The Paris Agreement has rightly been hailed as historic. On 12 December 2015 a record of 195 states adopted the first universal and legally-binding climate deal. Only six years earlier the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties (COP) had rather reinforced the divide between the Global North and South. Despite this success, the Paris Agreement is only a document outlining good intentions as long as it is not implemented. As Christiana Figueres, former Executive Secretary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change put it, Paris was “the easy part.”
By Susanna Theresia Mocker*
The Paris Agreement has rightly been hailed as “historic”. On 12 December 2015 a record of 195 states adopted the first universal and legally-binding climate deal. Only six years earlier the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties (COP) had rather reinforced the divide between the Global North and South. Despite this success, the Paris Agreement is only a document outlining good intentions as long as it is not implemented. As Christiana Figueres, former Executive Secretary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change put it, Paris was “the easy part.”1
Post-COP21 a plethora of commentaries have called for an early ratification in 2016 to keep momentum as the world is heading into five decisive years for climate change. But very little has been published on states’ domestic efforts to follow up on the adoption of the Paris Agreement. This is due to at least three reasons: severe data paucity, a decrease in media coverage – and funding therefore – since January 2016, and the big players like the US and China taking up the limelight. This stocktaking report addresses these problems and provides a comprehensive overview of climate action since COP21 in India, Japan and South Korea. Intended as a follow-up to the European External Action Service’s (EEAS) Green Diplomacy Network, the report intends to lend a hand to European policymakers addressing climate change in the EU‘s three strategic partners in Asia.
Looking at Table 1, there is good reason to not limit attention to the EU‘s number one Asian partner – China. India, Japan and South Korea rank 5th, 6th and 9th in the list of top ten global Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emitters. They are also part of a select group of states, intending to expand their usage of coal significantly. As Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technology cannot be used on a largescale at low cost yet, coal represents the number one resource that needs to be retired if climate change mitigation is to have a chance at success. Therefore the usage of coal receives special attention in this report. Even if the Paris Agreement in its current form was implemented to 100%, a 2.7- 3.5 degree increase in earth surface temperature is likely, surpassing the important threshold of 2 degrees warming.2 In order to implement the Paris Agreement, 55 states, accounting for 55% of global GHG emission, need to ratify the agreement. As of the beginning of July, only 19 states, accounting for 0.2% of global GHG emissions, have ratified the agreement. Hence, creating momentum and analysing the obstacles to domestic climate action is a very timely exercise.
India’s position at COP21 has been widely reported as taking a very strong stance on climate justice, demanding that developed countries provide carbon space for less developed ones. India held it was not part of the problem, which is in line with its very low CO2 emissions per capita depicted in Table 2. But India’s hunger for energy is set to grow as additional 315 million citizens will live in its urban areas by 2040.3 The International Energy Agency predicts India will be the one country to account for the biggest share in global energy demand, about 25%, by 2040.4
But the image of India as a climate laggard is beginning to shift. Post-COP21, India’s general position on climate justice has not changed, but its level of ambition has. Its INDCs have been rated as “medium” by Climate Action Tracker, thereby ranking higher than many others.5 As a leader of developing countries, this sends important signals to other emerging economies. India seeks to lower its emission intensity of GDP to 35% of 2005 levels by 2030, thereby reducing it by 33%. By 2030, non-fossil based power generation shall account for 40%. In 2012, nuclear, hydro and solar power accounted for a mere 3%, while biomass and coal accounted for 23% and 45% of primary energy supply respectively.6
Just one month after COP21, India organized the World Clean Coal Conference, which underlined its determination to continue to use coal for energy production. As Table 3 shows, India’s coal usage has increased steadily since the 1970s, surpassing the other states discussed here. In May 2016, Coal India Limited, a state-owned enterprise and the world’s largest coal miner, announced it had developed a roadmap to “substantially enhance production of coal by 2019-20”, after it had already increased production by 10% in the last quarter of 2015 when the Paris Agreement was negotiated.7 The Minister of Coal, Power, and New & Renewable Energy has repeatedly declared coal was the cheapest energy source for India and that coal was needed to provide India’s baseload of energy. Both arguments have repeatedly been challenged by economists.8
While the projected coal usage remains alarmingly high, India is not picky about how to alleviate the energy poverty of 240 million Indians who do not have access to electricity. India has quickly become the fastest growing market for renewables, thanks to political support in the Prime Minister’s office. 9 As Andrew Steer from the World Resource Institute puts it: “Prime Minister Modi didn’t make this decision because he’s a member of Greenpeace. He did it because it makes the most sense for India’s economic development.”10 Modi had already increased the previous goal for photovoltaic capacity by factor five to 100GW by 2022. For comparison, in 2014 global installed solar capacity amounted to 181GW. 11 In July 2016 some members of government call for an even more ambitious goal as India doubled its solar power capacity to 7GW over 18 months.12 Ambitions are similarly high for wind power capacity, but prospects for hydropower look dim. Dams, dubbed the “temples of modern India” when they provided over 45% percent of energy in the 1960s, have come under fire for the environmental damage caused. 13 As an emerging economy and set to become the world’s most populous country, India needs to pay attention to the food-water-energy nexus in particular.
