Moldova’s Close Election Stands As Warning To Country’s Pro-European Majority – OpEd

By David Smith

(EurActiv) — After suspected Russian interference in Moldova’s presidential election and EU referendum, Chisinau is calling for external support to consolidate its European path, while politicians have turned towards shoring up domestic political weaknesses ahead of next year’s parliamentary elections. 

On 20 October, Moldovan voters narrowly approved a referendum amending the constitution to include the national goal of EU integration by a vote of 50.4%.

On 3 November, Moldova’s President Maia Sandu won re-election in a runoff with Socialist candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo by 55% to 44%, thanks to high turnout among diaspora voters. Sandu narrowly lost the vote within Romania itself. 

Moldova’s former Foreign Minister Nicu Popescu recently wrote an opinion piecein Euractiv arguing that although the recent elections were closely contested, Moldovan voters sent a clear pro-European signal when factors such as global anti-incumbency sentiment and Russian interference were considered. 

While pro-European politicians in Moldova seek to portray an electoral victory, and opposition Socialist Party leaders declare that they do not recognize the results of the elections, all factions are attempting to impose their own narrative on a pair of close elections. 

The one narrative that is clear is the unprecedented nature of suspected Russian interference. Police have alleged that at least 130,000 citizens (around 7% of voter turnout in the runoff) received bribes via Russian banking apps in order to influence their votes. 

Following the election, police have levelled millions of Moldovan Lei in fines against voters who took bribes and continue investigations into Ilan Shor’s networks of voter bribery in Moldova. 

The scale of these efforts shocked Moldova and overwhelmed the systems meant to ensure a fair election. Prosecutors have alleged that the Russian security services coordinated the interference efforts and that one of their goals was to overwhelm Moldova’s justice system. 

In the first round of the presidential elections, Sandu’s campaign spent around $558,000, and the PAS party spent an additional $200,000 promoting the EU referendum. In the same period, police were able to track the $39 million spent by Ilan Shor’s network. 

This money represents voter bribery schemes in Moldova and not the extensive spending by Russian-linked oligarchs on platforms such as Facebook and Googlein the same time period. Additionally, there is emerging evidence of increasing anti-Moldovan influence campaigns pushed by Kremlin actors in Brussels and Washington and online in English.  

The sheer scale of resources at play is completely out of proportion with anything the Moldovan state has previously contended with. 

At the recent European Political Community Summit in Budapest, Sandu made her call clear, saying that Moldova needs more “support to strengthen our institutions, to better protect democracy in the country.”

Domestically, this election was a wake-up call that exposed serious political and institutional weaknesses that were leveraged by Russian interference. 

Moldova’s efforts at reforming the justice system and fighting corruption have been slow, and voters blame the government for the lack of tangible results. This was exemplified in the election itself, where courts showed themselves unable or unwilling to conduct speedy trials in cases of illicit financing. 

Thus far, no high-level Shor party officials have seen their cases completed in court, and all are free and continuing their political work as the trials stall on technicalities. 

Last week, Sandu levelled direct criticism at the country’s Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office for a “complete failure in the fight against large-scale corruption, especially political corruption.” She has also convened the Supreme Security Council to make urgent recommendations for a new direction in justice reform. 

Any such new direction will need to progress quickly in order for changes to take effect before the 2025 parliamentary elections, which are expected in June. If tangible progress is made, it could help secure the vote and allow PAS to run on the tangible accomplishments that their voters demand. 

However, it is unlikely that all the underlying political issues that this election also exposed will be solved. 

While Moldovan political parties have always scrambled traditional right vs leftpolitical definitions, income and class divisions can be clearly seen in voter behaviour. 

Sandu and her PAS Party draw the majority of their support from the diaspora and more urban and middle-class voters. 

These voters understand the geopolitical questions around EU membership, the free movement of people and capital and the benefits that they have personally felt from closer EU ties. 

Pro-Russian parties gather most of their voters from villages and towns where incomes are low, and infrastructure lags behind the increasingly European cities. These voters do not frequently travel to Europe or to the capital and are less likely to vote on clearly geopolitical issues. 

Moldova does not currently have any pro-EU political parties on the left end of the ideological spectrum making a credible pitch to these voters. 

Looking ahead to the 2025 parliamentary elections, this is the area likely to be targeted by the so-called “pseudo-European” politicians and parties that resemble the politics of the Georgian Dream. 

These parties profess to support EU integration while stressing social wedge issues such as gay rights and language politics and calling for a “balanced” foreign policy between Russia and Europe. 

The results of the recent elections indicate fertile ground for these positions going into next year’s parliamentary elections. Combined with suspected Russian interference efforts, massive spending, and the continued weakness of Moldova’s justice system, Sandu and the PAS Party are likely to face serious challenges in the year ahead.

This article is part of the FREIHEIT media project on Europe’s Neighbourhood, funded by the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF).