India’s Strategic Recalibration: Indus Waters Treaty Placed In Abeyance – Analysis

In a consequential policy shift expressing its deep outrage over the recent Pahalgam massacre, the Government of India—during a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS)—unveiled a set of stringent measures aimed at delivering a firm message of condemnation and holding Pakistan accountable. Chief among these was the decision to place the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960 in abeyance—a move that signifies a major strategic recalibration with wide-ranging implications for regional hydropolitics.

Brokered by the World Bank and signed on 19 September 1960 in Karachi by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan’s President Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the Indus Waters Treaty is one of the most enduring and successful international water-sharing agreements. It governs the distribution and management of the Indus River system, encompassing six rivers: the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. According to its provisions, India received exclusive rights over the eastern rivers—Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—while Pakistan was allocated the waters of the western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab.

Despite multiple wars and periods of diplomatic impasse, the treaty has been widely lauded as a rare example of sustained bilateral cooperation between two hostile neighbours. Its importance is further underscored by the fact that around 80 percent of Pakistan’s irrigated agricultural land—roughly 16 million hectares—relies on the Indus basin. The treaty sets out a detailed legal and technical framework regulating water usage, infrastructure development, and mechanisms for dispute resolution, aimed at ensuring fair distribution and long-term water sustainability.

India’s recent announcement to suspend the operational aspects of the treaty—though stopping short of a complete withdrawal—marks a clear departure from its traditionally cautious stance on trans-boundary water management. This signals a critical juncture in South Asian diplomacy and introduces a new dimension to India-Pakistan tensions, wherein water may increasingly be viewed through the lens of strategic leverage rather than cooperative necessity.

Pakistan’s Water Dependency and Agrarian Risks

The implications of placing the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance are deeply consequential for Pakistan, a nation whose agrarian economy and overall water security are intricately linked to the Indus River system. While the treaty permits India to build run-of-the-river hydroelectric projects on the western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—these are bound by stringent design and operational protocols to protect downstream flow volumes. Simultaneously, the agreement allows Pakistan to monitor and formally object to any project it deems as potentially violating the treaty’s provisions.

The stakes are particularly high for Pakistan, which relies on nearly 80 percent of the total flow in the Indus drainage basin. Of the approximately 168 million acre-feet (MAF) of water that flow annually through the system, India is allocated about 33 MAF, which it currently utilizes at over 90 percent efficiency. This leaves Pakistan overwhelmingly reliant on the remaining volumes to sustain its large-scale irrigated farming, domestic water use, and rural economies.

The Indus River system—including tributaries such as the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—constitutes the backbone of Pakistan’s freshwater supply, serving tens of millions. It meets roughly 23 percent of the nation’s agricultural water demand and supports nearly 68 percent of the rural population, whose livelihoods are closely tied to agriculture. Any disruption to this system, whether temporary or permanent, risks magnifying pre-existing socio-economic vulnerabilities.

Reduced water availability would likely lead to lower agricultural productivity, increased food insecurity, and worsening economic fragility, particularly in rural regions already burdened by poverty and national economic stress. Pakistan’s water storage infrastructure is also grossly insufficient to buffer against such shocks. Its two primary reservoirs—Mangla and Tarbela—together provide only 14.4 MAF of live storage capacity, amounting to a mere 10 percent of its annual water entitlement. This limited capacity renders Pakistan acutely susceptible to seasonal variability, prolonged droughts, or any upstream disruptions initiated by India.

India’s decision to put the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance is not just a symbolic diplomatic rebuke but a move with potential to reshape the strategic landscape of the region. While avoiding formal abrogation, this suspension sends a powerful signal of India’s willingness to reconsider long-standing cooperative mechanisms when faced with persistent cross-border threats and provocations.

Pakistan’s Internal Crisis over Indus Water

The escalating dispute over water resources between Pakistan’s Sindh and Punjab provinces has intensified in recent weeks, culminating in widespread protests, road blockades, and significant political unrest.​

At the heart of the conflict is the federal government’s Green Pakistan Initiative, which includes the construction of six new canals diverting water from the Indus River to irrigate lands in Punjab, particularly the Cholistan region. Sindh’s leadership and civil society have vehemently opposed this project, arguing that it threatens their already scarce water supply, violates the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord, and endangers the ecological balance of the Indus Delta. ​

Protests have erupted across Sindh, with lawyers, nationalist groups, and civil society organizations leading sit-ins and demonstrations. Notably, the Babarloi Dharna near Sukkur, initiated on April 18, 2025, saw major highways blocked, disrupting traffic between Sindh and Punjab and halting the movement of goods, including agricultural exports. The protests have also extended to railway lines, further exacerbating transportation challenges. 

The political ramifications have been significant. The Sindh Assembly passed a unanimous resolution opposing the canal project, and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) lawmakers staged a walkout in the Senate in protest. Sindh Chief Minister Murad Ali Shah has publicly condemned the project, asserting that no new canals will be constructed under the PPP’s governance. ​ 

In response to the mounting pressure, the federal government has expressed willingness to engage in dialogue. Law Minister Azam Nazeer Tarar emphasized that any decisions regarding the canal project would be made through constitutional means and mutual consultation with all stakeholders, including the Sindh government. This ongoing dispute underscores the critical importance of equitable water distribution in Pakistan and the need for collaborative solutions to address interprovincial resource challenges.