In spring 2016 there have been alarming signals of Indian states not having paid their bills for renewable energy, amounting to as much as 360 million USD. 14 Access to attractive financing and an extensive upgrade and expansion of the electricity grid are key to deploy more renewables in India and it is increasingly clear why India’s INDCs are conditional upon receiving international financial support.
Since May 2016, the Indian government is considering the introduction of an umbrella legislation, streamlining the various strategies and putting the Environment Ministry in charge.15 This could be a first step towards ratifying the Paris Agreement. The US in particular is pushing India to ratify “as early as possible” as a joint communication puts it. But India has not committed itself to a date and recent developments show India using its relevance for climate change as a bargaining chip: In June, a bid to enter the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which would allow India to trade nuclear material for energy production, was turned down by China and others since India has not ratified the Non- Proliferation Treaty. 16 The Indian Ministry of External Affairs reacted in a statement: “An early positive decision by the NSG would have allowed us to move forward on the Paris Agreement.”17
2016’s Japan is not the shining host of the Kyoto Protocol anymore, instead it is labelled as the laggard of the G7 in addressing climate change. In Paris, Japan pledged to reduce 2013 emission levels by 26% in 2030. Climate Action Tracker disregarded this effort as “inadequate”.18 May 2016 saw two important steps towards realizing the NDC: First, the revision of the country’s climate law, the “Law on Global Warming Prevention Measures”, which now emphasizes the importance of raising public awareness and boosting innovation. Second, Japan adopted a National Plan on Global Warming Prevention Measures, which is a detailed plan for implementing the NDCs. There has been no increase in ambition, instead the discussion saw some committee members backtracking, wishing to delete the reference to the 2012 decision to achieve 80% GHG emissions by 2050. Environment Minister Tamayo Marukawa stated in the end of May it was unlikely that Japan would ratify the Paris Agreement by end of 2016 thanks to lengthy deliberations in the Diet.19
Looking at Japan post-Paris, it must be doubted whether Japan is on track to achieve even the more moderate goal of 26% GHG reduction by 2030. Devoid of domestic energy sources and thus highly aware of the importance of stable energy supply, Japanese policymakers have long embraced nuclear power. Before the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima in 2011, Japanese reactors accounted for 29% of the country’s primary energy supply. Despite Prime Minister Abe – who is eager to lower the fuel bill – and wants nuclear power to account for ca 20% of Japan’s energy mix by 2020, it is far from secure whether the country will utilize nuclear power to achieve its NDCs.20 In 2016, public opinion is neatly cut into two camps and recent court decisions on public safety have switched the two nuclear power plants which remained on the grid “on and off like light switches.”21
Post-Fukushima saw a remarkable shift to fossil fuels, moving the country away from the needed energy transition. In 2013, fossil fuels accounted for 95% of Japan’s primary energy supply, with coal taking up 26%.22 A new report from May 2016 revealed that Japan has invested 22 billion USD in 2007-2015, making it by far “the worst G7 offender when it comes to public financing for coal projects.” 23 This is particularly relevant as Japan is very active in the field of ODA and OFDI and reportedly considers financing future coal projects worth 10 billion USD,24 amongst others in Indonesia and Myanmar. Domestically, 49 coal power plants, providing 28GW, are being planned.25 “Opposition from the Environment Ministry has been overruled in favour of a voluntary agreement with utilities to reduce emissions intensity.”26
