Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico At Center Of Political Storm – Analysis

By Robert Beck

(FPRI) — The assassination attempt in May 2024 in the village of Handlova that gravely injured Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico offered the irascible Central European politician a clear fork in the road. He could use the near tragedy to exhibit political maturity to unite his fractured country, or he could take the nation on a path of confrontation by demonizing the Slovak opposition, openly courting Moscow, and spreading dangerous conspiracy theories. The vast demonstrations across Slovakia in early 2025 clearly demonstrate that Fico chose the second of the two forks.

The recent political unrest comes from Fico’s late December 2024 meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow and a cascading series of disputes with Slovakia’s opposition, EU leaders in Brussels, and Slovakia’s erstwhile closest ally, the Czech Republic. How, then, did Fico, in the aftermath of the attempt on his life, drag his country to the precipice of a political and constitutional crisis?

Visit to Moscow

Although the Slovak leader has consistently tangled with the country’s primary opposition party, Progressive Slovakia (Slovak: Progresívne Slovensko), since his return to power in October 2023, the current political conflagration can be sourced directly to Fico’s unannounced visit to Moscow on December 23, 2024. While in the Russian capital, Fico met with Putin, discussing the soon-to-be-threatened supply of Russian energy as well as the military situation in Ukraine. Fico was primarily focused on ensuring a continuation of the supply of Russian natural gas, given Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s intention to not renew a contract with Gazprom to ship Russian natural gas to Central Europe via Ukraine at the end of 2024. Before the trip, Fico had pressed his case for continued access to Russian energy with his EU counterparts in Brussels, but to no avail.

Although Fico was the third EU leader—after Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer in April 2022 and, more recently, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban in July 2024—to travel to Moscow for talks with Putin since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, his journey unquestionably created the most significant political fallout. Upon returning to Slovakia, Fico encountered a growing backlash from his coalition government, the main opposition party, and a significant portion of the urban populace. His pugilistic response to the expanding wave of criticism deepened his political isolation.

Political Fallout at Home

The trip immediately dented the cohesion of the Slovak government as Fico’s leading coalition partner, Voice (Slovak: Hlas), issued a statement in which the party stressed that “Slovakia is firmly anchored in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” The statement further requested that the prime minister discuss the results of the Moscow visit at the next meeting of the coalition partners. For Fico and his Direction (Slovak: Smer) party, Voice is his key coalition partner, controlling nearly half of the government’s ministerial portfolios.

The country’s president, Petr Pellegrini, stated in reaction to the visit that “It is the indisputable responsibility of the prime minister to defend Slovakia’s national interests,” including the supply of energy. At the same time, Pellegrini expressed concern over the robust international dimensions of the trip, given Slovakia’s membership in the European Union and NATO.

However, it is critical to note, that other key figures in the Slovak leadership were more supportive of the premier’s tete-a-tete with Putin. The third and most junior coalition partner, the Slovak National Party (Slovak: Slovenská národná strana/SNS), offered unconditional backing to Fico’s somewhat unconventional foreign adventure. Andrej Danko, the party’s chairman, vigorously defended the prime minister, voicing the opinionthat visiting Moscow was the correct policy given the critical importance of Russian natural gas and nuclear fuel to Slovakia.

As for the country’s opposition parties, Fico’s pandering in Moscow for cheap energy drew immediate and widespread condemnation. In early January 2025, Michal Šimečka, the leader of Progressive Slovakia, blasted the prime minister for cowing to Putin on the gas issue instead of solving the country’s growing domestic challenges in healthcare and budget deficits. Additionally, the opposition initiated a motion for a no-confidence vote in parliament on the Fico regime, deciding in late January 2025 to drop the effort due to insufficient support.

Furthermore, one of Progressive Slovakia’s leading figures, Ivan Korčok, countered Fico’s criticism of Ukraine and EU leaders over the natural gas row, positing on December 30, 2024, that the prime minister “doesn’t consider it necessary to mention that the culprit (in the gas crisis) is not in Brussels or Kyiv but the Kremlin.”

In response to the swirling political tempest caused by the Moscow visit, Fico went on the offensive against Kyiv. In early January 2025, he threatened to cut off emergency electricity supplies to Ukraine as well as reduce support to Ukrainian refugees currently residing in Slovakia. He further announced that Slovakia would potentially halt all humanitarian aid to Kyiv and would consider using its veto power on EU policies in favor of Ukraine. These putative pro-Russia policies did not sit well with much of the Slovak public.       

Demonstrations and the Ghosts of 2018

No sooner had Fico returned from a meeting with Putin than anti-government demonstrations erupted. The public outcry, while somewhat muted during the extended holiday period, resumed in force in late January with tens of thousands of Slovaks peacefully taking to the streets on the evening of January 24 in the capital, Bratislava, as well as in nearly twenty additional municipalities. Similar protests were held across the country two weeks later, on February 7.

The common theme of the vocal, yet non-violent, expostulations against the Fico government was opposition to the perceived tilt of Slovak policy to the East, away from the European Union and NATO. Across the small Central European state, calls to support Slovakia’s strong European ties rang out. In Martin, home to a Volkswagen automotive plant, nearly 10,000 citizens braved the early February cold to proclaim, “We are Europe; we aren’t going to hell with you!”

For Fico, the wave of demonstrations likely engendered a troubling sense of deja vu. Seven years prior, in the winter of 2018, a similar series of protests against a Fico-led government ended with the collapse of the cabinet and his resignation. The 2018 civil unrest focused on government corruption and public anger over the brutal murders of journalist Ján Kuciak and his partner. While the nexus of the citizenry’s current wrath is Fico’s foreign policy, the ill-tempered Slovak leader has, this time, chosen the fight option, in the process dragging the country into the toxic stew of anti-Western conspiracy theories.

