How India’s Navy Became Sri Lanka’s Most Reliable First Responder – OpEd
By Ashu Mann
The ties between India and Sri Lanka, shaped by proximity and years of steady engagement, gained a fresh touchpoint this week. In early February, as part of post-disaster relief, an Indian naval vessel—INS Gharial—arrived in Colombo carrying ten Bailey bridges for areas hit by Cyclone Ditwah. The shipment forms part of India’s humanitarian response and underlines the Navy’s role under Operation Sagar Bandhu in the region as a reliable first responder. In many ways, the bridges being delivered mirror the broader bridge of goodwill between the two neighbouring countries.
What began almost incidentally in the early years has since evolved into a durable form of trust-building that no communiqué or joint declaration could truly replicate; it is not dramatic or attention-seeking, but steady and quietly consequential. It rarely makes headlines unless a disaster is involved. But cumulatively, those missions have built a habit of expectation: if the situation turns bad, India will turn up.
The origins go back to the 2004 tsunami, a crisis that collapsed normal bureaucratic rhythms. India was the first external responder. More missions followed—2016’s cyclonic disruptions, the devastating floods in 2017, fuel crisis support, the 2021 oxygen shipments during COVID pressure, and the 2022–23 economic breakdown. Most of these deliveries were not dramatic; some were modest. Yet they carved out a sense that Indian assistance tends to arrive quickly and without the hedging that often accompanies high diplomacy.
In recent years, this humanitarian record has merged with a broader maritime partnership. The establishment of the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Sri Lanka—funded and technically backed by India—was not an isolated initiative but grew out of years of cooperation during crises. The recurrent use of Indian Navy Dornier aircraft for surveillance missions in Sri Lankan waters has further normalised operational cooperation. One official described it as “a pattern of comfort that was not always present in earlier decades.”
The Indian Ocean is increasingly crowded with competing naval presences, and Sri Lanka occupies a position that draws interest from many corners.
In the Indian system, too, the approach is increasingly codified. New Delhi’s SAGAR doctrine—Security and Growth for All in the Region—frames humanitarian assistance as a central tool of regional engagement. But on the ground (or at sea), the doctrine works less like a grand strategy and more like a set of habits: dispatch ships early, prioritise practical needs, minimise formalities, and allow cooperation to build through repetition.
This is why the Bailey bridges matter. They are not spectacular foreign-policy statements. They are practical solutions to immediate reconstruction problems. Yet their arrival on an Indian naval ship reinforces the idea that humanitarian cooperation is not episodic but woven into the operational routines of both countries.
The relationship will face pressures in the coming years—economic uncertainties, domestic politics on both sides, and regional competition. But the legacy of repeated, dependable crisis response creates a buffer. In diplomacy, reliability is often more valuable than rhetoric. And in the India–Sri Lanka maritime space, it is reliability that has become the most recognisable feature of the partnership.
