan. CEDR, March 13, 2003, Doc. No. CEP -104; CEDR, January 7, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-91.
10 Also, Russia’s military operations in its breakaway Chechnya region after 1999 may have helped disrupt Al Qaeda plans for Central Asia. The terrorist group was operating terrorist training camps in Chechnya in the late 1990s that it planned to use in part as launching pads for establishing new cells and camps throughout Central Asia. Defense Intelligence [Agency] Report Details al Qaeda’s Plans for Russia, Chechnya & WMD, Judicial Watch, Press Office, November 16, 2004. The declassified Intelligence Information Report is dated October 1998.
11 CEDR, March 6, 2003, Doc. No. 217. In testimony in October 2003, then-Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones stated that “there is a resurgence of the ability of the IMU to operate” in Central Asia and that it “represents a serious threat to the region and therefore to our interests.” U.S. Congress. House International Relations Committee. Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, Hearing, October 29, 2003.
12 The IJG changed its name to the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) in 2005. According to Uzbek reporter Aleksey
Volosevich, the group “was headed by Najmiddin Jalolov, born in Andijon in 1972, and his deputy, Mansur Sohayil, whose nickname is Abu Huzaifa. Both of them are ethnic Uzbeks. They fell out with Tohir Yuldash unhappy with the absence of active combat actions on the territory of Uzbekistan…. Jalolov managed to get the backing of Al Qaeda regional leaders, after promising them to set up something like a Central Asian structural body of the organization.” CEDR, October 20, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950261.
13 CEDR, February 16, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-237; June 23, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-178; and May 14, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-443.
14 Osama bin Laden in mid-1991 began dispatching mujahidin to assist in overthrowing the then-communist regime in Tajikistan. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Final Report, July 23, 2004, pp. 58, 64.
15 BBC Monitoring South Asia, November 4, 2006.
16 Guido Steinberg, A Turkish al-Qaeda: The Islamic Jihad Union and the Internationalization of Uzbek Jihadism, Center for Contemporary Conflict, 2008; U.S. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Prepared Testimony of Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell: The Annual Threat Assessment, February 5, 2008.
17 Guido Steinberg, A Turkish al-Qaeda; UPI, March 17, 2008.
18 CEDR, August 4, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-318001.
19 Guido Steinberg has argued that several dozen recruits of various ethnic groups have travelled from Germany to Pakistan for training in IMU and IJU camps. Open Source Center. Europe: Daily Report, August 10, 2009, Doc. No. EUP-72003.
20 Simon Sturdee, “German Commandos Arrest Two Terror Suspects on Aircraft,” Agence France Presse, September 26, 2008; Craig Whitlock, “Germany Pulls Two Suspected Terrorism Trainees from Plane,” Washington Post, September 27, 2008, p. A14.
21 Open Source Center. Europe: Daily Report (hereafter EDR), June 5, 2009, Doc. No. EUP-85023.
22 Open Source Center. Iran: Daily Report, November 25, 2009, Doc. No. IAP-434001.
23 CEDR, February 28, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-284; March 9, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-27; October 26, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950306; ITAR-TASS, July 14, 2009.
24 ITAR-TASS, August 7, 2008.
25 CEDR, September 18, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950239; December 24, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950130; August 11, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950103; “Kyrgyzstan: Ambiguous Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Increases Risk Of Conflict,” Eurasia Insight, February 2, 2009.
26 CEDR, January 19, 2010, Doc. No. CEP950107; ITAR-TASS, January 18, 2010.
27 CEDR, February 17, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950088; September 8, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950162; December 13, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950238; January 12, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950025; May 14, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950537; January 24, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950013; December 29, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950177.
28 CEDR, November 6, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-130.
29 CEDR, January 15, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950078.
30 CEDR, October 20, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950282. In the case of contention between the residents of the Batken region in southern Kyrgyzstan and the bordering Soghd region in northern Tajikistan, the U.N. Development Program has implemented initiatives to create mutual trust and the sharing of trans-border resources such as water. CEDR, March 20, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950134; October 26, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950045.
31 Victoria Naumova, “Tajikistan, Uzbekistan to Hold Next Border Delineation Negotiations in Late April,” Asia-Plus, April 18, 2009; CEDR, April 9, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950027; July 24, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950177.
32 CEDR, January 24, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950088.
33 CEDR, October 20, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950261; September 4, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950154.
34 U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report, June 12, 2007. In the 2006 and 2007 reports, Uzbekistan was placed in “tier three,” among those countries that do not comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and are not making significant efforts to do so. Tier three countries may be subject to U.S. aid restrictions.
35 The World Bank. Governance Matters 2009: Country Data Reports, online at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp. See also Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, online at http://www.transparency.org/.
36 The non-governmental organization Global Witness alleged in 2006 that the late Turkmen President Niyazov personally controlled a vast portion of this gas wealth. The NGO raised concerns that organized crime groups were involved in these exports and urged the European Union to limit trade ties with Turkmenistan. Global Witness. It’s a Gas: Funny Business in the Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade, April 2006.
37 New York Times, December 11, 2002, p. A16; Interfax-Kazakhstan, February 5, 2003; Washington Post, June 10, 2002, p. A12; Financial Times (London), April 16, 2002, p. 12; Agence France Presse, September 24, 2001; PR Newswire, January 10, 2001; Washington Post, September 25, 2000, p. A1; Peter Maass, “The Fuel Fixers,” The New York Times, December 23, 2007; “Prosecutors Drop Some Charges Against Oil Dealer Giffen,” Platts Commodity News, December 10, 2008..