In Search Of A New Approach To Myanmar: Is An Alliance Between The US And Myanmar Military Possible? – Analysis
The civil war in Myanmar (until 1989 – Burma) is considered the longest civil war in history. With breaks, it has lasted for more than 70 years. However, this multifaceted and complex conflict has not been sufficiently studied, and in the public consciousness it is known mainly from the action movie “Rambo IV”.
The coup (or constitutional transition) of 1 February 2021 triggered a sharp upsurge in violence. The government of the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) of Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi was ousted on charges of election fraud and usurpation of power. The military returned to power, but this time they faced unexpected difficulties. Supporters of the ousted government formed a “National Unity Government” (NUG) and the armed “People’s Defense Forces” (PDF). A feature of the conflict at this stage is the formation of a united front of the Burmese opposition and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) against the Myanmar army (Tatmadaw).
An outside observer knows only about the struggle of the “resistance” with the “junta” and that the “junta” is suffering defeat and will soon fall. It is not our task to list the well-known facts, but we would like to look at the conflict from an unusual perspective.
Myanmar’s civil war is usually viewed in a false dichotomy of “pro-Chinese junta vs. pro-Western NUG.” Not only is this interpretation utilitarian and designed to serve the interests of a group of Burmese exiles in the West, but more importantly, it is historically flawed. It ignores the existing contradictions between the junta and Beijing, as well as the Tatmadaw’s history of hard-fought struggle against communist pro-Chinese rebels – there was a time when the US and Myanmar were de facto allies. Should the West support the NUG or would this be an irreparable mistake that would only strengthen China? Do the Myanmar military and the sinophobic hawks of the Trump administration have common interests? Some of these questions were raised in an article by Yusuke Watanabe, head of the Japan-Myanmar Association, back in late 2021. At the time, it caused a storm of indignation in the Burmese exile media. After China’s massive intervention during “Operation 1027”, it is time to ask these questions again. [1]
China’s Myanmar Strategy: the Power of Ambivalence
In October 2023, the war turned when the three EAOs (Three Brotherhood Alliance, 3BHA) announced the launch of “Operation 1027” in northern Shan State. By January 2024, the largest member of the 3BHA, the ethnic Han (Kokang) Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), forced the junta garrison in Laukkai (the capital of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone) to surrender. Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA) also achieved success. The self-proclaimed “Wa State” and its army (UWSA) formally remained neutral, but in practice they supported the anti-government forces. After a ceasefire brokered by China, fighting resumed in the summer of 2024 and ended with the capture of the headquarters of the Tatmadaw’s North Eastern Command in Lashio. Thus, almost the entire northern part of Shan State came under the control of the Chinese chauvinist group MNDAA. The persecution of Burmese and Shan people began in the occupied area, and the study of the Burmese language was banned in schools. [2] Myanmar was particularly outraged by footage of the destruction of a Buddhist pagoda in Laukkai by Chinese communists. [3]
China’s role in “Operation 1027” is a matter of debate. The consensus is that the rebel offensive had China’s benevolent approval. The Chinese government was unhappy with the junta’s efforts to combat cybercrime in the border areas, so it allowed the MNDAA and its allies to seize these areas to further destroy scam centers. The extent of China’s support for “Operation 1027” appears to go much deeper. Burmese-language military sources speak of Chinese weapons, mercenaries, and military advisers. Information about Chinese mercenaries in the MNDAA was also officially voiced by Tatmadaw officials during the 2015 conflict, when the MNDAA made an unsuccessful attempt to seize Kokang. [4]
Because the NUG supports MNDAA operations against the junta, opposition media are reluctant to talk about MNDAA’s ties to China. The Myanmar opposition is afraid of damaging its reputation in the United States – the leaders of MNDAA and UWSA are not only controlled by communist China, but are also the world’s largest drug traffickers. For this reason, NUG supporters spend a lot of time trying to prove that MNDAA and its allies are not “Chinese puppets”.
