Dual Fault Lines In China’s Military: Weapons Fail, Generals Jailed – Analysis

By Atul Kumar

On 9 March 2022, a BrahMos missile —launched accidentally due to a technical malfunction near Ambala—crashed in Mian Channu, Khanewal district, Pakistan. Though the missile was unarmed, the incident exposed a far critical vulnerability: the conspicuous failure of Chinese-supplied air defence systems deployed in Pakistan.

Despite Pakistan’s claims that its radar tracked the missile from launch to impact, it did not attempt to intercept it. This inaction raised early doubts about the efficacy of China’s HQ-9 and HQ-16 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems, which have now been confirmed. During the recently concluded ‘Operation Sindoor’, Chinese air defence platforms failed to protect military installations in Pakistan. Multiple airbases were severely damaged, rendered non-operational, and the systems failed to work as advertised.

The implications of these failures reach far beyond Pakistan. Inside China, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is confronting its own crisis of confidence. Senior officers are being purged and arrested at an unprecedented pace. The Chinese General He Hongjun is the latest addition, whose death has only added to China’s growing list of vanishing top brass. As weapons falter and commanders fall, the PLA is becoming increasingly brittle, turning into an unreliable instrument of coercion for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership that has staked much on its military prowess. The narrative of precision and control is cracking, and with it, the credibility of China’s military ambitions.

Chinese Weapon Systems Transfer to Pakistan 

China has emerged as Pakistan’s largest arms supplier, accounting for nearly 81 percent of Islamabad’s inventory—a staggering volume and variety on every count. Since 2000, China has transferred a broad list of advanced weaponry to Pakistan’s air and ground forces, as enumerated in Table 1. Nearly all of these systems played an important role in Islamabad’s clashes with New Delhi in May 2025.

Table 1: Chinese Arms Transfer to Pakistan 2000–2025  (for Air and Land Warfare)

These major weapon systems in Pakistan’s arsenal reflect a deepening strategic partnership with China. In 2019, Islamabad deployed the JY-27A 3D Counter-Very-Low Observable (CVLO) radar at Mianwali Airbase. This long-range air surveillance and guidance radar works in the Very High Frequency (VHF) band to track even stealth aircraft at a range of 500 km. China claims the radar is jamming-resistant and could guide surface-to-air missiles to strike incoming aircraft, making it a core element of Pakistan’s integrated air defence. Pakistan had also procured several air search radars, covering long to short ranges, including YLC 2, YLC 6, and YLC 18 gap filler radars. They were strategically placed across critical military installations to ensure persistent airspace surveillance.

In addition to radars, Pakistan acquired multiple SAM systems from China to create a layered air defence system, as listed in Table 1. The HQ-9 long-range and HQ-16 medium-range SAM systems received significant media attention during the May 2025 clashes. However, Pakistan’s short-range air defence network is equally dense. It includes multiple HQ-7 SHORAD systems, FM-90 launchers, and the latest FN-6 man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS).

Beijing also possesses a substantial stake/presence in Pakistan’s drone inventory, which includes smaller and Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) drones—such as Wing Loong, and the CH-4 series of combat and reconnaissance drones. The Chinese presence in the Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) inventory consists of JF-17, J-10C and a few older systems. Nonetheless, the current fog of war severely restricts a reliable assessment of China-supplied fighter aircraft’s performance in the Operation Sindoor and its aftermath.

The irony, however, is absolute: when Islamabad was desperate for these weapon systems, its Chinese-supplied radars, air defence systems, and drones failed to deliver. The drones either got shot down or returned unsuccessfully. More critically, Chinese radar and missile systems were either destroyed or, even if operational, were unable to prevent strikes on Pakistan’s key military installations and airbases.

Reliability of PLA’s Air Defence

The failure of Chinese systems in Pakistan has raised doubts about the credibility of the PLA’s layered air defence strategy. The PLA Air Force fields nearly 300 HQ-9 SAM variants for long-range air defence, while the PLA Ground Forces employ HQ-16, HQ-7 and FN-6 SAM systems for medium and short-range air coverage. JY-27 and YLC series radars in multiple variants form the bedrock of China’s air surveillance network. To demonstrate, a JY-27 guidance radar has been deployed near the Pangong Tso lake in the Eastern Ladakh region along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) opposite Indian positions.

Defence experts often claim this integrated air defence network is dense enough to repel even stealth fighters and bombers of the United States (US) Armed Forces. However, Pakistan’s experience exposes critical flaws, raising questions that these systems, most of which are reverse-engineered from the erstwhile Soviet Union or Russian designs, may underperform compared to the original systems they are based on, or even their own advertised claims.

PLA’s Vanishing Generals 

Furthermore, the PLA is amidst an acute leadership crisis with top officers vanishing under murky circumstances. In the third week of May 2025, reports emerged that General He Hongjun, Deputy Head of the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) Political Work Department, died by suicide while in custody, merely a year after his promotion to full general. The incident follows the November 2024 purge of his predecessor, Admiral Miao Hua and the April 2025 removal of General He Weidong, the CMC’s second Vice-Chairman, deepening turmoil at the apex of military command.

Over the past two years, more than 20 senior officers have been arrested or prosecuted, marking the most ruthless military purge in recent PLA history. While some dismissals may reflect and accompany ideological rifts or internal rivalries, most are tied to Xi Jinping’s sweeping anti-corruption drive. Moreover,  these arrests have extended beyond the military to senior executives in China’s defence industries, exposing systemic corruption in weapons procurement.

This eroding institutional trust has strategic implications. Corruption within the PLA and defence sector risks undermining the quality, reliability, and combat performance of Chinese weapon systems, aggravating the concerns that were already apparent during Operation Sindoor. Beijing has augmented its military inventory substantially over the past two decades, however, its quality, combat performance, and the PLA’s leadership capability have become increasingly unreliable.

Implications: China’s Lack of Confidence in the PLA

The poor performance of Chinese weapons in Pakistan and the mysterious disappearance of senior PLA generals expose a deeper crisis: Beijing’s shaky confidence in its own military. Excessive secrecy, long intended to protect internal cohesion, has facilitated substandard weapons procurement and politically driven promotions. Corruption has hollowed out both systems, leaving the PLA with critical gaps in competence and reliability.

China’s ruling CCP, alongside President Xi Jinping, have placed enormous strategic weight on the PLA’s shoulders. For decades, the Party’s legitimacy has rested on economic performance. However, this foundation is eroding with global trade headwinds, rising tariffs, and a growing reluctance among countries to absorb Chinese exports. In its place, nationalism has become the CCP’s principal source of political legitimacy, and the PLA is now expected to deliver on it.

Xi envisions the military as the key instrument to assert Beijing’s claims over Taiwan, dominate the South China Sea, and cement China’s role as the region’s paramount power. However, that ambition is currently facing a sobering reality. If Chinese weapons systems falter during battle and senior military leadership remains plagued by opacity and purges, the credibility of China’s military rise, and by extension, Xi’s national rejuvenation project, is bound to be questioned. Whether the PLA will shoulder the weight of Xi’s ambitions remains an unresolved and increasingly consequential question.

• About the author: Atul Kumar is a Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.
• Source: This article was published by Observer Research Foundation