At the occasion of the Japan-led G7 summit in May 2016, NGOs and activists called upon Japan to turn away from coal to stay in line with the Paris Agreement – but to no avail. If the costs for climate and health are politically ignored, hopes are high that private investors will keep an eye on the risk they are exposing themselves to when investing in Japan’s coal sector. Caldecott analysed this aspect and asks: “Does Japan seriously think that there will still be coal-fired power stations in the system in the 2070s? Because that is what they are committing themselves to with the plans they have laid out.”27Since the costs for renewables have fallen significantly in the last years, Japan risks the need to retire newly built coal plants early on, facing 60-80 billion USD in stranded assets.28 In spring 2016 leading trading house Mitsui & Co announced it would sell one third of its thermal coal assets over three years, citing the Paris Agreement and the subsequent outlook for fossil fuels as a reason.29
Despite the outlined dominance of the fossil fuel sector, Japan’s renewable energy industry is growing. In 2016, Japan will realize 14% of the world’s photovoltaic installations30 thanks to an incentivizing policy from 2012. A revision adopted in May 2016 seeks to shift support to other renewable energy sources and to reduce the feed-in-tariff for solar power, therefore Japan’s solar market will likely already peak in 2016.31
4. South Korea
The Republic of Korea (ROK) is host to the UN’s Green Climate Found, the South Korean nationals UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon and Head of the IPCC Lee Hoe-sung urge Heads of States worldwide to pursue more ambitious climate action. But at home, in South Korea, climate change mitigation lacks support. ROK’s INDCs have been labelled “inadequate”32 and exposed to a lot of naming and shaming. In February 2016 the incumbent government backtracked on the 2009 Green Growth Act promoted by former President Lee Myung-bak, under which an emission reduction of 30% below business-as-usual (BAU) level by 2020 was foreseen. In its current INDCs South Korea only aims to reduce its emission by 37% in 2030 compared with the BAU scenario. As Table 2 suggests, ROK has not managed to decouple GDP growth and GHG emissions as of yet. Instead, it features the “marginal emissions rates amongst OECD highest increasing countries.”33 This is due to the high reliance on fossil fuels, which provide for 83% of South Korea’s primary energy mix, while nuclear energy accounts for 15%.34
Post-COP21, there have been some encouraging developments spurred by a new report about South Korea’s devastating air quality. Yale’s Environmental Performance Index ranked ROK 173th out of 180 states in the category of air quality and found that >50% of South Koreans were exposed to unsafe levels of air pollution.35
Back in 2015, Greenpeace already busted the long held myth that the majority of air pollution originated in China, holding that 50-70% of particle-laden smog was emitted in South Korea itself.36 In a Cabinet Meeting on May 10, President Park lifted the topic up the agenda by adding an extensive section on air pollution herself. An official stated “(The fine dust issue) was not part of the prewritten script, so we presume that the president brought it up on her own, reflecting her growing interest in the matter.”37
Similarly, emission manipulation by Volkswagen and potentially also Nissan is a much debated topic in Korean newspapers.
The ensuing debate about air quality led in June 2016 to the announcement that the government considers retiring old coal power plants. This would affect about ten of ROK’s 53 coal power plants.38 While plans for four new coal power plans were scrapped at COP21, ROK plans to build 20 new plants until 2021 nonetheless.
The Environment Minister further announced a shift to LNG to make up for the retired power plants and announced that “South Korea’s energy industry has been too heavily dependent on the public sector, such as Kogas and the Korea National Oil Corp.”39
Thus there could be a significant change for the Korean utility market ahead.
