A New Arms Race In Europe: Euromissiles 2.0 – Analysis
By Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
By Aaron Stein
(FPRI) — Last week, Russia simulated a nuclear strike in Europe with a purpose-built missile designed to carry multiple nuclear or conventional warheads. The missile, which Russia has dubbed ‘Oreshnik’, is the latest Russian missile designed to strike targets in Europe. The missile is a purported variant of the RS-26, which was built using the first stage booster from the RS-24, a road-mobile missile designed to strike targets in the United States.
The RS-26 was never deployed when first tested in 2011. However, the missile’s use in combat is clearly now intended to signal to Europe that Russia has a credible delivery system for intermediate-range nuclear strikes. This is part of an effort to make Russia’s nuclear threats more credible and forebodes continued tensions in Europe. The backdrop to these developments is the collapse of Russo-Western relations. This downturn stems from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has destabilized Europe and forced European countries to prepare once again for the prospect of regional conflict.
These tensions have had a clear impact on missile proliferation in the region. The roots of missile proliferation date back to the turn of the 21st century, the gradual demise of the arms control agreements, and the upending of European security following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The use of the Oreshnik/RS-26 is, I believe, intended to influence decision-making in European capitals about the future of European-Russian relations. This is a classic Russian strategy and broadly reminiscent of Moscow’s thinking about the deployment and development of the SS-20 missile. I believe that this approach to intra-European relations will fail and, along with the United States, Europe is destined for the vast expansion of conventionally armed, medium-range missiles, designed to strike with extreme accuracy.
This development forebodes continued instability in Europe, a future where arms control will be far more difficult than ever before to use to lessen tensions and suggests that the arms build-up that is now taking place will continue well into the future.
A SS-20 Clone: Renewed Capabilities and Faulty Assumptions
The RS-26 has its roots in the Cold War. It is the successor to the SS-20, the ballistic missile the Soviet Union developed to get around limits it agreed to in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The missile was tested using three stages, but then packed full of warheads, and then cut down to hold airbases in Europe at risk.
The development and deployment of the SS-20 presented Washington and the NATO alliance with a strategic and political problem: the missile could carry multiple nuclear warheads and fire at Europe from well within the territorial boundaries of the Soviet Union. This meant that Soviet Union no longer had to deploy missiles in the Warsaw Pact countries, where they were far closer to NATO forces, and therefore more vulnerable to attack. The United States and NATO had no corresponding system, which led to the second major issue: the Soviet Union could strike NATO territory with nuclear weapons with a purpose-built delivery system, while simultaneously threatening to hit U.S. targets with longer range missiles. This created a dilemma for NATO: Russia could strike targets in Europe without using weapons slated for striking the United States. This meant that in the event of a limited nuclear war in Europe a U.S. leader would be forced to risk a Soviet nuclear counter-strike to respond to an attack in an allied third country. The goal was to undermine confidence in U.S. security guarantees to undercut NATO – and it was done with one country in mind: West Germany.
Russia’s goal was to make the defense of Germany untenable, thereby incentivizing West German leaders to be neutral by emphasizing their economic and security incentive to cooperate more closely with East Germany. This approach was broadly in synch with the intra-West German tensions about how to manage relations with their communist neighbors; whether to combat East German communists or cooperate with them.
In the end, the deployment of the SS-20 did not break NATO or force German neutrality. Instead, West Germany (and all of NATO) agreed to host two comparable systems: the Gryphon (a ground launched version of the ubiquitous Tomahawk cruise missile) and the Pershing-II (a very accurate, multiple nuclear warhead carrying ballistic missile). These U.S. made systems, along with the SS-20, were what the two sides agreed to give up when Premier Gorbachev and President Reagan signed the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 1987.
Euromissiles 2.0
The demise of the INF is multifaceted and largely Russia’s fault. However, the United States did undercut an absolutely critical component of all arms control with Russia. In 2002, the Bush administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which placed strict limits on the deployment of missile defense systems. The basic principle that underpinned this treaty was that neither side should seek to build its way out of vulnerability from strategic missile attack. The basic idea that neither side could “win” a nuclear war allowed for mutual arms reduction. This is also the most basic component of deterrence theory; deterrence works because the mutual threat of catastrophic destruction prevents the use of nuclear weapons, thereby creating a positive incentive to refrain from launching a first strike. A capable anti-missile system could, in theory, undercut the feeling of vulnerability, which would naturally then require building more missiles to overwhelm defenses to offset any defensive advantages. This build-up would then require more weapons, which would be impossible under various treaty constraints that the two sides had agreed to during the Cold War.