Fico Lashes Out

In response to the widespread public dissent of his pro-Kremlin leanings, the Slovak prime minister went on the offensive, claiming on January 23, 2025, that the country’s leading intelligence service, the Slovak Information Service, had uncovered a plan for the violent overthrow of the government. Fico, parroting a conspiracy theory straight out of “Autocracy for Dummies,” asserted that various groups, including the Slovak opposition, Ukraine, a mysterious rebel from Georgia, the West, non-governmental organizations, and, of course, George Soros, were behind the devious plan to depose him.

In a revelatory statement, the Slovak leader argued that the coup plotters were preparing a Slovak “Maidan”to wrest power from the democratically-elected government. The irony of the use of the term Maidan was not lost on the opposition, which views Fico as the Slovak puppet of Russian President Putin. By equating himself with the target of the original Maidan demonstrations in Kyiv in 2014—former pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich—Fico revealed his true colors for all to see.

Nonetheless, the prime minister’s most loyal supporters in the Slovak government stood by him in the wake of the coup conspiracy drama. While Pellegrini claimed there was substance to Fico’s warnings, he refused to use the word coup, nor did he view the need for any declaration of a state of emergency. Pellegrini’s prevarication regarding the coup plot was roundly criticized by opposition leader Šimečka, who labeled Pellegrini’s support to Fico a disgrace. 

When in Doubt, Blame the Czechs

Undeterred by the ruckus caused by his coup imputations, the Slovak premier doubled down at the end of January 2025, leveling accusations that the country’s previously close ally, the Czech Republic, was interfering in the internal affairs of Slovakia. Specifically, at a meeting with Czech diplomats on January 31, Fico criticized Prague for meddling in Slovakia’s business, stating, “It is not correct for any opinions, views, or recommendations about our internal political situation to come from the other side of the Morava (river).” In the same speech, Fico caviled at the perceived bias of the Czech press against Slovakia’s political leadership.

For their part, the Czech Republic had none of the Slovak leader’s bombastic rhetoric. Prime Minister Petr Fiala immediately characterized Fico’s allegations as “absurd,” while Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský also rejected the spurious assertions, pointing out that the Czech Republic is a democratic society in which freedom of speech is valued.

The most significant show of support for Fico from the Czech side of the border came from Miloš Zeman, a widely reviled ex-president. In an informal meeting in Prague on February 1 with Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár, Zeman farcically waxed about improving Czecho-Slovak relations, offering his full support to Fico in the process. The fact that Blanár sought support from undoubtedly the most Russophilic former Czech political figure speaks volumes of the shrinking pool of friends Slovak leadership enjoys in the region.

The Coalition Holds, for Now

Adding to Fico’s current litany of headaches, his already slim majority in parliament is being tested by rebellious delegates from Smer’s coalition partners, Hlas and SNS. In late January 2025, several of the rogue parliamentarians were expelled by their respective parties for making imprudent demands on the coalition. At that time, Fico had lost his previous parliamentary majority of seventy-one out of 150 seats.

Nevertheless, displaying his penchant for more lives than the proverbial cat, Fico cut a deal in mid-February to shore up his coalition, at least for the time being. In the agreement, the prime minister’s party will take over responsibility for two additional ministries, one each ceded by Hlas and SNS. According to Fico, the political accord will contribute to a reconciliation with the renegade representatives, ensuring a solid majority for the coalition.

 Given the fragile nature of the current governing coalition, Slovak politicians of all stripes are openly discussing the possibility of early elections. Fico has admitted that snap elections might be the logical solution to the country’s current political crisis. Dates in June and July of 2025 have been projected for the country to return to the polls, should the Fico regime crumble. According to the latest Infostat polling in late January 2025, the prime minister’s Smer party would finish second to Progressive Slovakia.      

Shifting Geopolitics

The result of the political turmoil spawned by the visit to Moscow is that Fico—as of this writing, February 28, 2025—has survived, at least temporarily. In the process, however, he has further isolated his country within the European Union, deepened the societal fragmentation in Slovakia, and supercharged the growing foreign policy chasm between Bratislava and its quondam allies in Prague. In a recent podcast, Erik Tabery, the editor of the well-respected Czech weekly magazine Respekt, opined that the European Union and the Czech Republic should consider the Slovak government hostile. The Slovak leader is thus playing a dangerous game that could lead to early elections, which he may lose or, worse, to domestic political violence.

The one silver lining for Fico in this otherwise tempestuous state of affairs is the dramatically changing strategic situation across Europe caused by the return of US President Donald Trump to power. Should America and Russia agree on a peace deal to stop the fighting in Ukraine, Fico’s December 2024 outreach to Moscow might be viewed differently. Blanár, in a statement on February 24, 2025, aligned Bratislava with Washington, praising the “active approach” of the United States in seeking a solution to the crisis.

Consequently, it is not out of the question that Fico—should he survive politically in the coming months—will morph from being the putative black sheep of the European Union to a valued partner of the two geopolitical heavyweights on the European continent: the United States and Russia. The consequences of that scenario would be a fascinating subject for a future essay.

• About the author: Robert “Bob” Beck is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He served overseas for nearly 30 years as a member of the US foreign policy community, in embassies in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. He has a BA in Soviet and Eastern European Studies from the University of Maryland and an MA in International Relations from Boston University. 
• Source: This article was published by FPRI