A further legislative change post-COP21 addresses ROK’s emission trading scheme, which is in operation since January 2015. As the government plans to achieve about one third of emission reductions via emission trade, it announced a reform of the ETS in June 2016, as it had not been in tune with the new reduction goals as of yet.40
To keep track of all policies affecting climate change, the Office for Government Policy Coordination, which is accountable to the Prime Minister, serves as a controlling unit since May 2016.41 Currently, the government is devising a 2030 GHG Reduction Roadmap”, which is to be published this year and will be crucial step towards implementing the Paris Agreement. While the government of South Korea had pledged to ratify the agreement in 2016 at the occasion of signing it, general elections just a few days before had caused some uncertainties. According to WWF Korea, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs answered a request for the ratification time schedule with cautious optimism that South Korea would
ratify in 2016.
At a presentation of a preliminary version of this paper, the question was raised what the use of global climate negotiations was if state’s climate action is in fact domestically driven. The above analysis has shown that India as a fervent defender of climate justice has been swayed into embracing technologies of the future on an impressive level thanks to international negotiations. The above analysis has also pointed out that India will indeed need international financial support to drop the technologies of the past as soon as possible. The case of Japan has also powerfully illustrated that no man is an island. Japanese investors start to realize that the relative prices of coal and renewable energy are determined on the global market, causing early movers to divest from the very coal industry its government embraces. In South Korea, studies commissioned abroad have highlighted the severity of Korean air pollution and pointed out that China cannot further be the scapegoat to blame as some pollution is home-made. International pressure and domestic resonance have lead South Korea to reassess its energy policy.
In sum, international climate negotiations and media scrutiny have a tremendous potential to spur domestic climate action and to hold leaders accountable. For this process to accelerate, it is vital that countries’ individual climate action receives continuous attention and analysis.
About the author:
*Susanna Theresia Mocker, Research Fellow EU-Asia Centre
The article was published by EU-Asia Centre
1 Cf. Climate Action (2016): UN climate chief calls Paris agreement the “easy part” and calls for action at Davos. In Climate Action, 1/21/2016. Available online at http://www.climateactionprogramme.org/news/u n_climate_chief_calls_paris_agreement_the_easy_ part_and_calls_for_action_a, checked on 7/11/2016.
2 Cf. United Nations (2015): COP21 – Frequently Asked Questions. 2015 Time for Global Action for People and Planet. New York: United Nations, here: p. 3. Available online at http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/wp- content/uploads/2015/10/COP21-FAQs.pdf, checked on 7/11/2016.
3 Cf. International Energy Agency; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2015): World Energy Outlook 2015. Executive Summary. Paris: International Energy Agency, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, here: p. 2. Available online at http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/ publication/WEB_WorldEnergyOutlook2015Executi veSummaryEnglishFinal.pdf, checked on 7/11/2016.
4 Cf. International Energy Agency; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2015): India Energy Outlook. World Energy Outlook Special Report. Paris: International Energy Agency; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, here: p. 11. Available online at http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weow ebsite/2015/IndiaEnergyOutlook_WEO2015.pdf, checked on 7/11/2016.
5 Cf. Climate Action Tracker (2015): India, 12/2/2015. Available online at http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/india.ht ml, checked on 7/11/2016.
6 Cf. Climate Observer: India. Venice: International Center for Climate Governance. Available online at http://climateobserver.org/country-profiles/india/, checked on 7/11/2016.
7 Government of India, Press Information Bureau (2016): Operation of Coal Mines Auctioned/ Allotted in Schedule-II, 5/9/2016. Available online at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/pmreleases.aspx?mincod e=42, checked on 7/11/2016.
8 Cf. Shahan, Zachary (2016): India’s Renewable Energy & Coal Minister Talks Energy Transition (Clean Technica Exclusive). In Clean Technica, 7/1/2016. Available online at http://cleantechnica.com/2016/07/01/indias- renewable-energy-coal-minister-talks-energy- transition-cleantechnica-exclusive/, checked on 7/11/2016.
9 Cf. Goswami, Urmi (2016): Realising India’s renewable ambition. In The Economic Times India, 7/2/2016. Available online at
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/201 6-07-02/news/74173057_1_renewable-energy- capacity-energy-option-solar-power-capacity, checked on 7/11/2016.
10 Cf. Press Trust of India (2016): India praised for its climate change initiatives. In The Economic Times India, 2/3/2016. Available online at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/201 6-02-03/news/70314109_1_climate-change- initiatives-solar-capacity-solar-energy, checked on 7/11/2016.
