LEO Wars: China’s Orbital Challenge To The US-Led Digital Order – Analysis

By Shannon Vaughn

(FPRI) — China’s growing dominance in space-based infrastructure is not just a commercial development—it is a calculated geopolitical move. With the full deployment of the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (北斗卫星导航系统), Beijing has created a viable alternative to the US Global Positioning System (GPS), and now it is aggressively expanding its reach into satellite internet services. On February 11, 2025, China launched a new batch of satellites for its planned 15,000+ satellite LEO constellation, aiming to provide global internet services and positioning, navigation, and timing data worldwide, challenging Western dominance in space-based communications.

However, this is far more than just an alternative to Western-backed services like Starlink and Viasat. China’s LEO satellite internet presents a threefold risk:

1. It enables China to replace US military GPS reliance worldwide, weakening US strategic advantages.
2. It provides a censorship-controlled internet model that authoritarian regimes can adopt, extending Beijing’s influence over global information flows.
3. It allows China to dictate international technology standards through bodies like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), creating long-term dependencies on Chinese space infrastructure.

The United States and its allies must recognize this initiative as a direct challenge to digital sovereignty, military security, and technological leadership and act accordingly.

Weakening US Strategic Advantages

China has already eliminated its military’s reliance on the US Global Positioning System by fully transitioning to its own BeiDou Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). Now, Beijing is actively marketing BeiDou to partner nations, particularly those with anti-Western alignments, as a strategic alternative to GPS. Countries such as Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and Venezuela have already begun integrating BeiDou into their military navigation systems, thereby reducing US leverage over their military operations and economic sanctions. As part of its broader geopolitical strategy, China is also incorporating BeiDou into its Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure deals, ensuring that participating nations become increasingly dependent on Chinese military navigation and surveillance capabilities. In a potential Taiwan contingency, China could leverage this dependency by selectively disabling GPS access in the region while maintaining full BeiDou functionality for its own forces, creating a significant strategic advantage.

Secure Communications for Adversaries

China’s LEO satellite network would create a formidable alternative to Western-controlled internet infrastructure. It would allow adversarial nations such as North Korea, Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela to take advantage of this system to operate beyond the reach of US surveillance and control, effectively insulating themselves from US economic restrictions and sanctions. This shift would severely limit Washington’s ability to disrupt financial transactions, intelligence sharing, and military coordination among hostile regimes.

Moreover, China could offer highly secure, encrypted military communications through its LEO network, reducing the effectiveness of US signals intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities. With a dedicated and protected communications backbone, adversarial states would be able to coordinate sensitive operations without fear of interception or disruption by US intelligence agencies. This would mark a significant transformation in global intelligence dynamics, allowing nations aligned with Beijing to develop more resilient, independent communication channels that would further weaken US influence in both military and geopolitical arenas. If widely adopted, China’s LEO network could reshape the global balance of power by enabling authoritarian regimes and hostile states to evade Western oversight with unprecedented ease.

Information Warfare and Censorship Risks

A Low Earth Orbit Chinese Firewall 

China’s LEO satellite network is not just a technological advancement; it is a direct extension of Beijing’s domestic internet control model, designed to export its censorship regime globally. Unlike Western satellite services that provide open and unrestricted access, China’s system can be engineered to filter information, suppress dissenting voices, and promote state-approved narratives. Through this system, Beijing could enforce its version of the internet worldwide, blocking foreign media, independent news sources, and social platforms such as Google, YouTube, and Twitter, effectively isolating populations from alternative viewpoints and reinforcing government-controlled narratives.

This model would be particularly appealing to authoritarian governments looking to tighten control over their populations. Authoritarian nations could adopt China’s LEO internet service to suppress internal dissent and restrict media freedom. By offering a turnkey solution for internet censorship, Beijing would empower regimes to silence opposition, disrupt political movements, and monitor online activity with far greater precision than ever before.

Furthermore, China could leverage its LEO internet as a geopolitical bargaining tool, providing discounted or even free access to allied governments while restricting, manipulating, or shutting down service in adversarial states. Countries that align with Beijing could receive full, prioritized connectivity, while those that challenge China’s policies—particularly on sensitive issues like Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea—could experience network slowdowns, disruptions, or outright denial of service.

This capability would give Beijing an unprecedented level of influence over digital access, economic activity, and political discourse in developing nations, further entrenching its control over the global information ecosystem. If widely adopted, China’s LEO network would represent a fundamental shift in the internet’s governance, moving it away from its decentralized, open foundations toward a controlled, state-monitored model that serves Beijing’s strategic interests.

The China Data Law: A Built-in Backdoor for the Chinese Communist Party

One of the most serious and far-reaching risks posed by China’s LEO satellite network is its built-in data collection and surveillance mechanisms, which are deeply embedded in Beijing’s legal and regulatory framework. Under China’s 2021 Data Security Law, all Chinese technology companies are legally obligated to provide any requested data to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), regardless of where that data is collected or stored. This law extends far beyond China’s borders, meaning that any data transmitted through China’s LEO network could be subject to surveillance, storage, and potential exploitation by the Chinese government.

Unlike traditional internet infrastructure, which relies on nationally regulated internet service providers, China’s space-based network bypasses local oversight altogether. This means that any entity—be it a government, corporation, or individual—using China’s LEO internet would have its communications exposed to CCP monitoring, creating massive security vulnerabilities for foreign users. Sensitive commercial data, government correspondence, and even classified military communications could be inadvertently routed through a system controlled by Beijing, granting China real-time access to critical global information.

