The Rise Of The Indian Teflon: Narendra Modi – OpEd

The rise of Narendra Damodardas Modi as a political juggernaut in Indian political tapestry can be elucidated through a number of factors including, his Hindutva credentials and brand of politics, the superstructure of Sangh Parivar and impact multiplier Indian media, Pakistan’s policy of brinkmanship, the groundwork of Hindu nationalism that was laid during the 1980’s in opposition to positive secularism associated with Indian National Congress and the wave of populist strongman leadership the world over. The recurrent leitmotif in all these factors has to do with the transformation of Hinduism and interpretation of nationalism to suit the ambitions of the Hindu Right. 

Significance of the 1980’s in the formation of militant Hindu nationalism  

For starters, to dissect the phenomenon of Modi being viewed as a fulcrum of Hindutva ideology at the state level in India today, it is important to mention the political environment of the 1980’s which could be considered as raison d’être for the complete institutionalization of militarized Hindu nationalism that is seen under Modi. The ideological support in the shape of Hindutva ecosystem and pent-up antipathy amongst the Hindu masses were already pervasive for a strongman like Modi exploit in the run-up to the 2014 elections.

The 1980’s featured the construction of the Hindu public sphere along with the inception of the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Appeasement of the Indian Muslims and Pakistan by members of the Indian intelligentsia, notably manifested by a few exceptions in the English print media along with the concept of pseudo-secularism which hurts the majority (Hindus) are leitmotifs of the militant Hindu nationalist lexicon. Over the years it has percolated amongst the Hindu middle class/masses or as bastions of Hindutva call it, the majority. Ram Janmabhoomi Movement initiated by Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the emergence of BJP during the said period were in reaction to the intersection of factors such as the resurgence of fanatical Islam globally along with the fall of the Nehruvian vision which was considered to be fossilized and pandering to the minorities. (1)

BJP embodies rejection of positive secularism, and with the electoral debacle of 1984 elections where the party only secured two seats in Lok Sabha, Lal Krishna Advani took over the reins as President from the relatively moderate Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Advani brought about a rejuvenation of the hardline-Hindu narrative making it a cornerstone of the party ideology as espoused by BJP’s precursor Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) and its ideological parent organization and fountainhead of Hindu nationalism Rashtriya Swyamsevak Sangh (RSS). (2)

The logical move was to align with Ram Janmabhoomi Movement and Advani played to the galley by becoming the poster boy of the campaign. By doing so BJP and the broader Hindu Right reconfigured the idea of Indian nationalism as couched in Hindu character and in vitriolic opposition to especially Muslims who are an aberration in the Rashtra – the idea of Hindu under siege due to anti-Hindu enemies within and without was disseminated across the country. Events in the 1980’s such as the rise of movements of secession in Assam and Punjab, which grew so violent that it displaced Hindu families in Punjab. Bomb explosions in Rajasthan, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana fomented a feeling a deep insecurity amongst the Hindus which was aggravated by the Meenakshipuram conversions in 1981 where around 150 Dalit families converted to Islam. Moreover, Bangladeshi Muslims were seen as infiltrators in Assam to meddle with the Hindu demographic. These instances pushed the Hindu psychosis into overdrive, consternation of a dwindling Hindu majority, a setting ripe for purveying Hindutva ideology. (3)

The 1990’s brought Narendra Modi his first opportunity to rise through the ranks of BJP amidst political ferment caused by the Ram Janmabhoomi Movement. Modi was tasked with mobilization of Hindu fanatics from every nook and cranny of India to welcome Advani in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh. Modi coordinated leg of the campaign worked as a catalyst to facilitate the transition of BJP from the periphery of the Indian politics to an oppositional force to reckon with at the center. (4)

This political momentum eventually helped BJP to form the government in the 1999 elections under the coalition of right-wing parties known as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) with 270 seats in the Lok Sabha, albeit this victory came after short stints in the government resulting from the 1996 and 1998 elections. The milieu starting from the 1980’s and particularly the Ram Janmabhoomi Movement announced Modi’s presence as a prominent stalwart and bulwark of Hindu nationalism, contributing to his rise in the Indian political arena. (5)