11 Cf. The Economist’s Data Team (2016): Indian Solar Power. In The Economist, 6/6/2016. Available online at http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2 016/06/daily-chart-2, checked on 7/11/2016.
12 Cf. Goswami, Urmi (2016): India’s renewable energy targets catch the attention of global investors, still need ground work. In The Economic Times India, 7/2/2016. Available online at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/201 6-07-02/news/74173054_1_india-s-energy- capacity-piyush-goyal, checked on 7/11/2016.
13 Cf. Chandrasekaran, Kaavya (2016): Capacity for renewable energy in India hits 42,850 mw; surpasses capacity of hydel projects. In The Economic Times India, 6/10/2016. Available online at
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/en ergy/power/capacity-for-renewable-energy-in- india-hits-42850-mw-surpasses-capacity-of-hydel- projects/articleshow/52680042.cms?from=mdr, checked on 7/11/2016.
14 Cf. Upadhyay, Anindya (2016): India Utilities Seen Holding Up $360 Million for Renewables. In Bloomberg, 6/15/2016. Available online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016- 06-15/india-s-utilities-seen-holding-up-360-million- for-renewables, checked on 7/11/2016.
5 Cf. Vishnoi, Anubhuti (2016): India consider umbrella legislation on climate change Read more at: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow /52931627.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&ut m_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst. In The Economic Times India, 6/27/2016. Available online at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politic s-and-nation/india-consider-umbrella-legislation- on-climate-change/articleshow/52931627.cms, checked on 7/11/2016.
16 Cf. Mourdoukoutas, Panos (2016): The Real Reason China Won’t Let India Join NSG. In Forbes, 6/30/2016. Available online at http://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukout as/2016/06/30/the-real-reason-china-wont-let- india-join-nsg/#2072dd21b2f6, checked on 7/11/2016.
17 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs (2016): Spokesperson’s comments on NSG Plenary meeting in Seoul, 6/24/2016. Available online at http://mea.gov.in/press- releases.htm?dtl/26949/Spokespersons_comment s_on_NSG_Plenary_meeting_in_Seoul, checked on 7/11/2016.
18 Definition of “inadequate” as defined by Climat Action Tracker: „if all countries adopted this level of ambition, global warming would likely exceed 3-4oC in the 21st century.” Cf. Climate Observer: Japan. Venice: International Center for Climate Governance. Available online at http://climateobserver.org/country-profiles/japan/, checked on 7/11/2016.
19 Cf. Kyodo News (2016): Japan unlikely to ratify Paris climate accord by year-end: minister. In Kyodo News, 5/31/2016. Available online at http://kyodonews.net/news/2016/05/31/63267, checked on 7/11/2016.
20 Cf. Tsukimori, Osamu (2016): Japan’s CO2 emissions fall to three-year low in 2014/15 fiscal year. In Reuters, 4/14/2016. Available online at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-carbon- idUSKCN0XC01S, checked on 7/11/2016.
21 Cf. Harding, Robin (2016): Japan’s nuclear restart stymied by courts. In The Financial Times, 4/6/2016. Available online at https://next.ft.com/content/1c92b5ac-fbbb-11e5- b3f6-11d5706b613b, checked on 7/11/2016.
22 Cf. Climate Observer: Japan. Venice: International Center for Climate Governance. Available online at http://climateobserver.org/country-profiles/japan/, checked on 7/11/2016.
23 Han, Chen; Doukas, Alex; Godinot, Sebastien; Schmidt, Jake; Vollmer, Sarah Lyn (2016): Swept under the Rug. How G7 Nations Conceal Public Financing for Coal Around the World. New York: National Resources Defense Council, here: p. 3. Available online at https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/swept- under-rug-coal-financing-report.pdf, checked on 7/11/2016.
24 Cf. Ibid.
25 Caldecott, Ben; Dericks, Gerard; Tulloch, Daniel J.; Kruitwagen, Lucas; Kok, Irem: Stranded Assets and Thermal Coal in Japan. An analysis of environment- related risk exposure. Oxford: Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, here: p. 6. Available online at http://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/research- programmes/stranded-assets/satc-japan.pdf, checked on 7/11/2016.
