Explained: Japan’s Defense White Paper 2024 And US ‘Extended Deterrence’

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Introduction

On 12 July 2024, Japan published The Defense of Japan 2024 White Paper. (1) This is its landmark 50th edition, with the inaugural edition published in 1970. Since 1976, the White Paper has come out every year. This year also marks the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces. The annual report was approved by the Cabinet at a meeting the same day. It is packed with tough assessments of what it says is an increasingly fraught regional security environment that includes “an aggressive China, nuclear-armed North Korea and revanchist Russia”. (2)

 The concept behind the front cover of the White Paper showed Japan working hard to forge its “sword” to avoid having to draw it as a deterrent to prevent any aggression against Japan. For the first time, Tokyo sounded a direct warning against the growing risk of a grave situation akin to Russia’s “invasion” of Ukraine occurring in East Asia. Expressing alarm over China, North Korea and Russia, the White Paper stated that a situation similar to Russia’s military operation in Ukraine may occur in the Indo-Pacific region in future, particularly in East Asia. (3)

The popular Asahi Shimbun observed in an editorial that while Japan needs a stable program and strengthens its defences to stay abreast of changes in its security environment, “excessive reliance on armed forces may prove counterproductive as this only generates unwanted tension”. (4)

The nation’s security issue was for the first time understood clearly by former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. It was he who initiated procedures to secure the country’s security both by strengthening Japan’s own capability and co-opting friendly nations to address the deteriorating situation in Japan’s neighbourhood and in the larger Indo-Pacific region. One major initiative that Abe took was to enact laws that allows Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence as dramatic overhaul of the country’s security policies by amending Article 9 of the Constitution hit major roadblock. This way the spirit of the Article 9, the peace clause, was substantially diluted even without amending Article 9. What the present Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is doing is taking forward further Abe’s initiatives by making major change in the direction of Japan’s security policy. The Kishida administration has therefore sought the understanding and cooperation of the people as it realises that these are indispensable to national defense. 

As regards China’s militarization and hard-line posture toward others, the White Paper noted that this is “a matter of serious concern for Japan as well as for the international community” and “the greatest strategic challenge”. It also took note of China’s escalating activity surrounding Taiwan, thereby heightening tensions in the Taiwan Strait. China has never reconciled to the existence of Taiwan and considers it a part of its territory and that the island must be incorporated with the mainland by peaceful means and, if necessary by the use of force. Though Beijing might be deterred from pursuing such a course as it is aware that any military intervention in Taiwan could quickly escalate into a major conflagration. In such an event, it could inevitably draw other major powers into the conflict, detrimental to China’s interests and that of others as well.

Regarding North Korea, the White Paper describes this as an imminent threat and more grave now than ever before and thus a security threat to Japan. The White Paper noted that Pyongyang is focusing on qualitatively improving its nuclear and missile capabilities.

Because of such stress to Japan’s security coming from the Ukraine war, China’s militarization and North Korea’s nuclear and missile development programs, Japan is compelled to beef up the nation’s defence capabilities, reinforce the Japan-US alliance and work closely with like-minded nations, so that deterrence will be more powerful and more effective to prevent an enemy from a possible attack on Japan.

Interestingly, the Defense Whte Paper 2024 contains a column by a researcher at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) about the power of deterrence. Another section dwells in details Japan’s “right to strike (an enemy) base”. This was earlier endorsed by amendments of three security-related documents, all of which are designed to serve as a deterrent and thereby prevent invasions. The cover of the White Paper with an image of a sword being forged is symbolic of this deterrence strategy.

Need for self-assessment and introspection

It is one thing that the White Paper highlighted issues that are matter of concern for the country and prescribed strategies to mitigate those deficiencies. But there are some loopholes in the system that could inhibit implementation of those strategies. This is because Japan’s Defense Ministry has seen some unpleasant developments in recent times reflecting insufficient governance of the organisation that could prevent result-oriented outcome. This refers to a series of scandals involving the Defense Ministry and the SDF in past months.