The Indian media that as a forerunner to complement Modi’s politics 

Another factor is the media at large and particularly the rooted language media along with talking heads on Hindi/English news channels which served as impact multiplier and vehicle for the likes of Sangh Parivar since the 1980’s – BJP is the most potent, decision-making face of this organization. The same media now works as the house organ of Narendra Modi and the Hindu Right. The likes of Arvind Rajagopal have described how Ramanand Sagar’s Ramayan and its depiction of Ram Rajya in the present day Ayodhya shown on national television facilitated in the creation of split publics i.e., on one hand it is the beleaguered Hindu majority while on the other are the minorities especially the Muslims who are not congruent with the concept of punyabhumi or the sacred land of Hindus since Muslims in India subscribe to the idea of Pan-Islamism, have allegiance to the Ummah making them deracinated.  (6)

However, debates regarding whether the Ram, the avatar of the Hindu deity Vishnu was actually born at the location of the Babri Masjid was excluded from the mediated political discourse. Moreover, the armchair experts on the media have reduced the Kashmir dispute to a Hindu-Muslim territorial dispute, vitiating the right of self-determination of Kashmiris, and eviscerating their democratic struggle. Similarly, subsequent to the Pokhran II tests in 1998, the debates on the media were lopsided forming connections between Vedic science and modern day nuclearism and conflating nuclear science with nuclear weapons. India going nuclear was seen as a natural phenomenon supported by ancient scripture and reinvigoration of Hindu greatness.

Also, the Indian media largely whipped war hysteria during the Kargil war and the 2001 parliament attack, viewing Pakistan solely through the prism of rogue neighbor. The reason why these instances have been mentioned to understand Modi’s rise, is because his politics is anchored in these subjects, and the media systematically promotes overly-patriotic discourse by labelling dissenting voices as anti-national which makes them anti-Hindu and extending intellectual apology to the terrorists (Muslims). (7)

Amongst other factors, Indian media could very well be ascribed with the making of a majoritarian strongman with a no prisoners taken approach, a decisive figure who orders for a blitzkrieg in Balakot, carries out the anschluss of Indian administered Kashmir (abrogation article 370 and 35-A), goes ahead with the construction of Ram Mandir, the groundswell for such actions developed over the years. BJP’s media management through hefty inducements and media cronyism have paid dividends as well, the media largely acts as the spokesperson of the likes of the Sangh Parivar, over the last 40 years it has culturally and politically shifted the discourse in favor of revivalism of militant Hindu nationalism, which is projected as encapsulating the Hindu ethos. (8)

According to Association of Democratic Reforms (ADR) during 2014-15, the BJP spend 51.9% of its total budget on advertisements/ media management (INR 471.89 million out of 931.01 million), followed by INR 606.04 million on mediated propaganda in 2016-17. BJP has been spending the most on its media projection compared to other party expenditures and more than its rival the Indian National Congress. (9)

Today primetime slots are teeming with hawkish news anchors such as Arnab Goswami, Rahul Shivshankar, Navika Kumar, Amish Devgan screaming at the top of their lungs, baying for revenge against the “anti-nationals”. The media created an ecosystem for a controversial figure like Modi to not only receive widespread currency, but also being marketed as the inevitable and much needed “panacea”. He continues to enjoy the blatant backslapping virtually turning into a teflon politician. The Indian media stuck to jingoism during the Kargil war, forming public opinion in favor of Vajpayee’s deployment of 800,000 troops on the border, and not taking the alleged mutilation of 6 Indian soldiers with a grain of salt, rather wrongly attributing the news to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Questions like whether the Kargil adventurism was Pakistan’s riposte to Siachen were not systematically excluded. (10)