26 Littlecott, Chris (2016): G7 Coal Scorecard Update. Coal Phase Out Commitments and Power Plant Closures. London: E3G – Third Generation Environmentalism, here: p. 2. Available online at https://www.e3g.org/docs/G7_Scorecard_update_ May_2016.pdf, checked on 7/11/2016.
27 Cf. Lewis, Leo (2016): Japan warned of flaw in coal-fired power plants project. In The Financial Times, 5/11/2016. Available online at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a7f90364-1770-11e6- b197-a4af20d5575e.html, checked on 7/11/2016. 28 Cf. Caldecott, Ben; Dericks, Gerard; Tulloch, Daniel J.; Kruitwagen, Lucas; Kok, Irem: Stranded Assets and Thermal Coal in Japan. An analysis of environment-related risk exposure. Oxford: Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, here: p. 6. Available online at http://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/research-programmes/stranded-assets/satc-japan.pdf, checked on 7/11/2016.
29 Cf. Obayashi, Yuka (2016): Mitsui to trim thermal coal assets amid climate concerns: CEO. In Reuters, 5/11/2016. Available online at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mitsui-results- ceo-idUSKCN0Y20PW, checked on 7/11/2016.
30 Cf. Hill, Joshua S. (2016): China, US, & Japan Lead Solar PV, As EU Slows. In Clean Technica, 3/1/2016. Available online at http://cleantechnica.com/2016/03/01/china-us- japan-lead-solar-pv-eu-slows/, checked on 7/11/2016.
31 Hill, Joshua S. (2016): Japan Solar Installations To Peak In 2016 At 13.2–14.3 GW, BNEF Projects. In Clean Technica, 2/22/2016. Available online at http://cleantechnica.com/2016/02/22/japan-solar- installations-peak-2016-14-3-gw-bnef/, checked on 7/11/2016.
32 Cf. Climate Action Tracker (2015): South Korea, 7/2/2015. Available online at http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/southko rea.html, checked on 7/11/2016.
33 Choi, Hyeonjung; Lee, Soohyun (2015): Not Good Enough. South Korea’s 2030 Carbon Mitigation Target and the INDC. Seoul: The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 10/29/2015. Available online at http://en.asaninst.org/wp- content/themes/twentythirteen/action/dl.php?id= 34994, checked on 7/11/2016.
34 Cf. Climate Observer: South Korea. Venice: International Center for Climate Governance. Available online at http://climateobserver.org/country-profiles/south- korea-2/, checked on 7/11/2016.
35 Cf. Hsu, Angel: 2016 Environmental Performace Index. New Haven: Yale University, here: p. 12. Available online at http://epi.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2016EPI_Full _Report.pdf, checked on 7/11/2016.
36 Cf. Shuan, Sim (2015): Smog In Korea. Coal Power Plants, Not China, Are Major Culprits, Says Greenpeace. In International Business Times, 3/4/2015. Available online at http://www.ibtimes.com/smog-korea-coal-power- plants-not-china-are-major-culprits-says- greenpeace-1835638, checked on 7/11/2016.
37 Bae, Hyun-jung (2016): Korea runs pell-mell over fine dust measures. In The Korea Herald, 6/1/2016. Available online at http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160 601000998, checked on 7/11/2016.
38 Cf. Lee, Charles; Kannan, Deepak (2016): S Korea to shut aging coal-fired power plants, LNG to get a boost: minister. New York: S&P Global Platts, 6/8/2016. Available online at http://www.platts.com/latest-news/coal/seoul/s-korea-to-shut-aging-coal-fired-power-plants- 27603471, checked on 7/11/2016.
40 Cf. Hongo, Takashi (2016): South Korea’s emissions trading scheme bears watching. In Nikkei Asian Review, 6/9/2016. Available online at http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20160609-TAKE- TWO/Tech-Science/Takashi-Hongo-South-Korea-s- emissions-trading-scheme-bears-watching?page=1, checked on 7/11/2016.
41 Cf. Yonhap News Agency (2015): Government policy coordination organization to lead climate change policies. In The Korea Herald, 5/17/2015. Available online at http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160 517000631, checked on 7/11/2016.