Thailand’s Defective Democracy Under Elite Control – Analysis

By Paul Chambers

Thailand’s political landscape in 2024 continued to reflect a deeply compromised democratic system — characterised by human rights violations and persistent authoritarian tendencies. While the country maintained a superficial pluralism through elected institutions, real power remained concentrated between the royal palace and the Shinawatra political dynasty.

The Pheu Thai–led coalition government demonstrated some progressive impulses. It improved social equality by introducing legislation to legalise same-sex marriage and granting citizenship for 483,000 long-term migrants and children born in Thailand. It also attempted to increase government control over the military, though this initiative ultimately failed due to opposition from coalition partners.

But human rights violations have remained appalling in Thailand. According to Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, from 18 July 2020 to 31 August 2024 at least 1956 individuals were charged for participating in public assemblies or expressing political opinions across 1302 cases. Of these, 273 individuals in 306 cases have been charged with lese-majeste — insults to the monarchy punishable by up to 15 years in prison.

Several high-profile cases highlighted the severity of lese-majeste. Activist Netiporn Saneesankhom died in detention after a prolonged hunger strike. Lawyer Anon Nampa was sentenced to 16 years in prison, with additional charges pending. Move Forward Party MP Chonticha Jaengraew was sentenced to two years, though she remains on bail and is appealing. In a politically motivated move, ex-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was indicted on lese-majeste charges, with his trial set to begin in July 2025 — relating to comments made in 2015.

Thai security officials were reportedly responsible for the arbitrary arrest, detention, extortion and forced return of Myanmar refugees — including 650 individuals deported in a single day on 24 April 2024. Reports also emerged of three Thai soldiers allegedly torturing and killing a Burmese national along the border. Another Burmese was quickly arrested and imprisoned for the crime though evidence clearly pointed to Thai security forces, a troubling example of institutional impunity.

The continuing counterinsurgency in Thailand’s Deep South has involved multiple human rights violations by the Thai security forces. In October 2024, Thailand’s judiciary dismissed charges against security officials implicated in the deaths of 78 Muslim protestors during the notorious 25 October 2004 Tak Bai incident, citing the expiration of the 20-year statute of limitations and failure to arrest suspects.

Democratic institutions also faced significant erosion. A quasi-election for Senators — where only candidates could vote — resulted in a chamber dominated by a Pheu Thai rival, the Bhumjai Thai party. Bhumjai Thai’s victory derived from a masterful use of clientelism and election irregularities. This process effectively guaranteed that the Senate would vote against any progressive legislation from the Lower House.

On 7 August 2024, the arch-royalist Constitutional Court disbanded the progressive Move Forward party (MFP), which had won the 2023 election, finding it guilty of treason for advocating reform of lese-majeste. The ruling banned the party’s leadership from politics for ten years. The National Anti-Corruption Commission also ordered an investigation into 44 ex-MFP MPs who had signed an agreement to amend the lese majeste law, potentially leading to a lifelong ban from politics.

Political volatility peaked in mid-August 2024. On 9 August, ex-Move Forward MPs regrouped under the new People’s Party. But this party was smaller and its leadership was not as charismatic. The People’s Party began losing by-elections in two-party MP contests and provincial-level elections against Pheu Thai.

Suddenly, on 14 August, the Constitutional Court dismissed prime minister Srettha Thavisin for malfeasance. He was replaced two days later by Paetongtarn Shinawatra — Thaksin’s daughter and the fourth member of the Shinawatra family to serve as prime minister. This move possibly signalled the palace and wider elites’ dissatisfaction regarding Thaksin’s political ambitions. Royals may later force Paetongtarn to step down if they think Thaksin is overreaching into politics through his daughter.

The annual 1 October military reshuffle produced a new line-up favoured by the palace. Incoming army commander Pana Klaewblaudtuk secured his role until 2027 — positioning him to potentially lead a future putsch, though this is unlikely in early 2025.

Attempts to amend the constitution failed in November. The People’s Party and Pheu Thai party could not replace the 2017 junta-created constitution with a more progressive charter that would, among other things, allow an elected Senate,with Senate opposition blocking efforts to simplify the amendment process.

Diplomatic tensions emerged in December when the Royal Thai Navy broke with the government over a maritime border dispute with Cambodia, declaring that it would adhere to royal commands rather than prime ministerial orders.

Throughout 2024, Thailand remained a defective democracy dominated by two levels of elites — the palace-controlled security apparatus and the Shinawatra political dynasty. This asymmetrical relationship between the palace and Thaksin seems based upon mutual interests — but also Thaksin not overstepping what royals perceive should be his limits.

The Shinawatras may face political trouble in 2025. Any Thai–Cambodian resolution to the boundary dispute might set off nationalist opposition to Paetongtarn’s government. Thaksin could also easily be forced from Thailand if he angers the palace and is found guilty of lese-majeste. Similarly, the arch-royalist Constitutional Court could rapidly find Paetongtarn guilty of malfeasance. If so, Bhumjai Thai party leader Anutin Charnvirakul could easily become the next prime minister. Though less likely, a military coup against Paetongtarn is also always possible.

Thailand in 2024 was first under the control of the palace, and under lesser domination by Thaksin. This political status looks set to persevere for the immediate future.

• About the author: Paul Chambers is Lecturer at the Centre of ASEAN Community Studies, Naresuan University, Thailand, and has published extensively on military affairs in Southeast Asia.
• Source: This article is published at East Asia Forum and is part of an EAF special feature series on 2024 in review and the year ahead.