In the same manner the Balakot airstrike of 2019 was an exercise in smoke and mirrors, the Indian media beat the war drums to the de rigueur anti-Pakistan rhetoric and lauded the Modi government for its aggressive posture and nuclear saber rattling compared to the weak-kneed Congress – the media largely ignored uncomfortable questions regarding what actually happened compared to the official version being fed to the people. The Indian media is in unison with the likes of RSS in heaping scorn on the Indian secularists of not condemning the minorities (appeasement) in instances such as the 2002 Godhra massacre/Sabarmati express burning, which claimed the lives of Hindu pilgrims and kar sevaks – Rafiq Hussain Bhatuk was indicted as the mastermind. The same line of argument is used by the media in Modi’s India today. (11)

Modi’s brand of politics and Indian political terrain 

From finding inspiration in the 1950’s movement for a separate Gujarati state curved out of the Bombay state in Vadnagar as child to becoming an apparatchik in RSS, Modi’s conception of nationalism was cast within the framework of anti-Congress sentiment and staunch conviction in Hinduism as the only bona fide culture of the Rashtra and way of life for all Indian denizens irrespective of creed, ergo in Hindustan, everyone is supposed to be a Hindu. (12)

In today’s India, anti-minority campaigns such as Sangh Parivar’s Ghar Wapsi have state protection.  He cut his teeth with Ram Janmabhoomi movement and wasn’t mealy mouthed towards next-door neighbor during the Kargil war, rather he seized the opportunity to showcase strongman image not sparing the enemy within (seculars and Indian Muslims) and without (Pakistan). Modi was now the so-called protector and champion of the fanatical Hindu ideology, and this earned him a huge political milestone in the shape of becoming the Chief Minister of Gujarat in 2002. His tenure was besmirched with the infamous Gujarat riots, during which he masterfully exploited the bottled-up anti-Muslim rhetoric and was accused of giving a carte blanche to Hindu rioters. (13) The fact that Modi is undoubtedly a polarizing, “uncompromising” figure and makes no effort to gloss it over has also contributed to his rise. 

However, national ambitions meant that Modi had to leap beyond the image of a Hindutva ideologue for wider electoral currency i.e., an astute economic reformer with a tested development model. As CM he managed to woo investment, providing one-window facility, successfully building a Potemkin village in Gujarat through massive infrastructure schemes that veneered the acute poverty experienced in the countryside. Gujarat model was touted as a blueprint for the whole of India during the 2014 election campaign.

During the last two elections, Narendra Modi twined development with Hindu militant nationalism by creating two extreme polarities, on one hand it is Modi who is the “chowkidar” and epitome of Hindu nationalism (the only true kind of nationalism) and on the other flank are the anti-nationals soaked in corruption (Congress), known for pandering to the Muslims. Modi’s inflated reputation of a man with a difference in Gujarat helped with his rise nationally, on the other hand BJP also got a facelift. In addition, Modi is an effective communicator just like former US President Ronald Reagan, a forked tongue one, he has been able to maintain his image of an ascetic leader despite the discovery of forsaken his wife, Jashodaben Chimanlal, with whom he tied the knot during his teenage – celibacy is a sine qua non to become a pracharak in RSS – he is indeed a teflon politician.(14)

Modi-Amit Shah electoral strategies have not only made BJP the biggest political entity in India, getting the better of the beleaguered Congress which is going through an existential crisis, but continue to sustain the “Modi-factor” or as some may call it, the “Modi myth”. In preparation for the 2014 elections, BJP managed to court a number key political dissenters from rival parties including, Chaudhary Birendra Singh and former Congress leaders Purandeswari, erstwhile CM of Uttar Pradesh Jagdamibka Pal and Satpal Maharaj. Prior to the State elections in Assam, Himanta Biswa Sarma, who was part of Tarun Gogoi’s cabinet, was brought into the party – similar strategy paid dividends in other states likes Uttarakhand. Furthermore, the BJP under Modi forged alliances with castes and sub-castes that were not part of the political circle until now, in Uttar Pradesh, BJP managed to woo non-Jatav Dalits and non-Yadav castes. In Tripura, Modi brought the tribals on board – the Indigenous Peoples Front of Tripura (IPFT) have been clamoring for a separate state – and that helped secure a huge electoral victory in 2018.  (15)