Chinese spokesmen are traditionally taciturn and prefer to voice platitudes. Unofficial Chinese propaganda is more overt. Zhao Dashuai, a member of the People’s Armed Police Propaganda Bureau, hails the success of the MNDAA, calls it “the first Xist revolution” (sic!) [5], and admits that “Kokang, Wa State and Mongla are held by ethnic Han or Sinicized minority forces in Northern Myanmar, they can be an important buffer zone on our southern border”. [6] This is not the official Chinese position, but it is in keeping with the CCP’s tradition of making its position known through unofficial “people’s diplomacy”.
After the impressive victories of the MNDAA and TNLA in Northern Shan, China felt it necessary to put pressure on the rebels. The reason is that the escalation of hostilities threatens the “One Belt, One Road” project, designed to provide China with access to the Indian Ocean (the agreement on the project was accepted by the NLD government and met with discontent among the military due to excessive concessions to Beijing). Information appeared in the pro-military media that China would like all stations of the project to be controlled by pro-Chinese rebels. Apparently, China is not ready to fully support the MNDAA, including for reasons of its cooperation with the “pro-Western” NUG.
It is quite possible that China has another motive for putting pressure on the 3BHA. China’s thinking is Sinocentric and requires sympathy for the struggle of ethnic Han Chinese against the Myanmar army. The territories occupied by the MNDAA are already being cleared of Burmese and are considered part of Greater China. However, for the full integration of Northern Shan with Yunnan Province, the anarchy that characterizes the EAO must end. Integration must be carried out in stages, so military success must be followed by a peaceful phase of bringing the occupied territory into line with Chinese standards. Before receiving a new round of support, the MNDAA must become more like the UWSA and unify its governance, economy, and law along Chinese lines. But this will require a suspension of hostilities and a truce with the Tatmadaw.
China’s strategy in Myanmar is highly ambivalent, and therefore puzzling to Western observers. Beijing is clearly behind some ethnic rebel groups, as evidenced by the fact that these groups are armed with weapons that they cannot produce themselves. Even as the rebels come under pressure from China, veterans of China’s PLA continue to serve in the MNDAA, and this is hardly their own initiative. At the same time, China’s support for anti-government rebels should be secret for several reasons.
First, despite all the sympathy for the Han people of Kokang, China is guided by geoeconomic interests. The key stations of the “One Belt, One Road” project are located in the Burmese heartland, which is the arena of battles between the Tatmadaw and the Burmese opposition. Despite the fact that the armies of the 3BHA have already left their tribal lands, the idea of a large-scale invasion of the densely populated areas around Mandalay looks dubious. The MNDAA and TNLA can and are already providing support to the PDF units, but China does not want the former residence of the Burmese kings to end up in the hands of the NUG, with its connections to the US Deep State.
Secondly, China fears that excessive support for the separatists will push the junta to change its foreign policy orientation. The confidential talks between the Myanmar naval officer Kyaw Lin Zaw and the US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink in Hanoi in June 2024 were apparently a timid attempt to find an anti-Chinese consensus between the Tatmadaw and the United States. [7] The precedent of Burmese-American cooperation against communist insurgents took place during the Cold War, when the Burmese Socialist Programme Party regime was a de facto ally of the United States in containing communism in Southeast Asia. Even Naypyidaw’s particularly warm relations with Moscow irritate China, which will not tolerate other players in its sphere of influence.
After heavy defeats, the junta is not going to provoke China with harsh statements. The surge of anti-Chinese sentiment among pro-Tatmadaw nationalists dates back to July-August 2024. [8] General Ne Win’s grandson, a well-known public figure in the country, for example, promised to burn the Chinese flag during Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi’s visit to Myanmar. However, the authorities soon had to reduce the intensity of hatred towards their northern neighbor. The junta has chosen a different tactic: instead of appealing to the ancient Burmese kings who fought against China, it is trying to prove to China that the military government in Naypyidaw is more preferable to its interests than ethnic groups, and especially the NUG. In the short term, this game has already benefited senior general Min Aung Hlaing, who, after nearly four years of being ignored, has secured an invitation to the Kunming summit in November 2024. However, in the long term, the Tatmadaw’s nationalist pride is difficult to reconcile with China’s ambitions for a creeping occupation of Myanmar. The presence of pro-Chinese enclaves such as “Wa State” in the north-east of the country hangs like a sword of Damocles over the fragile Myanmar statehood.