The White Paper appropriately therefore stressed the importance of information on security including specially designed state secrets, while also calling for “the creation of working environments in which harassment is not tolerated”. For example, on 12 July the day the White Paper was released, 218 personnel were disciplined over matters such as “power harassment” top-down bullying, improper state secret handling and fraudulently receiving allowances for deep water diving. The alleged gift-giving by staff of Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd to members of the Maritime Self Defense Staff (MSDF) also surfaced, further sullying the image of the Defense Ministry.

Japan’s Defense Ministry is also facing a personnel crunch and the ministry has seen a human resource deficiency in recent times. There are several reasons for this sad state of affairs. The number of new reserves hired is not up to the optimum level and those hired on a term-limited basis is still worse. The reason for this downward trend in the number of applicants is because of the spate of scandals which has dented the enthusiasm of the aspirants willing to join for the defence of the nation.                  

Japan-China Defense Cooperation

Despite the apprehensions of Beijing’s suspected military design, Japan has not abjured the option of not cooperating with China on defence issue. A bilateral defense hotline was inaugurated between the two defense authorities on 31 March 2023. Also the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Japan-China Defense Authorities, which included the hotline, aims to foster trust between the Japanese and Chinese authorities as well as to avoid contingencies. (5)

Also, then Defense Minister of Japan Yasukazu Hamada (replaced by current Minoru Kihara on 13 September 2023) and then Chinese State Councillor and Minister of Defense Li Shangfu visiting Singapore for the 20th IISS Asian Security Summit (Shangri La Dialogue) met on 3 June 2023 on the sidelines of the international conference. (6) Hamada expressed Japan’s serious concerns about the situation in the East China Sea, including the Senkaku Islands and the situation in the South China Sea. He also expressed Japan’s grave concerns about China and Russia continuing their joint military activities around Japan. The importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as well as North Korea’s relentless surge in ballistic missile development with greater sophistication also figured in their discussion. Besides this, the exchanges between SDF and Chinese army field officers, sponsored by a Japanese think tank which was suspended for four years, is now resumed. 

Notwithstanding the above initiatives keeping the dialogue channel open, Japan cannot afford to loosen its deterrence channel as the communications with China still remain inadequate on multiple levels. The Asahi Shimbun editorial therefore appropriately cautioned that “in order to avert an accidental clash or escalation of tensions from a misunderstanding, the Foreign Ministry and the entire Japanese government must be on board, not just the Defense Ministry and the SDF”. (7)

The Kishida administration is also committed to substantially hike Japan’s defense expenditure by breaking the self-imposed threshold of not exceeding 2 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and aiming to match the standard adopted by the NATO countries. This dramatic departure has raised the heckles in China and South Korea, both of which continue to view Japan’s rising defense posture suspiciously because of their experiences during the World War II. 

The government has planned to increase the defense budget to 43 trillion yen (about $273 billion) over the five-year period starting in fiscal 2023. But in the 6-trillion-yen ($38 billion) budget just for fiscal 2023, about 130 billion yen ($825 million) is expected to go unspent. This trend could be problematic for the government as securing an increased budget without getting the system in order could be subject to criticism as flaws in the system. The strain of securing an increased budget without getting the system in order may already be starting to show. The government could be losing people’s support for its intended plans for strengthening the defence preparedness. The Kishida government needs to introspect and revitalise the organisational culture of the country’s defense forces in order to arrest the plummeting confidence of the public regain in the defense preparedness plans.

Talks of “extended deterrence”

Because of South Korea’s vulnerability stemming from the continuous threats from the neighbouring nuclear-armed North Korea, talks are gathering steam within South Korea to revisit its nuclear option. In order to arrest this trend, the US has time and again assured Seoul of providing ‘extended deterrence’. As another East Asian ally and as reiterating assurance for protection, the US for the first time prepared to talk on bilateral security issues that would cover “extended deterrence’.