In the last elections, Modi was able get the better of mahagatbandhan, the regional alliance between Bahujan Samaj Party and Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh chiefly because the social arithmetic of scheduled caste who have historically voted for regional parties, swung in Modi’s favor. This illustrates how voting patterns amongst Dalits and other lower castes is susceptible to change probably due to failure of regional parties to make good on their promises, in Modi they see a renewed hope. This also bears an eloquent testimony to the fact that under Modi, BJP studied the micro-details of the Indian lower caste tapestry, contributing to his rise. Modi purportedly linked his politics with development projects for the poor such construction of toilets and homes, extending gas to the bottom feeders, whether poverty alleviation truly materializes is a subject to debate in the politics of India. (16)

Moreover, Modi’s rise can also be attributed to marketing BJP as a party of the masses rather than of the cadre and mid-level apparatchiks, a nation-wide membership campaign where a missed call from average Indians on designated number was responded to for registration, by 2015 BJP had amassed over 100 million members countrywide. (17) Modi is a political showman, he appears to dislike talking to the press, rather engages directly with Indians on Twitter – Narendra Modi has around 70 million Twitter followers – and hosts a radio show by the name of “Mann ki Baat” on All India radio. (18) In doing so, he comes across as a true representative of the people, “accountable” to them, by eschewing publicity via interviews in news channels, he manages to create an ascetic facade, embodying the common India, is accessible and just about gets the right publicity to win over the masses (reverse psychology).

Along with this it is important to mention how Modi’s foreign policy or the “Modi doctrine” can be linked with his rise. This entails the “India first” mantra, transitioning from becoming a “rule taker” to “rule maker” and mobilizing the diaspora under the pan-India concept, to invest in “Bharat Mata” (emphasis on nationalism). International Yoga Day which was adopted by the United Nations and “Made in India” are examples of soft-power, the recurrent theme is of Modi-defined greatness of India. (19)

Along with this the superstructure of RSS in the form of the Sangh Parivar and RSS offshoots inn far-flung villages such as Sewa Baharti, Sewashram, Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram and Ekal Vidalays have helped to build and maintain Hindu support base for Modi’s policies such as the controversial demonization which was touted as a policy step directly benefitting the poor. Modi has also replaced leaders who featured in the party during the Vajpayee era who didn’t have an RSS background such as Varun Gandhi, Yashwant Sinha, Sunil Shastri and Arun Shourie – some of them were signaled to leave BJP brass – with hardline Hindu nationalists who have rapport with RSS or roots in the said Hindu nationalist fountainhead, namely Devendra Fadnavis (Maharashtra) Biplab Dasgupta (Tripura), Raghubar Das (Jharkhand), Manohar Lal Khattar (Haryana). (20)

This Hindu hardline facelift wasn’t merely emblematic for BJP, but it meant the notion of militarized Hindu national security state has been completely internalized at the party and government level. The Modi government has conclusively and conspicuously become one with Hindutva ideologies in its truest form, striking a chord with the ideological support base (middle class/ masses) as the one true bastion of Hindu interests. 

Talking about teflon, notwithstanding the myopically designed demonetization policy, record high unemployment, cumbersome uniform sales tax, the teflon leader was still able to secure a second term, as he was not only able to absolve himself of poor policy decisions, but was also able to convince the Indian electorate of giving him another 5 years to correct ills of 6 decades and mismanagement by the party of yore, Congress. The image of Congress as a dynastic political outfit dominated by the Gandhis and resultant relegation to the second largest party in India has also contributed towards Modi’s rise. Modi appears to be unchallenged, unparalleled in the political realm, his divisive persona was able to sway many voters who would have voted for a party other than BJP if the Modi wasn’t the candidate for Premier in 2019, this conjecture is supported by a survey conducted by Delhi based Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), which revealed how 33% of the BJP electorate would have voted for another party in the 2019 elections if Modi wasn’t running for second term. (21)

Many in India opine that Modi is still India’s messiah, and as Milan Vaishnav of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace describes, Modi is believed to be peerless in his ability to fix all maladies that bedevil the masses. If one makes a comparison of electoral exploits between Modi-led BJP and Rahul Gandhi-led Congress, the former has been able to form governments beyond BJP’s strongholds such as Hindi-speaking North, Maharashtra and Gujrat, to ruling Assamese and Bengali speaking states in the Northeast. While, the latter has become non-existent in states like Telangana, Bihar, Bengal, Andra Pradesh and Bellwether Uttar Pradesh. In the West, Congress continues to be drubbed in Gujarat since the 1990’s and Maharashtra since 2014.