American Approaches to Myanmar: between ‘Democratic Jihad’ and Anti-Chinese Pragmatism
The history of relations between Myanmar and the United States is complex and ambiguous. After gaining independence in 1948, democratic Burma, led by the “Buddhist socialist” Prime Minister U Nu, enjoyed the support of the Western bloc in the fight against communist insurgents (in addition, numerous separatists, such as the Karen, fought against the government). Sympathy for Washington in Burma was noticeably diminished by the CIA’s patronage of the Kuomintang troops retreating to northeastern Burma after their defeat in China in 1950. The Burmese perceived this as a stab in the back from an ally in the context of the ongoing fight against the communists. The “white Chinese” occupied several provinces of a country and created a “second Taiwan” there. The need to combat foreign invasion forced the Burmese government to reach an agreement with Communist China – Burma became the first Asian country to recognize Mao Zedong’s regime (and the first Asian country to recognize the state of Israel). The Kuomintang troops were finally withdrawn from the country only in 1961 – but by that time power in the country was already concentrated in the hands of the Tatmadaw. The strengthening of the military’s influence in the conditions of a permanent war of “all against all” was predictable.
During the Vietnam War, the military regime in Yangon was not an official ally of the United States and adhered to the principle of neutrality. But in fact, Tatmadaw stood on the same side as the Free World, since the military was defending its own sector in the common fight against communism in Indochina. The entire 1960s and 1970s were spent in fierce battles against the troops of the Communist Party of Burma, generously supported by Chinese regime. While southern Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, despite direct support from the United States, fell under the red wave, Burma, relying on its own forces, was able to withstand and prevent the establishment of a regime similar to the Khmer Rouge. Burma’s leader, General Ne Win, skillfully maneuvered between Beijing and Washington, trying not to anger the former and maintain friendly ties with the latter.
The suppression of the 1988 mass unrest, which began as a communist plot, opened a new page in the relations between the USA and Myanmar. It seemed to the winner of the Cold War at that time that there should be no countries in the world based on ideological foundations other than Western-style liberal democracy. Despite the new military government’s rejection of the ideas of the “Burmese path to socialism” and the course taken to build capitalism with Buddhist specifics, Washington ostracized Myanmar. International isolation did not allow Myanmar to restore its economy and attract foreign investment, but it contributed to Myanmar’s inclusion in China’s orbit. Burmese-American historian Michael Aung-Thwin called this American policy “democracy jihad”. [8]
Indeed, the US hostility to the Tatmadaw has always been irrational. This is evident when comparing Myanmar with countries unfriendly to the US. While China is a global competitor to the US, the Kim regime has nuclear potential and directly threatens the Republic of Korea and Japan, theocratic Iran (and formerly Saddam Hussein’s Iraq) is waging an existential war against US ally Israel, and leftist Cuba and Venezuela are undermining US dominance in Latin America, the Myanmar military, with its pronounced isolationism in foreign policy, has never challenged the US. At the same time, Washington has found common ground with communist Vietnam, in the war against which about 60,000 American soldiers died, on the basis of containing China.
The adoption of the 2008 constitution and subsequent democratization significantly improved Myanmar’s image in the eyes of the American establishment. However, the NLD’s rule from 2015 to 2021 was a time of missed opportunities. The complex and controversial Rohingya conflict led to new sanctions against Myanmar and the military. The democratic forces failed to use their new powers to truly update the system. The Tatmadaw pursued its own interests in staging a coup in 2021, but large-scale election fraud actually took place.
NUG/PDF/EAO: Freedom Fighters or… New Khmer Rouge?
The phobia of foreign intervention is a historical trauma of Myanmar, dating back to the British conquest of the country in 1885. It has affected the psychology of the Tatmadaw, which sees itself as the defender of the sovereignty of a nation squeezed by its giant neighbors. The coup of February 1, 2021 can hardly be justified from a Western point of view, but the military’s motives are clearer from a Burmese-centric perspective. The Aung San Suu Kyi government was too susceptible to external manipulation to maintain power in Myanmar. In addition, the NLD is notoriously corrupt, which is generally typical of Asian democracies. In the area of ethnic policy, the NLD government may have been more Burmese chauvinistic than the military, which has shown greater flexibility, for example in delegating some powers to loyal ethnic armies (Border Guard Forces, BGF). The Rohingya genocide case, for which Tatmadaw is solely accused, occurred during the NLD’s time in power. Now in 2024, the mass killings of Muslims are being carried out by militants of the Arakan Army, which the NUG recognizes as part of the “resistance forces.” This prompts the Rohingya to join Tatmadaw to resist the Rakhine separatists. [9]
Trump’s victory raises questions about a new approach to American diplomacy in Myanmar. Myanmar exiles have been oriented toward the Democratic Party since 2021, pinning their hopes on it for tougher sanctions against the junta and even military support for “resistance forces.” Naturally, the victory of the American nationalist Trump has upset them and their Western friends from NGOs associated with the Democratic Party. Paul Greening writes on the Irrawaddy that “Trump will be a disaster for America and the world, including the people of Myanmar”. [10]
At the same time, Trump and the GOP’s focus on confrontation with China continues to inspire hope in the NUG. For example, Stimson analysts try to argue that the junta’s recent defeats on the battlefield should prompt Washington to support the “pro-Western” PDF and ethnic armies, including military aid. [11] Such a policy would prevent the strengthening of China, which allegedly patronizes the military. This view has several drawbacks.
Firstly, the unconditional information dominance of the Myanmar opposition and its sympathizers distorts the real course of military operations in Myanmar. Undoubtedly, the Tatmadaw has suffered a number of painful defeats on the outskirts of the country and lost the initiative, but this does not mean that the “collapse of the junta” is inevitable in any near future. The densely populated center of the country with its predominantly Burmese majority is still under the control of the military. In addition, in a number of battles, the Tatmadaw demonstrated high resistance and was able to push back the enemy (for example, the battle for Loikaw, the capital of Kayah State, or the battle for the Kani city in Sagaing Region). It is reported that the Tatmadaw has begun to effectively use drones and UAVs to destroy enemy ground targets. Note that, according to Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, after the fall of Lashio in August 2024, foreign, i.e. Chinese, UAV operators participated in “Operation 1027”. [12] The triumphant reports of the opposition media resemble similar reports from the Ukrainian side and are aimed at extorting cash injections.
Secondly, the orientation of the Myanmar opposition towards the West is highly questionable. The “democratic” PDF received assistance from the pro-Chinese groups MNDAA and TNLA, which are supported by the “Wa State”, a long-standing Chinese puppet. The drug lords who head the MNDAA and UWSA are listed by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). NUG spokesmen have never spoken out in favor of suspending Chinese infrastructure projects in Myanmar and have expressed their readiness to defend them. Moreover, the agreement with China on laying a pipeline from Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal was signed under the NLD government, which caused discontent among the military. The NUG’s position on Taiwan is no different from that of the junta: both support Chinese claims to the island.
Thirdly, most EAOs are closely aligned with Chinese interests (with the exception of the Karen and Karenni). Of course, even the 3BHA armies are incorrectly portrayed as blind followers of their northern neighbor’s orders. But the geopolitical and geoeconomic configuration inevitably pushes them into China’s zone of influence. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is not part of the 3BHA and has a high degree of independence, but even it must follow in the wake of Chinese policy. Therefore, the seizure of rare earth element mining territories by KIA will lead to a total Chinese monopoly on this strategically important resource in the context of the “new Cold War”. The hope for a pro-Western and pro-democratic turn of the drug-addicted tribal armies is a typical mistake of armchair strategists. There may be friction between China and its EAOs proxies (and there is now friction between China and the KIA), but in the long term, the EAOs are doomed to be loyal satellites of Beijing. While China benefits from a weak Myanmar divided along ethnic lines, the US priority might be a strong, united Myanmar based on “disciplined democracy”.