Unlike Huawei’s 5G infrastructure, which Western nations have largely been able to ban or remove, China’s LEO satellite network presents a much more difficult challenge. Because LEO satellites operate in space, they cannot be easily blocked, shut down, or regulated by national governments, making it nearly impossible to prevent data interception and surveillance once a country adopts the system. If widely integrated, China’s LEO internet would become a persistent, uncontrollable intelligence asset, allowing the CCP to expand its surveillance state beyond its borders and reshape the digital security landscape in its favor.

Moreover, the Chinese LEO system would allow Beijing to track real-time location data of users worldwide, including foreign government officials, corporate executives, journalists, and political dissidents. The ability to monitor movements, map networks, and analyze communication patterns at a global scale would give China unprecedented intelligence-gathering capabilities, far surpassing traditional cyber espionage. This is not a hypothetical concern—Chinese technology has already been implicated in mass surveillance efforts, including the tracking of Uyghur populations in Xinjiang and the suppression of dissent.

China’s Long Game in Global Standards Setting

China’s long-term strategy in shaping global technology standards is a critical but often overlooked component of its broader geopolitical ambitions. Central to this strategy is Beijing’s sustained effort to position its officials within the International Telecommunication Union, the United Nations agency responsible for setting global norms in telecommunications, internet governance, and satellite communications. By securing key leadership roles and influencing decision-making processes within the ITU, China aims to ensure that future digital infrastructure, including its LEO satellite internet network, conforms to standards that favor Chinese technologies and governance models. This approach reflects a deliberate effort to dictate the technical rules underpinning global communications, effectively extending Beijing’s influence over how information flows across borders.

If China’s LEO satellite network secures alignment with ITU-approved standards, many developing nations may have no viable alternative but to adopt it, especially those with limited financial or technological capacity to build independent systems. Such alignment would enable China to promote its state-centric, tightly controlled vision of the internet, marked by censorship, surveillance, and restricted data flows. The adoption of these standards would not only lock nations into Chinese-made infrastructure but also expose them to Beijing’s data security regulations, potentially allowing China unprecedented access to sensitive communications and national security information.

This scenario poses a significant strategic risk for the United States and its allies. The world could soon face a bifurcated internet, with one ecosystem operating under democratic, open principles championed by Western nations, and the other governed by China’s authoritarian digital framework. Such a division would create deep technological dependencies on Chinese infrastructure among countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, reducing their alignment with Western norms and increasing Beijing’s leverage in geopolitical negotiations.

Furthermore, this bifurcation would complicate cross-border data exchanges, international commerce, and global cybersecurity cooperation, undermining the interoperability that has driven global digital innovation for decades. If the United States and its allies do not proactively counter China’s influence within the ITU and other standard-setting bodies, they risk ceding control over the fundamental rules that will shape the internet and satellite communications for the foreseeable future. Ultimately, China’s success in this arena would represent not just technological dominance but also a reshaping of the global order, with profound implications for digital sovereignty, economic independence, and international security.

Opportunities for the United States and Its Allies

1. Develop Competitive Western Alternatives

The most direct counter to China’s expanding LEO satellite internet ambitions is to invest heavily in Western alternatives that provide secure, reliable, and open-access satellite internet. By supporting initiatives like Starlink, Viasat, and Project Kuiper, the United States and its allies can prevent China’s network from becoming the default option in emerging markets. These Western-led projects not only offer high-speed connectivity but also come without the surveillance risks and information control concerns posed by Chinese networks.

Opportunity – The United States should accelerate funding and deployment for Starlink, Viasat, and Project Kuiper, ensuring that allies have viable, non-Chinese alternatives for satellite internet. This investment will also enhance interoperability among allied forces, strengthen data security, and promote an open internet infrastructure globally.

2. Strengthen Economic and Security Partnerships

Emerging markets are key battlegrounds in the digital infrastructure race. China’s Belt and Road Initiative has provided many developing nations with much-needed digital infrastructure, but at the cost of increased dependency on Beijing. The United States and its allies must offer attractive alternatives that not only provide reliable infrastructure but also respect digital sovereignty and open access principles.

Opportunity – The United States should expand digital infrastructure projects in developing nations by partnering with international development organizations, private sector leaders, and allied governments. Initiatives like the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment should be used to provide transparent, sustainable, and secure alternatives, preventing China from dominating emerging markets and ensuring that these regions remain aligned with democratic values and open internet principles.

3. Expand ITU and Global Standards Leadership

China’s influence over the ITU presents a long-term challenge, as control over global standards could lock nations into Chinese-centric technologies. The United States must counter this by reasserting leadership in international bodies that set technical standards for satellite communications and internet governance. By leading standards-setting processes, the United States can ensure that open, democratic principles guide the future of the global internet.

Opportunity – The United States must counter Beijing’s influence within the ITU and other standards bodies by securing leadership positions for American and allied experts. Additionally, the United States should drive consensus on standards that emphasize transparency, interoperability, and data privacy, ensuring that democratic nations control future internet governance rules and prevent a bifurcated internet dominated by Chinese norms.

Conclusion

China’s LEO satellite internet initiative is more than an ambitious infrastructure project—it is a calculated move to dominate military communications, global internet access, and technological standards. If left unchecked, this system could diminish US military superiority, extend Beijing’s censorship model, and establish Chinese technological hegemony for decades. The United States and its allies must take urgent action to counter this threat, ensuring that the future of space-based internet remains open, secure, and democratic.

• About the author: Shannon Vaughn is a Non-Resident Fellow with the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) and the General Manager of Virtru Federal, a data privacy company headquartered in Washington, DC.
• Source: This article was published by FPRI