The demise of the ABM Treaty is one of many reasons for Russia’s decision to use legal language to circumvent the INF Treaty. The RS-26 was one such example. Moscow did what it did with the SS-20, it tested the RS-26 out to intercontinental range, removed a small third stage, and then packed the cut down missile with warheads. The excess weight decreased the missile’s range, thereby giving Russia an intermediate-range, nuclear capable delivery vehicle to strike targets in Europe. Moscow’s development of this system is often defined as a circumvention of the INF’s limits because it technically tested the missile to a range allowed under a different treaty agreement: New Start. The reasons for this require an entirely different piece, but needless to say, the development of the RS-26 was – and remains – a Russian effort to use known loopholes in two agreements – the INF and New Start – to build an intermediate-range missile capability. Russia also chose to violate the INF outright – and it was this violation that led the United States to withdraw from INF in 2019. This more concrete violation came when Russia developed of a land-based Kalibr cruise missile, known as the 9M729 “screwdriver”, which has a range in excess of the INF’s limits. The deadlock over this missile ultimately led President Trump to withdraw from the INF, which has since spurned U.S. developments of intermediate-range missiles for deployments in both Asia and Europe.
The first of these American-made systems is the Typhon. The Typhon missile launch system is designed to launch two-intermediate-range missiles: the SM-6 ballistic missile and the Tomahawk cruise missile. The Typhon has been deployed in the Philippines and was sent to Denmark for a training exercise. The system is conventionally armed and is slated for deployment on a rotational basis in Germany starting in 2026. The announcement of this deployment agreement in 2024 is one of the myriad of reasons cite by Putin for following through on the Oreshnik/RS-26’s development, deployment, and now use in combat in Ukraine.
The dynamics in Europe are very suggestive. The continent is at the start of a medium-range missile build up, led first by the Russian decisions about the INF, followed by the U.S. response to Russia’s missile development, and now by the tensions over Ukraine. These dynamics are very reminiscent of the late 1970s, following the Soviet development of the SS-20 and NATO’s decision to deploy U.S. systems in Germany. The difference this time around is twofold. First, the U.S. and European systems now under development are strictly conventionally armed. However, a second Trump administration may revisit warhead options for the Tomahawk missile, which could open the door for a nuclear armed cruise missile variant. The RS-26, in contrast, appears to have been designed for a nuclear role. However, the variant used to strike Ukraine was obviously carrying a conventional payload, which suggests that Russia may deploy a certain number of Oreshnik/RS-26 missiles with a conventional only payload.
Second, the situation in Europe has changed considerably since 1987. The United States and Russia no longer have a near monopoly on missile development and manufacturing. European and Asian missile makers now have the capabilities to build comparable systems to the missiles now spreading throughout Europe. The European missile maker, MBDA, for example, is developing a “deep strike” cruise and anti-ship missile that will replicate Tomahawk and 9M729 capabilities for probable deployment in Western Europe first, with the option to sell to Eastern European countries. South Korea makes a series of ballistic missiles and is working with Poland on long range artillery rockets, similar in design to the American ATACMS now being used by the Ukrainians. France and the United Kingdom make the very capable Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missile, which could very easily be modified for carrying on trucks.
The proliferation of these systems, this time around, means that the leverage of both the United States and Russia will be far more limited in constraining missile deployments in the near future. Put simply: it is no longer realistic to suspect that a bilateral agreement, where both sides demand concessions from each other, along with their allies, could be easily reached and enforced. Putin has, at times, dangled a moratorium on intermediate-range deployments following the INF’s demise. The United States and Russia may, at some point in the future, decide it is in their mutual interest to sit down again and discuss limits on certain missile deployments. However, as Europe now grapples with the continued prospect of war in Ukraine, along with a fierce U.S. effort for NATO countries to enhance their defenses, it’s almost certain that Europe will soon be awash in various intermediate-range missile systems. This makes the prospect of bilateral arms control moot and will exacerbate intra-European fissures about how best to deal with a revanchist Russia once the war in Ukraine ends or stalls out.
The future of Europe remains fraught. The trends suggest an environment with more missiles, made by more countries, and deployed very close to Russia’s border. This is a less-than-ideal outcome for Putin, one that will certainly incentivize him to return the favor and deploy countervailing systems. This is called an arms race. Europe is, once again, at the start of one.
- About the author: Aaron Stein is the President of the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI).
- Source: This article was published by FPRI