The top diplomats and defense chiefs in their high-level “two-plus-two” talks in Tokyo on 28 July 2024 involving Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa and Defense Minister Minoru Kihara and their US counterparts, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, grappled with the nuclear issue sensitive in Japan and not previously discussed in any bilateral talks. This was the first ministerial-level talks on the US extended deterrence to defend Japan. It was the first “two-plus-two” talks between the two countries in 18 months.

During the meeting, Kamikawa apprised her counterpart about the harsh security climate around Japan and therefore stressed the need to strengthen the US extended deterrence. In a related development, South Korea’s Defense Minister Shin Won-sik visited Japan at the same time to hold talks with his Japanese and US counterparts. In addition, Japan, the US, Australia and India as members of the Quad held a foreign ministerial meeting in Tokyo on 29 July 2024 in which the maritime issue because of China’s increasing footprint in South China Sea was extensively discussed. 

One needs to remember that Japan is the only country to have been attacked with nuclear weapons and the strong anti-nuclear sentiment in the country stems from that unpleasant experience. The talks therefore covered the issue of ‘extended deterrence’ as a means of US reassurance to Japan’s security. The US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink clarified that this was for the first time the issue was discussed at the ministerial level “to further strengthen U.S. extended deterrence bolstered by Japan’s defense capabilities.” 

What does the ‘extended deterrence’ mean? This means the US commitment to using its military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, to protect its ally and deter attacks. (8) South Korea already enjoys this and now Japan is likely to have the same cover. An inaugural joint document was agreed to be issued by the end of 2024. It aims to bolster deterrence by clearly articulating the US’ unwavering commitment to defending Japan amid growing nuclear threats from China, North Korea and Russia. 

Though the details are not yet released, the document is expected to provide direction on what situations Japan should face in order for the US to retaliate, including with nuclear weapons. As it transpires, more new areas of cooperation and collaboration between Japan and the US in the defence sector including industrial collaboration following Tokyo’s revision of strict defense export guidelines in March 2024 are likely in the near future. Both are also likely to partner to repair US warships and aircraft in Japan and jointly develop and produce advanced weapons. Japan is therefore likely to assume a more robust defense posture with the US cooperation to cope with the emerging security challenges emanating from China, North Korea and Russia.

Endnotes:

  1.  “The Defense of Japan, 2024”, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/wp/wp2024/pdf/DOJ2024_Digest_EN.pdf 
  2.  Jesse Johnson, “Japan’s new defense white paper delivers strongest words yet on Taiwan”, The Japan Times, 12 July 2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/07/12/japan/politics/japan-defense-white-paper/
  3.  Takahashi Kosuke, “Japan’s Defense White Paper Sounds Alarm Over China, North Korea, Russia”, The Diplomat, 12 July 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/japans-defense-white-paper-sounds-alarm-over-china-north-korea-russia/ 
  4.  “Annual defense white paper calls for increased deterrence”, The Asahi Shimbun, editorial, July 17, 2024, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/15349207 
  5.  “Establishment of the Hotline Between Japan-China Defense Authorities”, Ministry of Defense, 31 March 2023, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2023/03/dd1ddd1e633fe6b16f982cf5fd6762ec152934e7.html  
  6.  “Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting”, Ministry of Defense, 3 June 2023, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2023/06/dcd0524b778a51103cc052b755aaf6395015a132.html  
  7.  “Annual defense white paper calls for increased deterrence”, n. 3. 
  8.  Jesse Johnson, “U.S.-Japan security talks to cover ‘extended deterrence’ for first time”, The Japan Times, 23 July 2023, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/07/23/japan/politics/japan-us-two-plus-two-meeting-preview/?utm_source=pianodnu&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=72&tpcc=dnu&p 

Dr. Rajaram Panda

Dr. Rajaram Panda, Former Senior Fellow at Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, a think tank under the Ministry of Culture, Government of India, Former ICCR India Chair Professor, Reitaku University, Japan, and former Senior Fellow, IDSA, New Delhi E-mail: [email protected]

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