Political salvation is not in sight in the near future for Congress, which needs to undergo introspection, or as the Indian psephologist and apparatchik of Swaraj India, Yogendra Yadav says that Congress must die. Whether Congress has outlived its utility is debatable, however the party is fraught with political dynasties, third generation politicians in many parts of India, which makes it less popular with especially the young electorate. (22) Modi has made the most of Congress’s existential crisis along with collapse of the Nehruvian vision (positive secularism) to politically skyrocket to forming consecutive governments in New Delhi. Modi is considered to be striking down the political shibboleths associated with the likes of Congress. 

Narendra Modi’s rise in Indian politics needs to be analyzed in the context of masculinization of politics and also gendered political terms as well. Nuclear militarism, abrogation of articles 370 and 35-A under the philosophy of Kashmir being “atoot anug” or Lebensraum and the construction of Ram mandir on the site of demolished Babri masjid, are enshrined in BJP’s ideology, under Vajpayee India tested Pokhran II and went nuclear, but the other two objectives were fulfilled by Modi. Use of crude terms of machismo has been pretty common amongst right wing Hindu parties in India, following the nuclear tests, Bal Thackeray, the leader of Shiv Sena described it as a testament that Indians aren’t “eunuchs”. If you look RSS’s interpretation, rather repackaging of Ram as a warrior, also manifested in Ramayan, underpins the idea of martial theme in RSS’s interpretation of Hinduism – Ram displaying masculinity isn’t supported Ramcharitramanas, Tolerance and passive resistance preached by Gandhi is defeatist and a sign of meekness, ergo, every Hindu is militant, every deity possesses military prowess.  (23)

This sick obsession with manhood of the state was further “restored” by Modi’s style of politics. Modi like Ronald Reagan is a greater communicator, and with an ideological base synonymous with the masses which reeks of misogyny as well, boasting his 56-inch chest as a personification of masculinity, strength and virility which his predecessor Manmohan Singh or leaders in the past were bereft of, to teach the likes of China and Pakistan a lesson, is a form of muscular nationalism which has wide appeal in India. Similarly, according to Catarina Kinnvall, Modi exploited the insecurity of Hindus towards Muslims within India and across the border along gendered lines, Muslim women are deemed even more dangerous than Muslim terrorists, described as demographic bombs while, Muslim men have been loathed as libidinous preying on young impressionable Hindu women which is the rationale given by the Hindu Right for the “Love Jihad” campaign. Masculine and gendered terminologies have proven impactful for the rise of Modi as he communicates the idea that only in a strong Hindu Rashtra characterizing manhood and machismo will the Hindu majority be safe from Muslim conspiracies to change the demographic. (24)

International emergence of populist/ strongman leaders and the indirect role of Pakistan 

Political scientists also study Modi’s rise in terms of the popularity of strongmen, demagogues globally, this trend isn’t just peculiar to India. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Hungarian Premier Viktor Orbán, President of the Philippines Rodrigo Duterte, Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) in Saudi Arabia, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and until recently former US President Donald Trump rule more or less similar to Narendra Modi, some with an iron fist in a velvet glove. (25)

Populist leaders usually go after vulnerable segments of the social fabric such the immigrants in Europe, in India’s case RSS pet theory of higher rates of fertility amongst Muslim women, which is being weaponized to change the demographics is amongst other Islamophobic explanations to clamp down on the Muslim population in Modi’s India. The man has a history of antipathy towards Indian Muslims, subsequent to the Gujarat riots in 2002, as CM he ordered to shut down camps for Muslims displaced by the riots as he deemed these camps “baby generation factories”.  (26)