 Can India Withdraw from the Treaty?

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, though brokered by the World Bank, is primarily a bilateral agreement between India and Pakistan. Unlike multilateral treaties governed by frameworks such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), the IWT is binding solely on its two signatory nations.

The World Bank’s role was that of a facilitator and guarantor, but it is not a legal party to the treaty. As a result, the treaty is not enforceable under international law in the same manner as multilateral conventions. Consequently, any decision to suspend, amend, or revoke the treaty rests entirely within the sovereign jurisdiction and diplomatic discretion of India and Pakistan.

Given the bilateral nature of the agreement, India holds the theoretical authority to reconsider or temporarily place the treaty in abeyance as a political or strategic response to hostile actions, such as state-sponsored terrorism or cross-border violence. However, such a move would have significant geopolitical and humanitarian ramifications, necessitating careful consideration of regional water security, international perceptions, and long-term stability.

Reassessing India’s Strategic Leverage: Beyond Water as a Resource

In view of Pakistan’s persistent breaches of bilateral and international commitments, there is a strong case for India to adopt a more assertive and recalibrated approach in responding to such provocations. Over the years, Pakistan has consistently violated the spirit and letter of the Shimla Agreement (1972) by internationalizing the Kashmir issue at multilateral forums, despite the agreement’s clear stipulation that all disputes be resolved bilaterally. Furthermore, it has actively abetted cross-border terrorism, with so-called “non-state actors” widely believed to operate under the tacit support and direction of Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies. In addition, Pakistan has extended support to separatist movements in both Kashmir and Punjab, offering logistical assistance, military training, arms, and financial resources aimed at destabilizing India’s internal security. It has also engaged in economic sabotage by printing and circulating counterfeit Indian currency to fund terrorist activities and disrupt India’s economic stability. Compounding these violations is Pakistan’s disregard for international conventions, particularly the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963), as evidenced by its handling of Indian nationals such as Kulbhushan Jadhav.

Against this backdrop, it is both reasonable and strategically prudent for India to consider coercive diplomatic measures designed to compel Pakistan’s deep state to abandon its hostile and subversive conduct. Among the most potent non-military instruments at India’s disposal is the regulation and control of water flows under the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). It is essential to highlight that Pakistan currently benefits from water usage far exceeding its legal entitlement under the treaty. While the IWT grants India unrestricted use of the eastern rivers—Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—and allocates significant control over the western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—to Pakistan, India has exercised notable restraint in asserting its full rights. This longstanding policy of strategic patience must now be re-evaluated in light of Pakistan’s ongoing provocations, with a view to recalibrating India’s approach in a manner that safeguards national interests and deters future transgressions.

Is it Abeyance or Termination?

In international legal and diplomatic contexts, it is important to distinguish between placing a treaty in abeyance and terminating it, as both actions involve modifying the implementation of the treaty but carry distinct legal and strategic implications.

Placing a treaty in abeyance refers to the temporary suspension of its enforcement—whether partially or fully—without formally dissolving the agreement. In this situation, the treaty remains legally valid (de jure) but is not actively implemented by one or both parties. Such a suspension may arise due to emerging security concerns, political tensions, a reassessment of treaty terms, or delays in renegotiations. The implications of abeyance include the possibility of future reactivation, the ability to express strong diplomatic discontent without invoking the full legal consequences of termination, and the retention of a state’s international legal standing while applying diplomatic pressure.

In contrast, terminating or withdrawing from a treaty signifies a formal and permanent cessation of the treaty’s legal effect. This process is governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), particularly Articles 54 to 64, which outline permissible grounds for termination, such as a material breach, the impossibility of continued performance due to fundamental changes in circumstances (rebus sic stantibus), or mutual consent of the parties. The consequences of termination include the dissolution of all legal obligations, the potential for diplomatic backlash—such as retaliatory measures or arbitration—and possible reputational damage, particularly if the move is perceived as a unilateral violation of treaty norms.

Strategic Restraint or Tactical Recalibration?

India has, thus far, refrained from terminating the Indus Waters Treaty, likely to maintain diplomatic credibility and avoid escalation. However, placing the treaty in abeyance could serve as a powerful signal—short of complete abrogation—demonstrating India’s resolve to respond to Pakistan’s persistent violations through a legally nuanced and diplomatically calibrated strategy. Such a step would underscore India’s right to defend its national interests, while keeping open the possibility of restoring cooperation—should Pakistan choose to alter its course and recommit to peaceful bilateralism.

About the authors:

• Prof Jagmeet Bawa, Central university of Himachal Pradesh, Dharmshala, India.
• Mrs. Priyanshu Yadav, Research Scholar Central university of Himachal Pradesh, Dharmshala, India.