Moreover, the KIA and AA activities are the source of instability for India’s ethnically diverse northeastern states, and this is the reason for Naypyitaw and New Delhi’s long-standing security cooperation.
But the most important thing is that the top of the Myanmar exile community in the West is completely cut off from the “resistance forces” in Myanmar and does not represent the real picture in the confrontation zone. There are numerous records of war crimes committed by the PDF against rural officials, teachers, doctors, monks and anyone else accused of “working for the military dogs”. [13] The images from rural central Myanmar under PDF control are reminiscent of the atrocities of the Red Guards, Viet Cong and Khmer Rouge.
Moreover, the two “democratic” armies, the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA), officially consider themselves the heirs of the maoist Communist Party of Burma. It should not be forgotten that the far-left All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), one of the first armed opposition groups in Burma, was on the US terror list from 2001 to 2010 for mass killings in the jungle. These facts do not excuse the war crimes committed by the junta, but they help to better understand the depth of the tragedy that the Burmese people have faced.
A recent statement from the Anti-Fascist International Front suggests that far-left extremists are intent on using the conflict in Myanmar to gain military skills. [14] If that happens, the Myanmar “resistance” will become not just an unfortunate investment for the conservative Trump administration, but an outright enemy, given Trump’s comments about antifa as a “terrorist organization”.
Trump’s team promises to break the alliance of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. This will not be an easy task, given the depth of China’s penetration into the Russian economy. Therefore, it is logical to start breaking this chain in local areas. It is known that in Myanmar, Moscow is to some extent a competitor to Beijing, for example, in the military-technical equipment of Tatmadaw. China’s superiority over any other country willing to deal with the junta is so great that it can only be broken by the efforts of several players. Myanmar could become an ideal field for finding a primary consensus between the United States, Russia and, of course, India in the matter of strategic containment of China. At the same time, Washington could set the military a number of feasible conditions for democratization of the system. India is already sharing with the Myanmar government its experience in building federalization and conducting future elections.
It is difficult to predict how the US approach to Myanmar will change, or whether it will change at all. Trump is unlikely to continue to support forces that have compromised themselves by associating with his enemies from Deep State. For starters, the new administration could initiate the repeal of the Burma Act, which provides financial support to the Myanmar opposition. The prospect of confronting China in its most vulnerable areas seems much more significant. Myanmar is Beijing’s Achilles heel. There is a high probability that the Myanmar military, offended by China’s excessive demands, will be interested in a new configuration of US-Myanmar relations. But for this to happen, the new administration must show a genuine interest in the problems of Southeast Asia and demonstrate a high degree of strategic thinking.
References
[1] https://nationalinterest.org/feature/myanmar-japan-alone-must-hold-line-197639
[2] https://elevenmyanmar.com/news/mndaa-begins-demolishing-bamar-community-shops-in-laukkai
[4] https://ispmyanmar.com/op-17/
[5] https://x.com/zhao_dashuai/status/1743912148089417884
[6] https://x.com/zhao_dashuai/status/1743850752894963920
[7] https://thediplomat.com/2024/06/us-diplomat-reportedly-met-myanmar-naval-officer-in-vietnam/
[9] Aung-Thwin, M. Parochial universalism, democracy jihad and the Orientalist image of Burma: the new Evangelism. Pacific Affairs. Vancouver, 2002. Vol. 74, № 4. P. 483505
[12] https://www.stimson.org/2024/to-counter-china-u-s-must-do-more-in-myanmar/
[13] https://www.nationthailand.com/news/asean/40040351