Compared to India under Congress, which some argue followed “soft Hindutva” when it ruled India, in Modi’s India there is a preponderance of vigilantism against slaughter of cows and what Sangh Parivar’s “Love Jihad” campaign. In 2019 Modi government introduced the National Register of Citizens (NRC) for the identification of illegal immigrants, which hangs the Muslim populace out dry since they confront the double whammy of losing citizenship and disenfranchisement. In addition, Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA) underpinned by religious discrimination, was passed which fast-tracks asylum and citizenship of solely non-Muslim immigrants from neighboring Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, in other words otherizing Muslims. (27) These steps came in the backdrop of the Rohingya displacement.  

Lastly, the type of brinkmanship the Pakistani state has displayed could also be linked with the creation of space for a strongman, Hindu hyper nationalist like Modi. Ahmed Rashid recounts in his book Descent into Chaos, how by the mid-1990’s, ISI sponsored camps to train Kashmiri jihadis were set up in Afghanistan which was under Taliban rule back. (28) Fast-forward to the 2001 parliament attack, which was described as an onslaught on India’s democracy and more recently the 2008 Mumbai attacks which broke the straw have fueled the psychosis of the militarized Hindu national security state. In the context of the Mumbai attacks, the Hindu Right exploited the situation describing Manmohan Singh and Congress’s response as “effeminate”, “anodyne” and weak-kneed, identifying Pakistan as adversary that is hell-bent to bleed India by a thousand cuts. Following the 2019 Pulwama attack on Indian security forces in Indian administered Kashmir, the Indian Airforce conducted aerial strikes inside Pakistan, on what was described as a terrorist camp. Now, one might conjecture that it has little to do with poverty amelioration or job creation for middle class, but Modi was able to market himself as first of his kind, decisive leader who successfully defended Bharat Mata and garnered respect in the neighborhood and globally, this sentiment was vociferously channeled by the pro-Modi media and shared by the masses. Pakistan’s failure to stop its soil from being used by rogue non-state actors such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba against India, with or without the help of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISIS) could also be indirectly linked with the rise of Modi who has vowed not to brook terrorism emanating from Pakistan. 

Endnotes:

1.  Rita Manchanda, “Militarised Hindu Nationalism and the Mass Media: Shaping a Hindutva Public Discourse,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38, no. 3, (2002): 301-303. https://doi.org/10.1080/00856400208723504
2.  Satish Misra, “Understanding the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party,” Observer Research Foundation (ORF), September 21, 2018,  https://www.orfonline.org/research/44401-understanding-the-rise-of-the-bharatiya-janata-party/
3.  Rita Manchanda, “Militarised Hindu Nationalism and the Mass Media: Shaping a Hindutva Public Discourse,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38, no. 3, (2002): 305. https://doi.org/10.1080/00856400208723504
4.  Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, “Narendra Modi: The making of a majoritarian leader,” Al Jazeera, April 28, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/4/28/narendra-modi-the-making-of-a-majoritarian-leader
5.  Satish Misra, “Understanding the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party,” Observer Research Foundation (ORF), September 21, 2018,  https://www.orfonline.org/research/44401-understanding-the-rise-of-the-bharatiya-janata-party/
6.  Rita Manchanda, “Militarised Hindu Nationalism and the Mass Media: Shaping a Hindutva Public Discourse,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38, no. 3, (2002): 307-319. https://doi.org/10.1080/00856400208723504
7.  Rita Manchanda, “Militarised Hindu Nationalism and the Mass Media: Shaping a Hindutva Public Discourse,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38, no. 3, (2002): 307-319.  https://doi.org/10.1080/00856400208723504
8.  Rita Manchanda, “Militarised Hindu Nationalism and the Mass Media: Shaping a Hindutva Public Discourse,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38, no. 3, (2002): 307.  https://doi.org/10.1080/00856400208723504
9.  Satish Misra, “Understanding the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party,” Observer Research Foundation (ORF), September 21, 2018,  https://www.orfonline.org/research/44401-understanding-the-rise-of-the-bharatiya-janata-party/
10.  Rita Manchanda, “Militarised Hindu Nationalism and the Mass Media: Shaping a Hindutva Public Discourse,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38, no. 3, (2002): 314-319, https://doi.org/10.1080/00856400208723504
11.  Rita Manchanda, “Militarised Hindu Nationalism and the Mass Media: Shaping a Hindutva Public Discourse,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38, no. 3, (2002): 303-304, https://doi.org/10.1080/00856400208723504 See The Hindu, “Godhra train burning case accused held after 19 years,” The Hindu, February 17, 2021,  https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/godhra-train-burning-case-accused-held-after-19-years/article33853611.ece
12.  Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, “Narendra Modi: The making of a majoritarian leader,” Al Jazeera, April 28, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/4/28/narendra-modi-the-making-of-a-majoritarian-leader
13.  Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, “Narendra Modi: The making of a majoritarian leader,” Al Jazeera, April 28, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/4/28/narendra-modi-the-making-of-a-majoritarian-leader
14.  Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, “Narendra Modi: The making of a majoritarian leader,” Al Jazeera, April 28, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/4/28/narendra-modi-the-making-of-a-majoritarian-leader See Annie Gowen, “Abandoned as a child bride, wife of Narendra Modi hopes he calls,” The Washington Post, January 25, 2015,  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/abandoned-as-a-child-bride-indias-first-lady-still-hopes-her-husband-will-call/2015/01/25/3509dac5-5ac1-49e3-8b44-7d92e027c9ec_story.html
15.  Satish Misra, “Understanding the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party,” Observer Research Foundation (ORF), September 21, 2018,  https://www.orfonline.org/research/44401-understanding-the-rise-of-the-bharatiya-janata-party/ See Debraj Deb, “Tripura: IPFT holds strike in tribal council areas demanding separate statehood,” The Indian Express, October 15, 2020,  https://indianexpress.com/article/north-east-india/tripura/tripura-ipft-holds-strike-in-tribal-council-areas-demanding-separate-statehood-6744895/
16.  Soutik Biswas, “How Narendra Modi has reinvented Indian politics,” BBC, May 24, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-48293048
17.  Satish Misra, “Understanding the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party,” Observer Research Foundation (ORF), September 21, 2018,  https://www.orfonline.org/research/44401-understanding-the-rise-of-the-bharatiya-janata-party/
18.  Catarina Kinnvall. “Populism, ontological insecurity and Hindutva: Modi and the masculinization of Indian politics,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32, no. 2, (2019): 283-290, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1588851
19.  Catarina Kinnvall. “Populism, ontological insecurity and Hindutva: Modi and the masculinization of Indian politics,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32, no. 2, (2019): 283-288,  https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1588851
20.  Satish Misra, “Understanding the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party,” Observer Research Foundation (ORF), September 21, 2018,  https://www.orfonline.org/research/44401-understanding-the-rise-of-the-bharatiya-janata-party/
21.  Soutik Biswas, “How Narendra Modi has reinvented Indian politics,” BBC, May 24, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-48293048
22.  Soutik Biswas, “How Narendra Modi has reinvented Indian politics,” BBC, May 24, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-48293048
23.  Rita Manchanda, “Militarised Hindu Nationalism and the Mass Media: Shaping a Hindutva Public Discourse,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38, no. 3, (2002): 306-310,  https://doi.org/10.1080/00856400208723504
24.  Catarina Kinnvall. “Populism, ontological insecurity and Hindutva: Modi and the masculinization of Indian politics,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32, no. 2, (2019): 283-288, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1588851
25.  Soutik Biswas, “How Narendra Modi has reinvented Indian politics,” BBC, May 24, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-48293048
26.  Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, “Narendra Modi: The making of a majoritarian leader,” Al Jazeera, April 28, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/4/28/narendra-modi-the-making-of-a-majoritarian-leader
27.  “Shoot the Traitors,” Human Rights Watch, April 9, 2020,  https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/04/09/shoot-traitors/discrimination-against-muslims-under-indias-new-citizenship-policy
28.  Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), 2-6.

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